Lauer v. Zoning Com'n of Town of Redding

• Decision Date: 20 January 1998
• Docket Number: No. 15680,15680
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: Richard D. LAUER et al. v. ZONING COMMISSION OF the TOWN OF REDDING et al.

Page 840

716 A.2d 840

246 Conn. 251

Richard D. LAUER et al. v. ZONING COMMISSION OF the TOWN OF REDDING et al.

No. 15680.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued May 27, 1998.

Decided Jan. 20, 1998. ^*

Nancy Burton, Redding Ridge, filed a brief for appellant (named plaintiff).

Michael N. LaVelle, Bridgeport, for appellee (named defendant).

Helen L. McGonigle, Brookfield, for appellees (defendant Luciano Angeloni et al.).

Before CALLAHAN, C.J., and BORDEN, BERDON, NORCOTT and McDONALD, JJ.

NORCOTT, Associate Justice.

The certified issue in this appeal is: "Did the Appellate Court properly conclude that the trial court's judgment was untimely under General Statutes § 51-183b, ¹ and that the untimeliness was not waived?" Lauer v. Zoning Commission, 241 Conn. 902, 903, 693 A.2d 304 (1997). After this court published a written decision resolving that issue; see Lauer v. Zoning Commission, 243 Conn. 485, 705 A.2d 195 (1998); the defendants filed a joint motion to reconsider and to correct the rescript. That motion was granted and, at the same time, this court, sua sponte, expanded the order granting certification to include the issue of whether the Appellate Court correctly concluded that § 5.1.2 of the Redding zoning regulations was directory rather than mandatory. ² This court also ordered the parties to file supplemental briefs on the issue of whether § 5.1.2 is directory or mandatory and to appear for oral argument on that issue. ³

The following procedural history is relevant to the issues raised. The named plaintiff, ⁴ Richard D. Lauer, took an appeal from a decision by the named defendant, the zoning commission of the town of Redding (commission), granting a special permit to the defendant property owners, Luciano and Debra Angeloni. The trial court issued an order sustaining the appeal 119 days after the trial on the matter had been completed. Thereafter, 143 days after the completion of the trial, the trial court issued an eighteen page memorandum of decision explaining the factual and legal basis for its previous order, namely, that the court had sustained the appeal because the commission had failed to comply with the notice provisions of § 5.1.2, which the trial court concluded were mandatory rather than directory.

The defendants appealed to the Appellate Court from that decision claiming that: (1) the judgment of the trial court had been rendered beyond the 120 day period set by statute and, therefore, should be vacated; and (2) the trial court improperly had construed as mandatory § 5.1.2 of the Redding zoning regulations, which instructed the commission to submit the special permit application to certain town agencies. The Appellate Court reversed the judgment of the trial court concluding that, for purposes of § 51-183b, judgment is not rendered until a written memorandum setting forth the legal and factual bases for its ultimate conclusion is issued in accordance with Practice Book § 334A, ⁵ now Practice Book (1998 Rev.) § 6- 1, and, therefore, judgment in this case was rendered beyond the 120 day time limitation of § 51-183b. Lauer v. Zoning Commission, 44 Conn.App. 542, 545, 690 A.2d 893 (1997). Because it would arise on retrial, the Appellate Court also addressed the issue of whether the zoning regulation was mandatory rather than directory and concluded that it was directory. Id., at 546-47, 690 A.2d 893. We now consider both of those issues. ⁶

I

The facts and procedural history relevant to the timeliness issue are set forth in the decision of the Appellate Court. "The Angelonis obtained a special permit in 1989 to operate a riding academy in a residential zone in Redding. The 1989 permit allowed the owners to board a maximum of twenty-five horses at the academy. On October 23, 1991, the owners applied to the commission to amend the special permit, seeking, inter alia, to increase the number of horses from twenty-five to forty. The commission granted the special permit on January 22, 1992. The plaintiff appealed to the Superior Court from the granting of the special permit. On April 3, 1995, 119 days after the trial was completed, the trial court issued the following order: 'The administrative appeal is sustained. A memorandum will follow.' On April 10, 1995, the owners moved to set aside the order and for a mistrial, asserting that no judgment was rendered within the 120 day period set forth in General Statutes § 51-183b. The trial court did not rule on the motion, but, instead, issued its memorandum of decision 143 days after the completion of the trial." Lauer v. Zoning Commission, supra, 44 Conn.App. at 543-44, 690 A.2d 893.

"In past cases interpreting § 51-183b and its predecessors, we have held that the defect in a late judgment is that it implicates the trial court's power to continue to exercise jurisdiction over the parties before it." Waterman v. United Caribbean, Inc., 215 Conn. 688, 692, 577 A.2d 1047 (1990); Whitaker v. Cannon Mills Co., 132 Conn. 434, 438, 45 A.2d 120 (1945); Foley v. Douglas & Bro., Inc., 121 Conn. 377, 380, 185 A. 70 (1936). "A delay in decision beyond that authorized by the statute makes the decision voidable and, absent waiver, requires a new trial." Frank v. Streeter, 192 Conn. 601, 603, 472 A.2d 1281 (1984). In the present case, however, an order was issued within the mandatory 120 day period. Therefore, we must decide whether the order of the trial court satisfied the requirements of § 51-183b.

The ultimate issue is one of statutory construction. We must determine whether the order of the trial court constituted a "judgment" within the meaning of § 51-183b, or whether, as the Appellate Court concluded, a judgment is not rendered for purposes of § 51-183b unless and until the trial court explains the reasons for its ruling in accordance with Practice Book § 334A.

Our analysis is guided by well established principles of statutory construction. " 'Statutory construction is a question of law and therefore our review is plenary.' " State v. Burns, 236 Conn. 18, 22, 670 A.2d 851 (1996). We commence our analysis with settled principles of statutory construction designed to ascertain and give effect to the apparent intent of the legislature. " '[W]e look to the words of the statute itself, to the legislative history and circumstances surrounding its enactment, [and] to the legislative policy it was designed to implement....' " United Illuminating Co. v. New Haven, 240 Conn. 422, 431, 692 A.2d 742 (1997).

We begin with the language of the statute. Section 51-183b provides in relevant part that "[a]ny judge of the Superior Court ... shall render judgment not later than one hundred and twenty days from the completion date of the trial...." The language of the statute does not give any specific direction as to what the court must do to "render judgment." Because the term "render judgment" is undefined and the language of the statute does not illuminate our inquiry, it is necessary to look to other sources for its definition.

" 'If a statute ... does not sufficiently define a term, it is appropriate to look to the common understanding of the term as expressed in a dictionary.' " State v. Payne, 240 Conn. 766, 771, 695 A.2d 525 (1997). A "rendition of judgment" is "effected when [the] trial court in open court declares the decision of the law upon the matters at issue...." Black's Law Dictionary (6th Ed.1990). Furthermore, a "judgment" is the "final decision of the court resolving the dispute and determining the rights and obligations of the parties...." Id. The plaintiff argues that the order of the trial court meets these requirements because the decree resolved the dispute and determined the appeal in his favor. We agree.

Our conclusion is further supported by the legislative purpose of § 51-183b. Section 51-183b was amended "in order to reduce delay and its attendant costs, [and] imposes time limits on the power of a trial judge to render judgment in a civil case. The origin of the section may be traced to chapter 3 of the Public Acts of 1879. Spelke v. Shaw, 117 Conn. 639, 643, 169 A. 787 (1933)." Waterman v. United Caribbean, Inc., supra, 215 Conn. at 691, 577 A.2d 1047. The 1981 amendment to § 51-183b shortened the time period allowed for judges to render judgment from eight months to 120 days from the completion of the trial. See Public Acts 1981, No. 81-52.

The general purpose of § 51-183b, therefore, is to reduce delay in the trial courts. This purpose would be frustrated by the requirement that a memorandum of decision be issued within 120 days after completion of trial, a requirement beyond those enumerated by the rules of practice. Moreover, it would appear to be unnecessary. First, a memorandum of decision is most helpful when a case is appealed, and many cases are never appealed. Second, the demand for a memorandum of decision in all cases where judgment is rendered, beyond what is required by the rules of practice, would further tax the already overburdened trial courts. A trial judge would feel compelled to deliver a memorandum of decision in all cases, even those cases in which an elaborate explanation is not warranted because of the simplicity of the issues, or for other reasons, which could delay other memoranda that truly need to be written. Third, the threat of overloading the docket with new trials because the trial court had lost jurisdiction over the parties when a judgment had been rendered, but when a memorandum of decision had not been issued, would also frustrate the utility of the statute. The purpose of the statute, therefore, would be hampered by the Appellate Court's decision.

Although we recognize the concern of the Appellate Court, that appellate rights might be compromised, we note that there are provisions in the appellate procedure section of the rules of practice that ameliorate this concern. For example, an appellant may file a motion for an extension of time to appeal pursuant to Practice Book § 4040, ⁷...