Laughlin v. City of Atlanta, A03A2572.
Decision Date | 07 January 2004 |
Docket Number | No. A03A2572.,A03A2572. |
Citation | 265 Ga. App. 61,592 S.E.2d 874 |
Parties | LAUGHLIN v. CITY OF ATLANTA. |
Court | Georgia Court of Appeals |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Benjamin H. Terry, Peachtree City, for appellant.
Jo Avery, Kimberly M. Patrick, Serena L. Sparks, Shelitha R. Robertson, Atlanta, for appellee.
We granted Kennith Laughlin's application for discretionary appeal to consider whether the Superior Court of Fulton County erred in dismissing, for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, Laughlin's petition for writ of certiorari. See OCGA § 5-4-1(a).1 For the reasons which follow, we affirm.
The record reveals the following undisputed facts. Laughlin worked as a City of Atlanta police officer for 28 years. In 2001, Laughlin applied for workers' compensation benefits in connection with a back injury. After a hearing, the Board of Workers' Compensation determined that Laughlin sustained an aggravation of a pre-existing condition and that the aggravation arose out of and in the course of Laughlin's employment. The Board awarded him temporary total disability benefits. The city did not appeal the award.
Laughlin then applied for so-called "IOJ" (injured on the job) benefits. See Code of Ordinances of the City of Atlanta, Georgia, Section 114-424. That ordinance, titled "Disability leave," provides that, subject to certain conditions, "[a]ny [city] employee who is covered by the state workers' compensation act and who suffers an on-the-job injury which is compensable under ... the state workers' compensation act, may receive full salary in lieu of workers' compensation during the period of disability" for a period of up to six months. Laughlin argued the department was bound by the Workers' Compensation Board's finding that his disability resulted from an injury on the job. In a letter dated October 8, 2002, the chief of police (through the city's law department) disagreed and stated his position that Laughlin was not entitled to IOJ benefits. In response to Laughlin's persistent demands, the police chief responded that the October 8, 2002 letter was his final decision on the matter.
Laughlin submitted an appeal to the city's Civil Service Board. The commissioner of the city's Department of Personnel and Human Resources, through the director of the Bureau of Labor Relations, denied Laughlin's request for a hearing (and effectively dismissed his appeal to the Civil Service Board), stating that the Ordinance Code did not authorize appeals to the Board for such a matter. See Code of Ordinances, Section 114-546.2 Laughlin does not challenge this ruling.
In his petition for writ of certiorari to the superior court, Laughlin identified the October 8, 2002 letter as containing the "error[ ] committed by any inferior judicatory or any person exercising judicial powers" warranting relief on certiorari. OCGA § 5-4-1(a). After a hearing, the trial court granted the city's motion to dismiss, finding the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the action because there was no judicial or quasi-judicial action below. In this appeal, Laughlin contests the trial court's characterization of the proceedings. The city contends, on the other hand, that the decision memorialized in the October 8, 2002 letter was a discretionary exercise of executive power and, therefore, was not appealable under OCGA § 5-4-1.
(Citations, punctuation and emphasis omitted.) Mack II v. City of Atlanta, 227 Ga. App. 305, 307(1), 489 S.E.2d 357 (1997). We owe no deference to a trial court's ruling on questions of law and review such issues de novo under the "plain legal error" standard of review. Brooks-Powers v. MARTA, 260 Ga.App. 390, n. 1, 579 S.E.2d 802 (2003); Suarez v. Halbert, 246 Ga.App. 822, 824(1), 543 S.E.2d 733 (2000).
The record is devoid of any evidence an applicant for IOJ benefits has a right under the law to demand a hearing in accordance with judicial procedure. Section 114-424 itself does not address whether an employee who applies for IOJ benefits is entitled to notice and an opportunity to present evidence and be...
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