Laughlin v. Perry

Decision Date30 June 2020
Docket NumberNo. SC 98012,SC 98012
Citation604 S.W.3d 621
Parties Dwight LAUGHLIN, Respondent, v. Dewayne PERRY and Ellen Flottman, Appellants.
CourtMissouri Supreme Court

Perry and Flottman were represented by Solicitor General D. John Sauer, Deputy Solicitor General Zachary M. Bluestone and Michael E. Pritchett of the attorney general's office in Jefferson City, (573) 751-3321.

Laughlin was represented by William J. Fleischaker of Fleischaker & Williams in Joplin, (417) 623-2865.

George W. Draper III, Chief Justice

Public defenders Dewayne Perry (hereinafter, "Perry") and Ellen Flottman (hereinafter "Flottman") appeal the circuit court's judgment affirming a jury's verdict in favor of Dwight Laughlin (hereinafter, "Laughlin") on his legal malpractice claim. Perry and Flottman argue the circuit court erred in overruling their motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict ("JNOV") because they had official immunity from being sued for legal malpractice and because Laughlin failed to make a submissible case. This Court holds public defenders are entitled to official immunity from suit. Because this point is dispositive, this Court does not reach Perry and Flottman's other claim of error. The circuit court's judgment is reversed, and the case is remanded.1

Factual and Procedural History2

In 1933, the United States acquired land in Neosho, Missouri, on which to build a United States post office, and the State of Missouri ceded jurisdiction over the land to the federal government.3 The United States Constitution provides, if a state cedes jurisdiction over federal property within the state, the United States has exclusive jurisdiction to hear cases involving offenses committed on that federal property, depriving that state's courts of the authority to enforce state law on federal property. U.S. Const. art. I, sec. 8, cl. 17.

In 1993, Laughlin burglarized the Neosho post office and caused property damage. The federal government declined to prosecute Laughlin, but state charges were filed. Perry and another public defender, Mark White (hereinafter, "White"), were assigned to represent Laughlin at his trial. Neither public defender challenged jurisdiction although Laughlin thought the state "did not have the right to prosecute" him. Perry spoke with the prosecuting attorney about the issue. Perry, White, and the prosecuting attorney all believed concurrent jurisdiction to prosecute Laughlin existed, and none of them could recall an instance in which the federal government had exclusive jurisdiction in a similar criminal case. After a jury trial, Laughlin was found guilty and sentenced to thirty years’ imprisonment on the burglary count and ten years’ imprisonment on the property damage count, to be served consecutively.

Laughlin appealed. While his direct appeal was pending, Laughlin's appointed appellate public defender, James Martin (hereinafter, "Martin"), filed a Rule 29.15 post-conviction motion, alleging "the trial court did not have jurisdiction to try [his] case since it was a federal offense thereby preempting state court jurisdiction." The motion court denied his claim because "[n]o evidence was adduced showing the offense was not a state offense or that the federal government had pre-empted jurisdiction."

The court of appeals consolidated Laughlin's direct appeal and his post-conviction appeal. Flottman represented Laughlin in this proceeding. Laughlin sent Flottman a letter stating, "My charges were originally federal because the building was a post office" and cited cases he alleged demonstrated "due process flaws." However, Flottman could not glean that Laughlin was conveying his desire to assert a jurisdictional challenge. She believed there was concurrent jurisdiction and did not believe jurisdiction was a "good issue." Neither appeal challenged the circuit court's jurisdiction to try his case. Both judgments were affirmed. State v. Laughlin , 900 S.W.2d 662 (Mo. App. S.D. 1995).

While incarcerated and after the appeals were final, Laughlin discovered the deed to the post office and the federal and state provisions conferring exclusive federal jurisdiction in his criminal case. Laughlin began filing pro se motions to secure his release that were denied routinely until 2009. In November 2009, Laughlin petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus to determine whether his criminal convictions were void because the circuit court lacked jurisdiction over the subject matter. The state argued whether jurisdiction was proper was litigated years ago, Laughlin was bound by the circuit court's judgment, and relief was barred due to his failure to raise the matter on appeal. After the circuit court and court of appeals denied Laughlin relief, this Court issued a writ of habeas corpus, holding Missouri did not have jurisdiction over offenses occurring in the Neosho post office; therefore, the circuit court lacked jurisdiction to prosecute Laughlin for burglary or property damage. State ex rel. Laughlin v. Bowersox , 318 S.W.3d 695, 703 (Mo. banc 2010). Laughlin was discharged from custody.

In August 2011, Laughlin sued Perry, White, Martin, and Flottman, alleging legal malpractice and breach of fiduciary obligation for their failure to assert the jurisdictional challenge during their representation of him at trial, on appeal, and in his post-conviction proceedings.4 All defendants raised official immunity as an affirmative defense, contending official immunity applied to them because they were being sued for the performance of their official duties as state agents, officers, or employees while performing functions requiring a broad degree of discretion.

Laughlin submitted the legal malpractice claims at trial. Laughlin presented testimony from an expert who opined the defendants breached the standard of care by failing to pursue the jurisdictional challenge, which the expert characterized as "obvious." The jury returned its verdict in Laughlin's favor against Perry and Flottman and in Martin's favor against Laughlin. Perry and Flottman filed a JNOV motion alleging they were shielded from liability due to official immunity. The circuit court overruled their motion, and they now appeal.

Standard of Review

"The standard of review for the denial of a judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV) is essentially the same as review of the denial of a motion for directed verdict." Spalding v. Stewart Title Guar. Co. , 463 S.W.3d 770, 778 (Mo. banc 2015) (quoting All Am. Painting, LLC v. Fin. Sols. & Assocs., Inc. , 315 S.W.3d 719, 723 (Mo. banc 2010) ). When reviewing the overruling of a JNOV motion, "[t]his Court must determine whether the plaintiff presented a submissible case by offering evidence to support every element necessary for liability." Barron v. Abbott Labs., Inc. , 529 S.W.3d 795, 799 (Mo. banc 2017) (quoting Fleshner v. Pepose Vision Inst., P.C. , 304 S.W.3d 81, 95 (Mo. banc 2010) ). This Court reviews the evidence in the light most favorable to the jury's verdict. W. Blue Print Co., LLC v. Roberts , 367 S.W.3d 7, 12 (Mo. banc 2012).

Official Immunity

Perry and Flottman argue the circuit court erred in overruling their motion for JNOV because they have official immunity from Laughlin's legal malpractice claim. Perry and Flottman maintain that, as public defenders, they are public employees employed by the state of Missouri and were acting within the scope of their authority as public defenders when choosing which strategies and defenses to pursue in Laughlin's case. Perry and Flottman contend foregoing the jurisdictional challenge was a discretionary decision entitling them to official immunity.

This Court thoroughly explained the official immunity doctrine in State ex rel. Alsup v. Kanatzar , 588 S.W.3d 187 (Mo. banc 2019). Alsup noted this Court has long held official immunity "protects a public official from liability if that official acts within the course of his [or her] official duties and without malice." Id. at 190 ; see also Southers v. City of Farmington , 263 S.W.3d 603, 610 (Mo. banc 2008) (stating official immunity protected "public employees" in the same manner). "Courts and legal commentators have long agreed that society's compelling interest in vigorous and effective administration of public affairs requires that the law protect those individuals who, in the face of imperfect information and limited resources, must daily exercise their best judgment in conducting the public's business." Kanagawa v. State ex rel. Freeman , 685 S.W.2d 831, 836 (Mo. banc 1985). "Courts applying the doctrine of official immunity must be cautious not to construe it ‘too narrowly lest they frustrate the need for relieving public servants of the threat of burdensome litigation.’ " Alsup , 588 S.W.3d at 191 (quoting Kanagawa , 685 S.W.2d at 836 ).

Public Defenders Are Public Employees

The question of whether official immunity applies to public defenders is an issue of first impression for this Court.5 A public defender's duty to represent indigent individuals is mandated by both the United States and Missouri constitutions, caselaw, and prescribed by Missouri statute. The Sixth Amendment provides, "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence." "Because this right is ‘fundamental and essential to a fair trial,’ the constitutional guarantee of counsel is ‘protected against state invasion by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.’ " State ex rel. Mo. Pub. Def. Comm'n v. Waters , 370 S.W.3d 592, 605 (Mo. banc 2012) (quoting Gideon v. Wainwright , 372 U.S. 335, 341, 83 S. Ct. 792, 9 L.Ed.2d 799 (1963) ). The Missouri Constitution provides, "in criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear and defend, in person and by counsel." Mo. Const. art. I, sec. 18(a).

"To fulfill Gideon ’s promise that ‘every defendant stands equal before the law,’ the Missouri General Assembly has enacted an elaborate public...

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