State Ex Rel. Dwight Laughlin v. Bowersox

• Decision Date: 26 August 2010
• Docket Number: No. SC 90542.,SC 90542.
• Citation: 318 S.W.3d 695
• Parties: STATE ex rel. Dwight LAUGHLIN, Petitioner,v.Michael BOWERSOX, Respondent.
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

318 S.W.3d 695

STATE ex rel. Dwight LAUGHLIN, Petitioner,v.Michael BOWERSOX, Respondent.

No. SC 90542.

Supreme Court of Missouri En Banc.

Aug. 23, 2010.

Rehearing Denied Aug. 26, 2010.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Ginger Gooch, Husch Blackwell Sanders LLP, Springfield, for Petitioner.

Andrew W. Hassell, Attorney General's Office, Jefferson City, for Respondent.

MICHAEL A. WOLFF, Judge.

Introduction

Dwight Laughlin was convicted and sentenced to prison in 1993 by the Newton County circuit court for burglary and property damage crimes occurring in the United States post office in Neosho. Under the United States Constitution, if a state cedes jurisdiction over federal property in the state, the United States has exclusive jurisdiction to hear cases involving offenses committed on that federal property.

When the United States acquired the land to build the Neosho post office, the state of Missouri by statute ceded jurisdiction over the land to the federal government. Article I, section 8, clause 17 of the United States Constitution deprives Missouri's courts of the authority to enforce state laws on this federal property.

Following his conviction, Laughlin filed a Rule 29.15 post-conviction motion, alleging that the circuit court lacked jurisdiction over him. He argued that his crimes occurring in the Neosho post office were within the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States. His claim was denied, and his counsel at the time did not raise the claim on appeal. More than fifteen years later, Laughlin pro se, petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus. This Court issued a writ of habeas corpus to determine whether the criminal conviction was void because the state court lacked jurisdiction of the subject matter. ¹

The state asserts that the issue of jurisdiction was litigated years ago and that Laughlin is bound by the judgment and by his failure to raise the matter on appeal. In a criminal case in which the court lacked the authority to try the defendant, the defendant's failure to appeal the issue in the earlier proceeding cannot confer subject matter jurisdiction on a court whose jurisdiction was void from the beginning.

Laughlin is ordered discharged.

Facts and Procedural History

Dwight Laughlin is currently serving an aggregate 40-year sentence for his 1993 convictions for first-degree burglary and first-degree property damage. As to the burglary count, the prosecutor charged that Laughlin “knowingly entered unlawfully in a building, located at 101 E. Hickory, Neosho, Missouri and owned by the United States Postal Service....” As to the property damage count, the prosecutor charged that Laughlin “knowingly damaged a safe, which property was owned by the United States Postal Service....” Laughlin also was charged as a prior and persistent offender. A jury found Laughlin guilty of the charged crimes, and Laughlin was sentenced to the department of corrections for 30 years on the burglary count and 10 years on the property damage count, with the sentences to be served consecutively.

Laughlin appealed his conviction, and while that appeal was pending, he filed a motion to vacate the judgment pursuant to Rule 29.15. In his Rule 29.15 motion, Laughlin raised the issue of lack of jurisdiction, arguing that “the trial court did not have jurisdiction to try [his] case since it was a federal offense thereby preempting state court jurisdiction.” The Newton County circuit court denied this claim because “[n]o evidence was adduced showing the offense was not a state offense or that the federal government had pre-empted jurisdiction.” Laughlin then appealed the overruling of his Rule 29.15 motion. The court of appeals consolidated Laughlin's original appeal and the appeal of his Rule 29.15 motion, addressing each appeal separately. See State v. Laughlin, 900 S.W.2d 662, 664 (Mo.App.1995). On appeal of the Rule 29.15 motion, the sole point raised was that Laughlin received ineffective assistance of counsel. His appeal did not raise the issue of jurisdiction, and the court of appeals affirmed the order denying post-conviction relief. Id. at 668.

Laughlin filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus challenging the circuit court's jurisdiction in November 2009. After Laughlin sought relief in the circuit court and in the court of appeals, this Court granted a writ of habeas corpus in March 2010.

The Circuit Court's Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction

Subject matter jurisdiction is the authority of a court to hear and decide a case. Missouri circuit courts have subject matter jurisdiction over criminal cases under article V, section 14 of the Missouri Constitution. J.C.W. ex rel. Webb v. Wyciskalla, 275 S.W.3d 249, 253 n. 6 (2009). But no state, including Missouri, can grant subject matter jurisdiction to its courts to hear matters that federal law places under the “exclusive” jurisdiction of the federal courts. Id.

The United States purchased the Neosho post office in 1933 and continuously has owned it since then. Under Article I, section 8, clause 17 of the United States Constitution, the United States gains exclusive authority over the land if that jurisdiction is ceded by the state; this provision grants to the federal government:

To exercise exclusive Legislation [i.e., jurisdiction] in all Cases whatsoever, over such District (not exceeding ten Miles square) as may, by Cession of particular States, and the Acceptance of Congress, become the Seat of the Government of the United States, and to exercise like Authority over all Places purchased by the Consent of the Legislature of the State in which the Same shall be, for the Erection of Forts, Magazines, Arsenals, dock-Yards, and other needful Buildings.

By enacting section 12.010, RSMo 2000,² the state of Missouri consented to the federal government's purchase of the land to establish and maintain a post office in Neosho.

Section 12.020, RSMo 2000, ³ granted and ceded jurisdiction over that land to the United States, reserving to the state the right to serve process but not to prosecute crimes committed on the property.

Missouri does not have jurisdiction over land or a building that is under the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States. As James Madison explained in The Federalist No. 43, Article I, section 8, clause 17, in addition to providing for purchase of land for the “seat of government,” also explicitly provided for other land to be purchased for federal purposes for “needful buildings” and that the state in which the land was located had to agree by cession of the land. The necessity for federal jurisdiction of such land and buildings, Madison said, “is not less evident” than the need for federal control of the seat of government. “The public money expended on such places, and the public property deposited in them, require that they should be exempt from the authority of the particular State,” he said. The federal-state, or federalist, principle is preserved by the need for the state's agreement. “All objections and scruples are here also obviated by requiring the concurrence of the States concerned in every such establishment.” The Federalist No. 43 (James Madison).

Article I, section 8, clause 17 has since been interpreted by state and federal courts in the manner envisioned by Madison. The United States Supreme Court has noted that a state must cede jurisdiction to the United States for the state no longer to have jurisdiction; it is not enough for the United States simply to purchase land within the state. “The consent of the states to the purchase of lands within them for the special purposes named, is, however, essential, under the constitution, to the transfer to the general government, with the title, of political jurisdiction and dominion,” the Court said in Fort Leavenworth R.R. Co. v. Lowe, 114 U.S. 525, 531, 5 S.Ct. 995, 29 L.Ed. 264 (1885). “ Where lands are acquired without such consent, the possession of the United States, unless political jurisdiction be ceded to them in some other way, is simply that of an ordinary proprietor.” Id. (emphasis added).

The United States Supreme Court has held a state's cession of jurisdiction does not have to be absolute. See, e.g. Surplus Trading Co. v. Cook, 281 U.S. 647, 652, 50 S.Ct. 455, 74 L.Ed. 1091 (1930) (“[T]he state undoubtedly may cede her jurisdiction to the United States and may make the cession either absolute or qualified as to her may appear desirable, provided the qualification is consistent with the purposes for which the reservation is maintained and is accepted by the United States. And, where such a cession is made and accepted, it will be determinative of the jurisdiction of both the United States and the state within the reservation.”).

“When the United States acquires title to lands, which are purchased by the consent of the legislature within which they are situated the Federal jurisdiction is exclusive of all State authority.” United States v. Unzeuta, 281 U.S. 138, 143, 50 S.Ct. 284, 74 L.Ed. 761 (1930) (emphasis added). “[T]he state may impose conditions which are not inconsistent with the carrying out of the purpose of the acquisition.” Id. Under section 12.020, “the state retained only the right to serve civil and criminal processes within the land.” United States v. Heard, 270 F.Supp. 198, 200 (W.D.Mo.1967). The United States, therefore, has exclusive jurisdiction for all crimes occurring on the Neosho post office's land. ⁴See 21 Am.Jur.2d section 445 Offenses committed within state on land owned by federal government (citing state as well as federal cases, e.g., State v. Mack, 23 Nev. 359, 47 P. 763 (Nev.1897) (holding that the state had no jurisdiction to prosecute crimes where the United States had exclusive jurisdiction); People v. Mouse, 203 Cal. 782, 265 P. 944 (Ca.1928) (same)).

The Federalist No. 43 and these cases make it clear that the state of Missouri could have chosen not to cede criminal jurisdiction to the United States. If the state had not done so, the state of...