Laureano v. Christensen

• Decision Date: 28 June 1971
• Citation: 95 Cal.Rptr. 872,18 Cal.App.3d 515
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: Edward L. LAUREANO and Lydia Laureano, Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. George J. CHRISTENSEN, Defendant and Respondent. Civ. 28479.

Page 872

95 Cal.Rptr. 872

18 Cal.App.3d 515

Edward L. LAUREANO and Lydia Laureano, Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. George J. CHRISTENSEN, Defendant and Respondent.

Civ. 28479.

Court of Appeal, First District, Division 4, California.

June 28, 1971.

Samuel P. McGeachy, Oakland, for plaintiffs-appellants.

Nagle, Vale, McDowall & Cotter, San Mateo, for defendant-respondent.

ELKINGTON, Associate Justice. ^*

Plaintiffs, Edward L. Laureano and Lydia Laureano, appeal from a summary judgment in favor of defendant, George J. Christensen. ¹ Defendant was found not to be the owner of a certain motor vehicle under the owner's liability statute, Vehicle Code section 17150 (hereafter all statutory references herein will be to that code).

The owner's liability statute on which plaintiffs rely, Vehicle Code section 17150 (formerly section 402) provides:

'Every owner of a motor vehicle is liable and responsible for death or injury to person or property resulting from a negligent or wrongful act or omission in the operation of the motor vehicle, in the business of the owner or otherwise, by any person using or operating the same with the permission, express or implied, of the owner.'

Vehicle Code sections 4000 and 4150 provide that all motor vehicles and their ownership must be registered with the Department of Motor Vehicles.

Vehicle Code section 4450 provides that upon such registration the department shall issue a 'certificate of ownership' to the owner of the motor vehicle.

A declaration of defendant Christensen filed in support of his motion for summary judgment alleged the following. He had been the owner of a 1961 Thunderbird automobile. In March of 1967 he traded the vehicle to Turner Motors in San Bruno, California, in exchange for a new automobile, delivering to the dealer 'the keys, the vehicle, the pink slip (certificate of ownership) and the white slip, and divesting himself fully of possession thereof or right to control said vehicle.' On April 9, 1967, a 'dealer's notice of sale (of the Thunderbird) showing sale by Turner Motors to Benjamin Mendoza was mailed to the Department of Motor Vehicles.' On the next day, April 10th, while being driven by Benjamin Mendoza (a codefendant in the action below), the Thunderbird was involved in an accident allegedly resulting in injuries to the plaintiffs Laureano.

A reply declaration of the plaintiffs established that the dealer's notice of sale, allegedly mailed by Turner Motors from San Bruno, California on April 9, 1967, was received by the Department of Motor Vehicles in Sacramento on April 19, 1967, and, that although Christensen had signed the pink certificate of ownership, neither he, nor anyone, had Dated it. ²

The trial court in granting summary judgment concluded that as to defendant Christensen there was no triable issue that he was the Thunderbird's 'owner' on April 10, 1967, the day of the accident, within the meaning of that term as used in section 17150. Plaintiffs Laureano contended the contrary, thus posing the issue for our determination here. Their appeal rests upon the effect of the failure of defendant Christensen to Date the Thunderbird's ownership certificate at the time he signed and delivered it to Turner Motors.

'Owner' as the term is used in section 17150 was defined in the case of Borjesson v. Simpson, 177 Cal.App.2d 365, 368, 2 Cal.Rptr. 366, 367. There the court stated:

'The liability of the owner as established by the Vehicle Code, § 402 (the substantially similar predecessor of section 17150), is purely statutory. 'Ownership' as contemplated by the section, is not determined by the same rules of law as is the ownership of the ordinary chattel. Rather, ownership liability is determined by the registration record and certain transfer procedures prescribed by the Vehicle Code. These sections provide an owner who sells or transfers his vehicle and delivers possession at the time of sale a means of protecting himself from the liability imposed by section 402.' (See also Stoddart v. Peirce, 53 Cal.2d 105, 115, 346 P.2d 774; Singleton v. Perry, 45 Cal.2d 489, 493, 289 P.2d 794.)

As relevant here the 'certain transfer procedures prescribed by the Vehicle Code' which according to Borjesson v. Simpson, Supra, determine motor vehicle ownership are sections 5751, 5753, 5600, and 5602.

Vehicle Code section 5751 ³ provides that on a transfer of title the transferor 'shall Write his signature and address * * * in the appropriate spaces provided on the certificate of ownership' (emphasis added).

The closely adjacent section 5753 enlarges on the transferor's duties. It provides:

'It is unlawful for any person to fail or neglect properly to endorse, date, and deliver the certificate of ownership and, when having possession, to deliver the registration card to a transferee who is lawfully entitled to a transfer of registration. * * *' (Emphasis added.)

Vehicle Code section 5600 ⁴ provides that Title to a motor vehicle passes: (a) when the transferor has made 'proper endorsement and delivery of the certificate of ownership and delivery of the registration card To the transferee as provided in this code' (emphasis added), and the transferee has delivered or mailed the papers to the Motor Vehicle Department, or; (b) the transferor has delivered or mailed the appropriate transfer documents to the department. (The latter alternative (b) concededly was here uncomplied with by defendant.)

Section 5602 ⁵ prescribes the methods by which an owner who has made a bona fide sale of a motor vehicle may be Released of civil liability arising out of the subsequent operation of the vehicle by another. It provides that further civil liability of the seller ends: (a) 'When he has made Proper endorsement and delivery of the certificate of ownership and delivered the certificate of registration As provided in this code' ⁶ (emphasis added), or; (b) when he has mailed or delivered to the department the notice of sale required by section 5900 ⁷ or other appropriate transfer of ownership registration documents.

Strict compliance with Vehicle Code section 5602 is required to enable a transfering owner to escape the liability imposed by section 17150 on account of an accident occurring before notice of the transfer is received by the Motor Vehicle Department. (Stoddart v. Peirce, Supra, 53 Cal.2d 105, 115, 346 P.2d 774; Uber v. Ohio Casualty Ins. Co., 247 Cal.App.2d 611, 616, 55 Cal.Rptr. 720.)

The issue before us narrows to the question whether the signing (but not dating) and delivery by defendant Christensen of the Thunderbird's ownership certificate was compliance with the statutory demand (Veh.Code, § 5602(a)) that he make 'proper endorsement and delivery of the certificate of ownership * * * as provided' in the Vehicle Code.

We have concluded that defendant's failure to date the ownership certificate amounted to noncompliance with section 5602(a). He did not make 'proper endorsement and delivery' thereof As provided by the Vehicle Code, and the summary judgment must be reversed. The reasons for our conclusion follow.

We are confronted with several sections of the Vehicle Code, each differing somewhat in content, but all dealing with the transfer of ownership of a motor vehicle by a writing on its certificate of ownership. Section 5751 requires the transferor to Write thereon his signature and address; section 5753 mandates him to endorse And date; and sections 5600 and 5602 provide respectively that title passes and the transferor's liability ends when he has made Proper endorsement on, and has delivered, the certificate.

In our interpretation of these related sections we are aided by well-known rules of statutory construction. The several provisions are to be regarded as blending into each other and as constituting a single statute (Pesce v. Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control, 51 Cal.2d 310, 312, 333 P.2d 15; In re Porterfield, 28 Cal.2d 91, 100, 168 P.2d 706.) Significance must be credited and given to each of the sections (People v. Western Air Lines, Inc., 42 Cal.2d 621, 638, 268 P.2d 723), and if possible each must be harmonized with the others and given effect (People v. Trieber, 28 Cal.2d 657, 661, 171 P.2d 1). We are bound to maintain the integrity of each of the sections if they may reasonably stand together (Warne v. Harkness, 60 Cal.2d 579, 588, 35 Cal.Rptr. 601, 387 P.2d 377).

Applying these standards by harmonizing and giving effect to each of the statutory provisions in question, one must conclude that for a motor vehicle transferor to make 'proper endorsement' of the ownership certificate--thus passing title and avoiding future liability (§§ 5600, 5602)--he must not only 'write' his signature thereon (§ 5751), but he must also 'date' the writing (§ 5753). Any lesser requirement would unnecessarily and unreasonably ignore one or more of the several statutory commands.

Further, it is fundamental that we must give effect to the legislative intent in adopting the motor vehicle registration laws. (People v. Superior Court, 70 Cal.2d 123, 132--133, 74 Cal.Rptr. 294, 449 P.2d 230.) A principal purpose of those statutes is to afford ready information to those injured or otherwise damaged by automobiles, concerning the persons liable under the owner's liability statute, section 17150. (See Stoddart v. Peirce, Supra, 53 Cal.2d 105, 117, 346 P.2d 774; Helton v. Stewart, 198 Cal.App.2d 114, 120, 17 Cal.Rptr. 524; Meza v. Ralph, 195 Cal.App.2d 453, 456, 15 Cal.Rptr. 754; Gorham v. Taylor, 176 Cal.App.2d 600, 604, 1 Cal.Rptr. 546.) It has variously been said: that the purpose of the statutes is to afford a more certain indicia of ownership than mere possession for the protection of the public with respect to accidents, violations of law, and fraud upon innocent purchasers (Cooke v. Tsipouroglou, 59 Cal.2d 660, 666, 31 Cal.Rptr. 60, 381 P.2d 940); that they 'were enacted in the interest of the public welfare' (Henry v. General Forming, Ltd.,...