Singleton v. Perry

• Decision Date: 08 November 1955
• Citation: 289 P.2d 794,45 Cal.2d 489
• Court: California Supreme Court
• Parties: Eula Mae SINGLETON, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Manuel Smith PERRY as Administrator with the Will Annexed of the Estate of S. W. Corlett, Deceased, Defendant and Appellant. S. F. 19288.

Page 794

289 P.2d 794

45 Cal.2d 489

Eula Mae SINGLETON, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Manuel Smith PERRY as Administrator with the Will Annexed of the Estate of S. W. Corlett, Deceased, Defendant and Appellant.

S. F. 19288.

Supreme Court of California, In Bank.

Nov. 8, 1955.

Rehearing Denied Dec. 8, 1955.

Theodore M. Monell and William Klein, San Francisco, for appellant.

Pierre J. Ibos and James A. Himmel, San Francisco, for respondent.

SCHAUER, Justice.

Defendant S. W. Corlett ¹ appeals from a judgment pursuant to a jury verdict against him in the amount of $25,000 in an action for malicious prosecution and for false imprisonment. Plaintiff brought two such actions, the present action, which is based upon defendant's charge that plaintiff stole a Cadillac automobile, and a second action, which is based upon defendant's charge that plaintiff stole rings, luggage, and other personal property. ² As a result of the two charges plaintiff underwent a single arrest, imprisonment, and a preliminary hearing which resulted in dismissal of the charges. The two civil actions were tried together. Verdict and judgment in the second action were for defendant and no appeal was taken.

The principal issue is whether, in view of the fact that the arrest and detention for the claimed theft of the automobile, on which the present action is based, were simultaneous with the arrest and detention which the jury in the second action found justified, plaintiff has shown in the present action that she was damaged in any measurable amount, or at all. Defendant also contends: the evidence does not support the verdict for plaintiff in that it establishes that the Cadillac belonged to defendant; the verdict in the second action (in which no appeal was taken) is inconsistent with the verdict in this action; the trial court erred to defendant's prejudice by instructing the jury that plaintiff sued for a total of $400,000 when in fact the total amount for which plaintiff prayed was only $200,000. We have concluded that each of these issues must be resolved against defendant.

The Evidence

Defendant Corlett and plaintiff were not married but lived together as husband and wife in San Francisco from 1947 until the quarrel in 1952 which led to this action. Defendant supported plaintiff and gave her many presents. Among these was a Buick automobile. Plaintiff traded this car in as part payment on a Cadillac automobile. Defendant was angry about plaintiff's purchase of the Cadillac. Because of his anger plaintiff went to Los Angeles in the Cadillac. While plaintiff was in Los Angeles defendant paid the balance due on the Cadillac and had the 'pink slip' of legal ownership issued in his name; plaintiff remained the registered owner. Defendant told plaintiff, 'I paid the car off for you' and 'I paid the car note off so you don't owe anything on the car.' Defendant persuaded plaintiff to return to San Francisco and they continued to live together but they frequently quarreled.

While defendant was ill and hospitalized they had an argument. Plaintiff took the Cadillac, luggage (which she testified did not belong to her), rings and other articles of personal property (which are the subject of conflicting testimony as to whether they had been given to plaintiff by defendant), and went to Cleveland, Ohio. Defendant reported the matter to his attorney, then to a police inspector, then to a deputy district attorney. Defendant swore to two complaints against plaintiff, one charging theft of the car (Veh.Code, § 503) and one charging grand theft of other articles of personal property. Defendant gave the police various addresses to which he thought plaintiff might have gone. The police found her in Cleveland. She was jailed there for nearly a month, returned to San Francisco in custody of a police matron, and jailed in San Francisco for about a week. As previously stated, after preliminary hearing both criminal cases were terminated in favor of plaintiff (defendant in the criminal cases) by dismissal. On the issue of damages, plaintiff testified to her mental and physical suffering, humiliation, damage to her reputation among 'friends that looked on me as decent and respectable,' and her difficulties in obtaining employment.

Defendant recognizes the familiar rule that where the evidence is in conflict the appellate court will not disturb the verdict of the jury, but asserts that 'in view of the peculiarity of the particular situation existing in the case at bar, appellant urges that the record undisputedly shows that he was the owner of the Cadillac and, therefore, entitled to pursue the same in the hands of plaintiff and hence that his procedure in having her arrested constitutes neither false arrest nor can the ensuing criminal proceedings constitute malicious prosecution, even though she was acquitted at the hearing.'

Defendant's words as to 'paying the car off' for plaintiff, followed by plaintiff's possession of the car, could be construed as an executed gift of all defendant's interest in the automobile, in the absence of the special statutory rules as to transfer of legal title to automobiles. But 'Old rules respecting transfer of personal property give way to those set forth in the Vehicle Code. (Citation.)' (Pike v. Rhinehart (1952), 112 Cal.App.2d 530, 532, 246 P.2d 963.) The transaction as to the Cadillac took place, as previously stated, in 1952. Applicable sections of the Vehicle Code as amended in 1951 are quoted in the margin. ³ Because of those sections no transfer of legal ownership to plaintiff was effected. The parties themselves, however, on the view of plaintiff's evidence which the jury impliedly accepted, could have believed that defendant had given plaintiff the right to use the automobile as she desired and therefore he had no right to use criminal process to obtain its possession.

As stated, plaintiff's action is both for false imprisonment and for malicious prosecution. As the court says in Neves v. Costa (1907), 5 Cal.App. 111, 117-118, 89 P. 860, "False imprisonment is the unlawful violation of the personal liberty of another' (Pen.Code, sec. 236), the interference with the personal liberty of the plaintiff in a way which is absolutely unlawful and without authority. Malicious prosecution is procuring the arrest or prosecution of another under lawful process, but from malicious motives and without probable cause.

'The provocation, motive and good faith of the defendant in an action for false imprisonment constitute no material element in the case and can be considered only where punitive or exemplary damages are asked, and then only as affecting the measure of such damages. On the other hand, malice and want of probable cause are the gist of the action for malicious prosecution. Without allegation and proof of both, the action will fail. (Citation.)

'No one can recover damages for a legal arrest and conviction; therefore, in cases of malicious prosecution it becomes necessary to await the final determination of the action. But the same principle does not apply to an action for false imprisonment, as the form of action is based upon an illegal arrest and no matter ex post facto can legalize an act which was illegal at the time it was done. From this it will be seen that one of the essential elements of a complaint for malicious prosecution is that the proceeding upon which it is based has finally terminated in favor of the plaintiff, while it is equally apparent that this is not a necessary or proper allegation in an action for false imprisonment. (Citations.)' (Accord, Barrier v. Alexander (1950), 100 Cal.App.2d 497, 499, 224 P.2d 436; Collins v. Owens (1947), 77 Cal.App.2d 713, 715-716, 176 P.2d 372.)

It is to be assumed, in view of the instructions given, that the verdict is based upon the tort of malicious prosecution, rather than the tort of false imprisonment. Concerning false imprisonment the jury were told only that it is defined by the Penal Code (§ 236) and is 'the unlawful violation of the person and liberty of another,' and that 'the interference of the personal liberty of Eula Mae Singleton was upon a complaint made and a warrant issued by a duly constituted legal authority.' There was no instruction as to damages recoverable for the tort of false imprisonment.

On the other hand, the jury were instructed at some length concerning the tort of malicious prosecution, particularly the elements of probable cause and malice and defendant's claim that he acted on the honestly requested advice of counsel after a full and fair presentation of the facts. And they were correctly told (see Wong v. Earle C. Anthony, Inc. (1926), 199 Cal. 15, 18, 247 P. 894) that damages for such tort 'may include loss of time and liberty, injury to reputation, if any, mental suffering, as well as for bodily harm, if any.'

In this state of the instructions it is to be assumed, as indicated, that the jury followed the charge as to malicious prosecution and found the existence of facts which constitute that tort.

Asserted Inconsistency of the Verdicts in Plaintiff's Two Actions

The verdicts of the jury in the two civil actions do not appear to be necessarily and as a matter of law inconsistent. As previously stated, the jury could have concluded that defendant gave plaintiff the right to use the Cadillac automobile as she saw fit and therefore had no proper ground of complaint when she took it. The jury could have believed that defendant's motives in pressing the charge with reference to the automobile were improper. Thus, it could have determined that the elements of a cause of action for malicious prosecution were shown (see Jaffe v. Stone (1941), 18 Cal.2d 146, 149, 114 P.2d 335, 135 A.L.R. 775): a judicial proceeding terminated in plaintiff's favor; the existence of facts which show lack of probable cause; and malice. On the other hand, the jury could have believed that defendant acted without malice and with probable...