Lauterbach v. Lauterbach
| Docket Number | 13-21-00174-CV |
| Decision Date | 02 June 2022 |
| Parties | PAUL DOUGLAS LAUTERBACH, Appellant, v. CHRISTINE ANN LAUTERBACH, Appellee. |
| Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
On appeal from the 267th District Court of Calhoun County Texas.
Before Chief Justice Contreras and Justices Benavides and Tijerina
Appellant Paul Douglas Lauterbach appeals from the trial court's entry of a final judgment in his divorce from appellee Christine Ann Lauterbach. By five issues, Paul argues that the trial court erred by: (1-3) improperly dividing Paul's retirement accounts (4) awarding Christine attorney's fees; and (5) denying Paul's motion for new trial. We affirm as modified in part and reverse and remand in part.
In February 2020, after nearly twenty-three years of marriage, Paul filed for divorce from Christine, and Christine filed a counter-petition.[1] Both parties expected to enter into a written agreement concerning the division of their marital estate. Paul filed an "inventory and appraisement of all assets and liabilities." Christine did not.
Before the trial court held a final divorce hearing in November 2020, the parties agreed to a proposed division of marital property, which they labeled and referred to as Exhibit A. At the November hearing, Christine testified that Exhibit A represented a fair and just division of the parties' community estate. Most relevant to this appeal, Christine acknowledged and agreed to: (1) a 50/50 split of the funds in Paul's Merrill Lynch IRA retirement plan after $90, 000 had been credited to Paul as his separate property; (2) a 50/50 split of the funds in Paul's Merrill Edge retirement plan; and (3) a 50/50 split of the funds in Paul's JP Morgan Smart Retirement plan. Paul initially expressed disagreement with how Exhibit A treats the division of certain real property but ultimately requested the division of property be approved as dictated in Exhibit A. The court admitted Exhibit A into evidence, asked the parties to draft an agreed final divorce decree based on the evidence, and stated that it wanted both attorneys and both parties to sign the decree. The trial court concluded the hearing by noting that when the parties "get [the divorce decree] signed, I will sign it, but as of now both of you are divorced."
Christine's attorney drafted the final divorce decree. Unlike Exhibit A, which listed the division of retirement funds by the plan names and in dollar terms, the divorce decree further divided the Merrill Lynch IRA and Merrill Edge plans by various associated account numbers and listed the division of all accounts in terms of percentages. Four account numbers are associated with the Merrill Lynch IRA plan, and one account number is associated with the Merrill Edge plan. The JP Morgan plan remains listed without an associated account number but is named in the divorce decree as the "Tokai Carbon 401(k) plan."[2]
In a March 3, 2021 letter to the trial court, before the divorce decree was signed, Paul's attorney suggested certain edits to the proposed decree, including that it should specifically state the dollar amount of each of the six retirement account numbers and "specific language as to the date the funds [in the accounts] will be locked." As it stood then, Paul was unaware whether the retirement funds, which "fluctuate[] with the market," would be split as of the date of the November 2020 hearing-when the trial court stated "as of now both of you are divorced"-or the date the divorce decree would ultimately be signed by the trial court.
Christine and Christine's attorney, but neither Paul nor his attorney, signed the divorce decree without Paul's suggested edits. Nonetheless, on March 8, 2021, the trial court signed the "agreed final decree of divorce." On April 7, 2021, Paul filed a motion for new trial, asserting the "evidence [was] legally and factually insufficient to support ourt's judgment as to the division of [the retirement] accounts," and largely echoing the concerns he raised in his attorney's March 3 letter.
The trial court held a hearing on Paul's motion for new trial on May 4, 2021. Following the hearing, the court denied Paul's motion for new trial and clarified that "all dates as it relates to monies will be as of the date of the divorce decree." Christine's attorney requested nearly $2, 000 in attorney's fees allegedly incurred by Christine "post prove-up," but she did not present any evidence regarding the fees. The trial court granted the request for attorney's fees. Appellant then filed his notice of appeal.[3]
By his first three issues, Paul argues the trial court erred by improperly dividing his and Christine's marital estate. Specifically, Paul claims the trial court failed: (1) to "divide the parties' community property in conformity with the evidence and the parties' agreement"; (2) to "specifically segregate Paul's separate property and confirm it as separate property"; and (3) to "divide the estate of the parties in a manner that is just and right."
In a divorce decree, the trial court must order a division of the marital estate "in a manner that the court deems just and right, having due regard for the rights of each party."
Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 7.001; see Pearson v. Fillingim, 332 S.W.3d 361, 362 (Tex. 2011) (per curiam). This "just and right" standard is the sole method the court utilizes to account for and divide community property upon divorce. Schlueter v. Schlueter, 975 S.W.2d 584, 588 (Tex. 1998). "Such a standard may at times lead to a disproportionate division of assets and liabilities of the parties, depending on the circumstances that courts may consider in refusing to divide the marital estate equally." Id. Thus, the property division need not be equal, but there must be some reasonable basis for an unequal division of the property. Murff v. Murff, 615 S.W.2d 696, 698-99 (Tex. 1981) (); O'Carolan v. Hopper, 414 S.W.3d 288, 311 (Tex. App.-Austin 2013, no pet.).
We review the trial court's division of the community estate upon divorce for an abuse of discretion. Bradshaw v. Bradshaw, 555 S.W.3d 539, 543 (Tex. 2018) (citing Murff, 615 S.W.2d at 698). A trial court has wide discretion in making a just and right division, and we presume the trial court properly exercised its discretion. Banker v. Banker, 517 S.W.3d 863, 869 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi-Edinburg 2017, pet. denied) (citing Handley v. Handley, 122 S.W.3d 904, 907 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi-Edinburg 2003, no pet.)). Appellant bears the burden to show from the record that the division was so disproportionate, and thus unfair, that it constitutes an abuse of discretion. Id. at 870 (citing O'Carolan, 414 S.W.3d at 311); Handley, 122 S.W.3d at 907 ().
In an abuse of discretion analysis, legal and factual sufficiency are not independent grounds of error, but rather relevant factors in assessing whether the trial court abused its discretion. Banker, 517 S.W.3d at 869 (citing Handley, 122 S.W.3d at 904). "There is generally no abuse of discretion on grounds of insufficiency if some probative evidence supports the trial court's findings." Id.; see Handley, 122 S.W.3d at 907. When a party agrees to a proposed division of property that the trial court deems just and right, its complaints on appeal that the same suggested division of property was an abuse of discretion should not be heard. Coggin v. Coggin, 738 S.W.2d 375, 378 (Tex. App.- Corpus Christi-Edinburg 1987, no writ); Weaks v. Weaks, 471 S.W.2d 454, 456 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1971, writ dism'd).
In a divorce, a trial court will divide community property among the parties, but it cannot divest either spouse of his or her separate property. See Pearson, 332 S.W.3d at 363-64; Eggemeyer v. Eggemeyer, 554 S.W.2d 137, 140-41 (Tex. 1977). "If the trial court mischaracterizes a spouse's separate property as community property and awards some of the property to the other spouse, then the trial court abuses its discretion and reversibly errs." Kelly v. Kelly, 634 S.W.3d 335, 348 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2021, no pet.) (quoting Sharma v. Routh, 302 S.W.3d 355, 360 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2009, no pet.)).
Pursuant to Rule 11, no agreement between the parties is enforceable "unless it be in writing, signed and filed with the papers as part of the record, or unless it be made in open court and entered of record." Tex.R.Civ.P. 11. When parties have reached a property division agreement, a final judgment based on that agreement must be in "strict or literal compliance with that agreement." Vickrey v. Am. Youth Camps, Inc., 532 S.W.2d 292, 292 (Tex. 1976). The trial court cannot supply, modify, or omit material terms to the agreement. Chisholm v. Chisholm, 209 S.W.3d 96, 98 (Tex.2006). In essence, the trial court must act in a ministerial capacity in signing and entering the agreement. Nuno v. Pulido, 946 S.W.2d 448, 451 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi-Edinburg 1997, no writ).
When a final judgment based on a property division agreement is not in strict compliance with the terms of the agreement recited on the record, the judgment must be set aside. Chisholm, 209 S.W.3d at 98. But "when the record reflects a clerical variance between a judgment announced in open court and the judgment eventually signed by the trial judge, the appellate court can modify the judgment to correct the mistake." McLendon v. McLendon 847 S.W.2d 601, 610 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1992, writ denied); see Tex. R....
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