Lawrence M., In re

• Decision Date: 02 August 1996
• Docket Number: No. 78678,78678
• Citation: 172 Ill.2d 523,219 Ill.Dec. 32,670 N.E.2d 710
• Parties: , 219 Ill.Dec. 32 In re LAWRENCE M. et al., Minors (The Department of Children and Family Services et al., Appellants).
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Page 710

670 N.E.2d 710

172 Ill.2d 523, 219 Ill.Dec. 32

In re LAWRENCE M. et al., Minors (The Department of Children and Family Services et al., Appellants).

No. 78678.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Aug. 2, 1996.

Rehearing Denied Sept. 30, 1996.

James E. Ryan, Attorney General, Springfield (Barbara A. Preiner, Solicitor General, and Susan Frederick Rhodes, Assistant Attorney General, Chicago, of counsel), for appellant Illinois Department of Children & Family Services.

Patrick T. Murphy and Margot Gordon, of the Office of the Cook County Public Guardian, Chicago, for minors-appellees Lawrence M. et al.

Rita A. Fry, Public Defender, Chicago (Robert C. Drizin, Assistant Public Defender, of counsel), for parents-appellees.

Diane Redleaf and Stacey Platt, Chicago, for amici curiae Illinois Action for Children et al.

Justice HARRISON delivered the opinion of the court:

In these consolidated interlocutory appeals, we are asked to decide whether the circuit court has the authority under section 2-10 of the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (705 ILCS 405/2-10(2) (West 1994)) to enter orders requiring the Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) to provide and pay for inpatient drug treatment services for mothers whose children were removed from their custody due to their mothers' drug-related neglect of them. On nine separate occasions in 1993 and 1994, DCFS appealed from the entry of such orders by the circuit court of Cook County, juvenile division (hereinafter juvenile court). The appellate court consolidated the appeals, and affirmed the juvenile court orders in all but two instances. ¹ 269 Ill.App.3d 253, 206 Ill.Dec. 817, 645 N.E.2d 1069.

We allowed DCFS's petition for leave to appeal. 155 Ill.2d R. 315. Separate appellees' briefs were filed by the office of the Cook County public guardian, on behalf of the minor children, and by the Cook County public defender, on behalf of the minors' parents. "Appellees," as used in this opinion, refers, interchangeably, to the minor children or to their parents. We granted leave to the Austin Christian Law Center; the Children and Family Justice Center of the Northwestern University School of Law; and Illinois Action for Children, the Legal Assistance Foundation of Chicago, and Joyce M. to file amicus curiae briefs in support of appellees. 155 Ill.2d R. 345.

Initially we note that, in an interlocutory appeal, the scope of review is normally limited to an examination of whether or not the trial court abused its discretion in granting or refusing the requested interlocutory relief. See Dixon Ass'n for Retarded Citizens v. Thompson, 91 Ill.2d 518, 524, 64 Ill.Dec. 565, 440 N.E.2d 117 (1982); Kellerman v. MCI Telecommunications Corp., 134 Ill.App.3d 71, 73, 89 Ill.Dec. 51, 479 N.E.2d 1057 (1985), aff'd, 112 Ill.2d 428, 98 Ill.Dec. 24, 493 N.E.2d 1045 (1986). However, where the question presented is one of law, a reviewing court determines it independently of the trial court's judgment. Best Coin-Op, Inc. v. Old Willow Falls Condominium Ass'n, 120 Ill.App.3d 830, 76 Ill.Dec. 344, 458 N.E.2d 998 (1983). Moreover, to the extent necessary, a reviewing court may consider substantive issues in order to determine whether the trial court acted within its authority. See Wilson v. Wilson, 217 Ill.App.3d 844, 859, 160 Ill.Dec. 752, 577 N.E.2d 1323 (1991). In the instant case, DCFS asserts that the juvenile court acted outside its authority in directing DCFS to pay for drug treatment services to the parents of minors before the court because such orders are barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity, violate the doctrine of separation of powers, and are not authorized by the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (705 ILCS 405/1-1 et seq. (West 1994)). Therefore, to the extent necessary to resolve these substantive issues, we are not limited to the traditional scope of review of an interlocutory appeal. See Dixon, 91 Ill.2d at 524-25, 64 Ill.Dec. 565, 440 N.E.2d 117.

We first address the question of sovereign immunity in order to determine whether the juvenile court had subject matter jurisdiction. DCFS argues that the appellate court erred in holding that the juvenile court orders did not violate the doctrine of sovereign immunity, because each juvenile court order was directed to DCFS, a State agency, to compel the expenditure of State funds. We find little merit in this challenge. While sovereign immunity dictates that the State can be sued only in the Court of Claims, the determination of whether an action is in fact a suit against the State turns upon an analysis of the issues involved and the relief sought, rather than the formal designation of the parties. Currie v. Lao, 148 Ill.2d 151, 157-58, 170 Ill.Dec. 297, 592 N.E.2d 977 (1992); Healy v. Vaupel, 133 Ill.2d 295, 308, 140 Ill.Dec. 368, 549 N.E.2d 1240 (1990).

In the present case, the juvenile court sought to compel DCFS, through Gary T. Morgan, its guardianship administrator and the appointed temporary custodian of each of the minors, or Carlton Williams, another DCFS administrator, to fulfill duties it believed were mandated by the Juvenile Court Act. A suit against state officials which seeks to compel them to perform their duty is not held to be a suit against the State even though the duty to be performed arises under a certain statute, and the payment of state funds may be compelled. See In re V.H., 197 Ill.App.3d 52, 58, 143 Ill.Dec. 751, 554 N.E.2d 686 (1990); Franks v. Tucker, 132 Ill.App.3d 455, 461, 87 Ill.Dec. 323, 476 N.E.2d 1315 (1985). Therefore, the appellate court did not err in finding that the juvenile court orders at issue here were not barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity, where the orders essentially directed DCFS administrators to provide mandated services. 269 Ill.App.3d at 256-57, 206 Ill.Dec. 817, 645 N.E.2d 1069.

DCFS also contends that the juvenile court orders violated the doctrine of separation of powers because the juvenile court usurped the authority of DCFS to determine the proper services to be provided for the families involved herein. The separation of powers clause provides: "The legislative, executive and judicial branches are separate. No branch shall exercise powers properly belonging to another." Ill. Const.1970, art. II, § 1. However, the doctrine of separation of powers was not designed to achieve a complete divorce among the three branches of government, nor does it require governmental powers to be divided into rigid, mutually exclusive compartments. In re J.J., 142 Ill.2d 1, 7, 153 Ill.Dec. 239, 566 N.E.2d 1345 (1991). There are instances in which the separate spheres of governmental authority overlap (In re J.J., 142 Ill.2d at 7, 153 Ill.Dec. 239, 566 N.E.2d 1345), and this is an excellent example of one of them.

The legislature has designated DCFS as the state agency authorized to provide social services to children and their families which are directed toward, inter alia, "preventing or remedying, or assisting in the solution of problems which may result in, the neglect, abuse, exploitation or delinquency of children." 20 ILCS 505/1, 5(a)(3)(B) (West 1994). However, the legislature has also authorized the juvenile court, in dealing with a minor it has probable cause to believe is abused, neglected or dependent, to enter orders for the "provision of services to the minor or his family to ameliorate the causes contributing to the finding of probable cause." 705 ILCS 405/2-10(2) (West 1994). Therefore, the "evil" of the court's usurping the executive discretion of DCFS in providing child welfare services is absent in abuse and neglect proceedings, where both DCFS and the court share the duty of protecting the child's best interest and the goal of preserving families whenever possible. See In re J.J., 142 Ill.2d at 8-9, 153 Ill.Dec. 239, 566 N.E.2d 1345; see also 325 ILCS 5/2; 20 ILCS 505/5(a)(3)(C), (a)(3)(D); 705 ILCS 405/2-10(2), (9)(d) (West 1994). Indeed, section 8.4 of the Abused and Neglected Child Reporting Act (325 ILCS 5/8.4 (West 1994)) requires that DCFS "provide or arrange for and monitor * * * rehabilitative services for children and their families on a voluntary basis or under a final or intermediate order of the Court." (Emphasis added.) Thus, where it is clear that the legislature contemplated interplay between DCFS and the juvenile court in deciding the appropriate social services for neglected and abused children and their families, the juvenile court orders involved herein did not violate the doctrine of separation of powers.

Having disposed of these preliminary matters, the central issue presented for our resolution remains: whether the juvenile court, pursuant to the Juvenile Court Act, may order DCFS to provide and pay for in-patient drug treatment services for mothers whose children are removed from their custody due to the mothers' drug-related neglect of them. DCFS argues that the juvenile court has no authority to exercise a power not specifically granted to it by the Juvenile Court Act, and that because there is no statutory authority requiring that DCFS provide and pay for drug treatment services for the parents of minors, the juvenile court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to enter the orders in question. However, circuit court jurisdiction is conferred solely by the constitution, except in the limited area of administrative review. See Ill. Const.1970, art. VI, § 9; In re M.M., 156 Ill.2d 53, 65, 189 Ill.Dec. 1, 619 N.E.2d 702 (1993). Therefore, contrary to DCFS's assertion, circuit courts no longer seek statutory justification for the exercise of jurisdiction. See In re M.M., 156 Ill.2d at 75, 189 Ill.Dec. 1, 619 N.E.2d 702 (Miller, C.J., concurring). Further, while it is true that the constitutional source of a circuit court's jurisdiction does not carry with it a license to act in ways inconsistent with controlling statutory law (see In re M.M., 156 Ill.2d at 75, 189 Ill.Dec. 1, 619 N.E.2d 702 (Miller, C.J., concurring)),...