Lawrence v. Ladd

• Decision Date: 25 October 1977
• Citation: 280 Or. 181,570 P.2d 638
• Parties: Maxine F. LAWRENCE, Respondent, v. Priscilla LADD, as personal representative of the estate of John Henry Cline, Appellant.
• Court: Oregon Supreme Court

Page 638

570 P.2d 638

280 Or. 181

Maxine F. LAWRENCE, Respondent, v. Priscilla LADD, as personal representative of the estate of John Henry Cline, Appellant.

Supreme Court of Oregon, Department 2.

Argued and Submitted Sept. 14, 1977.

Decided Oct. 25, 1977.

Michael R. Genna, Cottage Grove, argued the cause for appellant. With him on the briefs was Maynard Wilson, Cottage Grove.

Herb Lombard, of Sahlstrom & Lombard, Eugene, argued the cause and filed a brief for respondent.

Before DENECKE, C. J., TONGUE and BRYSON, JJ., and GILLETTE, J. Pro Tem.

TONGUE, Justice.

This is an action against a decedent's estate by a woman who lived with him for 14 years without the benefit of matrimony. In her complaint she seeks recovery both for breach of an alleged oral agreement to make a will and also for breach of an implied contract to pay her for the reasonable value of her services. The case was tried to a jury, which returned a verdict in her favor in the sum of $36,190.12. Defendant appeals from the resulting judgment.

The controlling issue to be decided in this case is whether there was sufficient evidence to support the verdict of the jury "other than the testimony of the claimant," so as to satisfy the requirements of ORS 115.195, which provides as follows:

"A claim that has been disallowed by the personal representative may not be allowed by any court except upon some competent, satisfactory evidence other than the testimony of the claimant."

We recognize, as contended by plaintiff, that in such a case, as an action at law, the sole function of this court is to determine whether there is any substantial evidence in the record to support the findings by the jury and that in doing so we must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. ¹ Nevertheless, in such an action the question remains, by reason of ORS 115.195, whether plaintiff has sustained the burden to establish her claim by "some competent, satisfactory evidence other than the testimony of the claimant." ²

Summary of the evidence.

(a) Plaintiff's testimony.

Plaintiff testified that she met the decedent, John Cline, in 1960 after her former husband had died in 1958, leaving her with two small children and some income from his Social Security and Veterans benefits. When she started "going with plaintiff" she was employed at a hotel and lived with her children in a house that she had rented. At that time he owned a logging truck and hauled logs for various lumber companies. He also then owned a car and a ranch.

In 1961 Mr. Cline moved into the house rented by the plaintiff. Beginning at that time plaintiff paid for the rent, groceries, clothing, dental and doctor bills with her own funds. She did not, however, pay any bills "related to what John was doing." After about two years he bought some property and a trailer house. They lived there for a time and then moved to another rented house.

Plaintiff testified that when Mr. Cline bought that property he wanted to put it in her name, but she "didn't want that" because of "Social Security." He also wanted to get married, but she didn't want to "on account of (her) income." During those years, however, her children lived with them and called him "Dad" and he would introduce her as "Mrs. Cline," although she "still maintained (her) name as Lawrence."

In about 1972 Mr. Cline became sick. He later learned that he had cancer and that he was going to die soon. According to plaintiff, they then had "a discussion" about the "giving of (his) property" to her and that he "wanted to get married because he wanted me to have everything." Plaintiff also testified that at or about that time he told her that he wanted to "leave my property to you"; that she "said then that (she) didn't want it," but that from then on there was "a growing understanding" that "he wanted (her) to have everything"; that he "told (her) that several times," and that "he wanted (her) to have it rather than his relatives."

Mr. Cline died on October 23, 1975. Plaintiff testified that when he "came from the doctor" the day before he died they talked again about getting married; that they then made plans to go to Washington to get married and also talked about going to an attorney to make a will, but that he died before he could do so.

Plaintiff also testified that during the years that she lived with Mr. Cline from 1961 to 1975 she received a total of $67,741.57 in Social Security and Veterans benefits and used all of that money for "family purposes"; that the reasonable value of the services performed by her during that period for the "family" was $200 per month; that "during the time that (she) was with Mr. Cline * * * (she) had some expectation that (she) was going to be compensated"; that this was her "understanding and agreement with him"; and that she felt that she had "earned the money" claimed in her complaint in the sum of $36,190.

(b) Testimony of other witnesses.

One witness, Irving Hamilton, testified that in August 1976, about two months before decedent's death, he talked with Mr. Cline about buying "a piece of ground" across the road for his trailer house and that "he said 'No,' he wouldn't sell it because he wanted her to have the land instead of the money," and that "if something happened to him she'd have a place to live."

A second witness, William Adams, who had known Mr. Cline as a "log truck driver" testified that in a conversation with the decedent shortly before his death "he started to cry * * * and said that he was dying" and that Mr. Cline said, "(M)e and Max (the plaintiff) is going down in the morning to make a will out."

Plaintiff's two children testified that they referred to decedent as "Dad" and heard him refer to plaintiff as "Mrs. Cline"; that plaintiff received an income from Social Security and Veterans benefits from their deceased father; that they never received any of that money and that "as far as (they) knew" it was used for family bills.

Plaintiff also offered documentary evidence of the amount of Social Security and Veterans benefits received by her, totaling $67,741.57. In addition, plaintiff offered in evidence the appraisal of decedent's estate in the sum of $36,190, including several motor vehicles and other items of personal property, a tract of real property (including a trailer house) appraised at $12,500, and a contract for the sale of another tract of real property appraised at $6,588.06.

Plaintiff failed to sustain her claim against decedent's estate by "competent, satisfactory evidence other than that of the claimant."

(a) The alleged oral contract to make a will.

Plaintiff contends that a contract to make a will "need not be executed with the formalities required for testamentary dispositions"; ³ that such a contract may be enforced either at law or in equity, including an action for damages for its breach; ⁴ that plaintiff's claim under such a contract "is similar to any other contract claim and is proven by 'the usual course of evidence' "; ⁵ that the corroboration required by ORS 115.195 for claims against an estate by "some competent, satisfactory evidence other than the testimony of the claimant" may be provided by "any competent, satisfactory evidence to support the findings made by the triers of the fact," ⁶ including the use of circumstantial evidence; ⁷ that the "high evidentiary standard" required in suits in equity for specific performance of such an agreement does not apply in an action at law for damages; ⁸ that evidence which "shows that the claimant performed according to the agreement, if believed, is sufficient to corroborate the existence of an express agreement"; ⁹ and that testimony of the plaintiff as to the existence of the contract and testimony of another witness that she intended to perform is sufficient to satisfy the requirement for independent corroborating evidence for an action at law. ¹⁰

Plaintiff calls attention to her testimony that four years before decedent's death, when he knew that he was ill, decedent stated that plaintiff was to have his property upon his death and that he wanted to leave his property to her; that on the day before he died decedent repeated that promise. Plaintiff then contends that "when corroborated this testimony is sufficient to support the existence of an express agreement if it is believed by the jury."

Finally, plaintiff contends that the corroboration required by ORS 115.195 was provided by the testimony of her son and daughter to the effect that plaintiff "performed her part of the agreement by supporting and caring for decedent in reliance that he would perform his part of the bargain and leave his property to her at his death" and that such an agreement was also corroborated by the testimony of Irving Hamilton of decedent's refusal to sell some of his property because "if something happened to him she'd (plaintiff) have a place to live" and "he'd rather she (plaintiff) had that than the money" and by the testimony of William Adams that shortly before decedent's death he said that "me and Max (the plaintiff) is going down in the morning to make a will out."

After reviewing the cases and authorities cited by plaintiff, as well as other previous decisions by this court construing and applying the provision of what is now ORS 115.195, we conclude that plaintiff's contentions cannot be reconciled with the requirements of that statute, as construed in such cases. ¹¹

As early as in Harding v. Grim, 25 Or. 506, 36 P. 634 (1894), this court, in construing an earlier statute with identical language (Section 1134, Hill's Code) said (at 508, 36 P. at 634):

" * * * The effect of this statute is that, while the claimant is a competent witness in an action against an executor or administrator upon a claim or demand against the estate of the deceased, he cannot prevail in the action unless he proves his case by some competent or satisfactory evidence other than the testimony of himself. His...