Lawrence v. Michigan Dept. of Corrections

• Decision Date: 16 January 1979
• Docket Number: Docket No. 78-326
• Citation: 276 N.W.2d 554,88 Mich.App. 167
• Parties: James LAWRENCE, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. MICHIGAN DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US

Page 554

276 N.W.2d 554

88 Mich.App. 167

James LAWRENCE, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. MICHIGAN DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, Defendant-Appellant.

Docket No. 78-326.

Court of Appeals of Michigan.

Jan. 16, 1979.

Released for Publication March 29, 1979.

Frank J. Kelley, Atty. Gen., Robert A. Derengoski, Sol. Gen., Thomas L. Casey, Asst. Atty. Gen., for defendant-appellant.

James Lawrence, in pro per.

Before WALSH, P. J., and T. M. BURNS and D. E. HOLBROOK, Jr., JJ.

WALSH, Presiding Judge.

Defendant Department of Corrections appeals by leave granted from the order of the Ingham County Circuit Court denying the defense motion for accelerated judgment. The court ruled, Inter alia, that a prison misconduct hearing is a "contested case" within the meaning of Michigan's Administrative Procedures Act, M.C.L. § 24.201 Et seq.; M.S.A. § 3.560(101) Et seq. Defendant's appeal is limited to the issue presented in this portion of the trial judge's ruling. We affirm.

Plaintiff James Lawrence was an inmate at the State Prison of Southern Michigan at Jackson. On August 3, 1976, a misconduct report was filed against him. It was alleged that he had violated the prison rule against possession of marijuana. After an August 6, 1976, hearing, plaintiff was found guilty and was sentenced to detention for five days, transferred from medium to close security and from the Trusty Division of the prison to close custody. A recommendation that his good time be reviewed was made to the warden. Notice of the misconduct determination was placed in files available to the parole board and other Department of Corrections officials. Plaintiff appealed and the decision of the disciplinary committee was upheld by the warden on August 11, 1976. Plaintiff filed a complaint in circuit court seeking judicial review under the Administrative Procedures Act, M.C.L. § 24.301; M.S.A. § 3.560(201). Defendant moved for accelerated judgment asserting that the APA did not apply to prison misconduct proceedings. The trial judge ruled that a prison disciplinary hearing is a "contested case" and that an aggrieved inmate can seek judicial review in circuit court under the APA. ¹

Section 3(2) of the APA, M.C.L. § 24.203(2); M.S.A. § 3.560(103)(2), defines "agency" as "a state department, bureau, division, section, board, commission, trustee, authority or officer, created by the constitution, statute, or agency action". It is not disputed that the Department of Corrections is an "agency" for purposes of the APA. Human Rights Party v. Michigan Corrections Comm., 76 Mich.App. 204, 256 N.W.2d 439 (1977), Lv. den. 402 Mich. 906 (1978), Parshay v. Department of Corrections, 61 Mich.App. 677, 233 N.W.2d 139 (1975), Lundberg v. Corrections Comm., 57 Mich.App. 327, 225 N.W.2d 752 (1975). ² The APA further provides that, unless expressly exempted, all agency proceedings are governed by the act. M.C.L. § 24.313; M.S.A. § 3.560(213). A party to an agency proceeding which qualifies as a "contested case" is entitled to certain procedural safeguards, M.C.L. § 24.271 Et seq.; M.S.A. § 3.560(171) Et seq., and has the right to judicial review, M.C.L. § 24.301; M.S.A. § 3.560(201). Presented for our determination here is the question whether a prison misconduct hearing is a "contested case" as that term is defined in § 3(3) of the act, M.C.L. § 24.203(3); M.S.A. § 3.560(103)(3).

Section 3 of the APA defines "contested case" as follows:

"(3) 'Contested case' means a proceeding, including but not limited to rate-making, price fixing and licensing, in which a determination of the legal rights, duties, or privileges of a named party is required by law to be made by an agency after an opportunity for an evidentiary hearing."

Under generally recognized principles of statutory construction, when there is no necessity to reconcile conflicting statutes, Wayne County Civil Service Comm. v. Board of Supervisors, 384 Mich. 363, 184 N.W.2d 201 (1971), when there is no absence of adequate operational definitions of relevant terms, Prisoners' Labor Union v. Department of Corrections, 61 Mich.App. 328, 232 N.W.2d 699 (1975), Lv. den. 394 Mich. 843 (1975), and when the statutory language is plain and unambiguous, Jones v. Grand Ledge Public Schools, 349 Mich. 1, 9-10, 84 N.W.2d 327 (1957), judicial construction or attempted interpretation to vary the plain meaning of the statute is precluded.

The definition of a "contested case" is clear and unambiguous. The statutory provision in which we find it requires neither construction nor interpretation. Application of the plain language of the statute leads unalterably to the conclusion that a prison disciplinary hearing fits squarely within the terms of the definition. Such a hearing is certainly a proceeding in which the Department of Corrections is required to make a determination as to an inmate's legal rights, duties or privileges and there is no question that due process requires that the inmate be given an opportunity for an evidentiary hearing. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 41 L.Ed.2d 935 (1974), Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33, 70 S.Ct. 445, 94 L.Ed. 616 (1950).

We recognize that the premier rule of statutory construction is to discover and give effect to the intent of the Legislature. Spartan Asphalt Paving Co. v. Grand Ledge Mobile Home Park, 400 Mich. 184, 253 N.W.2d 646 (1977), Reh. den. 400 Mich. 1029 (1977). It may be that if the Legislature had foreseen the application of the instant statutory provision to a prison misconduct hearing, it would have carved out an exception. This possibility, however, does not authorize or justify judicial usurpation of the legislative function. Husted v. Consumers Power Co., 376 Mich. 41, 135 N.W.2d 370 (1965). The judiciary has no alternative but to apply a statute in accordance with its plain meaning unless "the absurdity and injustice of applying the provision to the case would be so monstrous that all mankind would, without hesitation, unite in rejecting the application". Sturges v. Crowninshield, 4 Wheat. (17 U.S.) 122, 203, 4 L.Ed. 529, 550 (1819), quoted in 2A Sutherland, Statutory Construction, § 46.04, p. 55. Such is not the case here. There is principled disagreement as to whether fundamental fairness requires extending to inmates involved in prison misconduct hearings the expanded procedural safeguards of the APA. ³

Because the statutory definition of a "contested case" is plain and unambiguous and because prison disciplinary hearings fall squarely within that definition, we rule that a prison disciplinary hearing is a "contested case" as that term is defined in the APA and that parties to such proceedings are entitled to the procedural safeguards set forth in Chapter 4 of the act, M.C.L. § 24.271 Et seq.; M.S.A. § 3.560(171) Et seq., and have the right to judicial review, M.C.L. § 24.301; M.S.A. § 3.560(201). ⁴

We emphasize that our ruling here is necessitated by the nature of our judicial function. We urge the Legislature, however, to consider the practical effect of the necessary application of the statute. In Wolff v. McDonnell, supra, the United States Supreme Court set forth minimal due process protections to be observed in prison disciplinary hearings. In fashioning the type of process which is constitutionally due in this context, the Court discussed at length the unique nature of the prison setting. 418 U.S. 559-572, 94 S.Ct. 2963. The procedural protections which are appropriate in a prison setting have been described as limited in scope; the need to balance procedural protection against the interests of the prison system and the public have often been observed. See E. g., Polizzi v. Sigler, 564 F.2d 792, 798 (C.A. 8, 1977).

It is not for this Court to resolve the debate over the type of process which is due Michigan inmates accused of misconduct. Barring constitutional implications, such policy determinations are left for legislative resolution.

The trial court is affirmed.

1 Procedural protections currently afforded Michigan inmates charged with misconduct are significantly less extensive than those set forth in the APA. See Michigan Department of Corrections Hearings Handbook (1977). The APA's provision for cross-examination of witnesses in a contested case, M.C.L. § 24.272; M.S.A. § 3.560(172), for example, has no counterpart in the list of rights of inmates at disciplinary hearings. In addition to lacking the right to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses, inmates have only a qualified right to present witnesses on their own behalf. Contrast with this the APA's broad recognition of this right. M.C.L. § 24.272(3); M.S.A. § 3.560(172) (3). Under the APA, an official record of evidence and documents must be kept; all proceedings must be recorded and available for transcription. M.C.L. § 24.286; M.S.A. § 3.560(186). There is no such requirement under current prison disciplinary rules.

2 Recently the Michigan Supreme Court held that the Department of Corrections was immune from local zoning ordinances. Dearden v. Detroit, 403 Mich. 257, 269 N.W.2d 139...