Lawrence v. State

• Decision Date: 31 July 2015
• Docket Number: No. S–14–0133.,S–14–0133.
• Citation: 354 P.3d 77,2015 WY 97
• Parties: Kyle Jordan LAWRENCE, Appellant (Defendant), v. The STATE of Wyoming, Appellee (Plaintiff).
• Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

354 P.3d 77

2015 WY 97

Kyle Jordan LAWRENCE, Appellant (Defendant)

v.The STATE of Wyoming, Appellee (Plaintiff).

No. S–14–0133.

Supreme Court of Wyoming.

July 31, 2015.

Representing Appellant: W. Keith Goody, Attorney at Law, Cougar, Washington.

Representing Appellee: Peter K. Michael, Attorney General; David L. Delicath, Deputy Attorney General; Jenny L. Craig, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Darrell D. Jackson, Director, A. Walker Steinhage, Student Director, and Laureen S. Rogers, Student Intern, Prosecution Assistance Program, University of Wyoming, College of Law. Argument by Ms. Rogers.

Before BURKE, C.J., and HILL, KITE, DAVIS, and FOX, JJ.

Opinion

BURKE, Chief Justice.

[¶ 1] Appellant, Kyle Jordan Lawrence, challenges his conviction for voluntary manslaughter. He contends the district court erred in excluding evidence indicating the victim was under the influence of methamphetamine at the time of the events leading to his death. We affirm.

ISSUE

[¶ 2] Appellant presents the following issue:

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it granted the State's motion in limine and excluded any reference to methamphetamine use by Klakken, the shooting victim?

The State phrases the issue in a similar manner.

FACTS

[¶ 3] On the night of July 6, 2012, Appellant, Kyle Lawrence, and his fiancée were drinking and socializing with a neighbor, Ta'Maira Michalides, in their apartment complex in Rock Springs, Wyoming. At approximately 9:30 p.m., the victim, Andrew Klakken, began shooting off fireworks in front of the apartment complex. Ms. Michalides asked the victim to stop shooting fireworks because her son was sleeping. The victim became belligerent and began shouting profanities and insults at Ms. Michalides and Appellant's fiancée. Appellant came out of his apartment on the third story of the apartment building and began exchanging profanities with the victim. After the verbal altercation escalated, Appellant retrieved a handgun from his apartment and told the victim “Come on up here, I['ve] got something for you.” At that point, Appellant's neighbor and friend, Michael Keeley, came to Appellant's apartment and urged him to put the gun away. Appellant removed the magazine from the gun and set the magazine and the gun on a table in his apartment.

[¶ 4] Appellant then returned to the balcony in front of his apartment and shot a firework in the direction of the victim. The firework struck the victim or landed near him. The victim began running up the stairs of the apartment complex toward Appellant, and Appellant told the victim not to continue because he had a loaded weapon. Appellant retrieved the gun from his apartment, returned to the doorstep, and shot at the victim three times, striking him once. The victim later died from the gunshot wound. A toxicology report conducted in conjunction with the victim's autopsy indicated that the victim was under the influence of methamphetamine at the time of his death.

[¶ 5] The State charged Appellant with first-degree murder, aggravated assault and battery, and possession of a deadly weapon with unlawful intent. The district court subsequently dismissed the charges of aggravated assault and battery and possession of a deadly weapon at the request of the State. Prior to trial, the State filed a motion in limine to exclude any evidence of the victim's methamphetamine intoxication at the time of his death, including the post-mortem toxicology report and photos of a pipe found next to the victim's body. After a hearing at the final pretrial conference, the district court granted the motion, finding that evidence of the victim's intoxication was not relevant under W.R.E. 401 because there was no evidence to indicate Appellant knew the victim was under the influence of methamphetamine.¹ The court also found the evidence was inadmissible under W.R.E. 403 because “being accused of having the characteristics of a methamphetamine user is extremely prejudicial, particularly in a county like Sweetwater, with a severe problem with methamphetamine trafficking and use.”²

[¶ 6] At trial, Appellant claimed he was acting in self-defense when he shot the victim. The jury rejected Appellant's claim, finding him guilty of voluntary manslaughter, a lesser included offense of first-degree murder. The district court sentenced Appellant to 14 to 20 years in prison.

[¶ 7] Following trial, Appellant submitted a “Motion for Judgment of Acquittal and a New Trial.” He argued that he was entitled to a new trial, in part, because he had not been permitted “to mention the fact that [m]ethamphetamine was found in the victim's system at autopsy or to discuss the significant amount of [m]ethamphetamine in his system at the time he was shot by the Defendant.” The district court denied the motion, stating that “The evidence presented at trial has not changed the Court's evaluation of the probative value [of the evidence] and the risk of unfair prejudice and confusion of the issues.” Appellant subsequently initiated this appeal.

[¶ 8] While his appeal was pending, Appellant filed a motion with this Court seeking a limited remand to develop his claim that his counsel was ineffective for failing to hire an expert witness to interpret the post-mortem toxicology report of the victim, provide a report to the district court, and produce the expert to testify at the hearing on the State's motion in limine. We granted the motion, and the district court held an evidentiary hearing. At the hearing, Dr. David Benjamin offered expert testimony relating to the effects of methamphetamine. Dr. Benjamin testified that the victim had an “extremely high” level of methamphetamine in his blood at the time of his death, and he opined that “the methamphetamine significantly contributed to [the victim's] agitation and violent behavior and aggressive nature.” However, on cross-examination, when Dr. Benjamin was asked whether the victim would have acted differently if he had not been under the influence of methamphetamine, Dr. Benjamin stated that he “would not be able to respond to that without speculating.”

[¶ 9] Following the hearing, the district court concluded that counsel's failure to call an expert witness did not constitute deficient performance. The district court found as follows:

Dr. Benjamin acknowledged that he was not able, without speculating, to testify whether Mr. Klakken had developed a tolerance to methamphetamine or how that level of methamphetamine affected his behavior, if it affected his behavior at all. More importantly, [Appellant] has still not made any connection between Dr. Benjamin's testimony about how dangerous a person who is using methamphetamine has the potential to be and the nature of the threat that was perceived by [Appellant] at the time he decided to use deadly force against Mr. Klakken.

(Emphasis in original.) The district court also noted that “Dr. Benjamin did not have any evidence that the Defendant had direct knowledge on July 6, 2012 that Mr. Klakken had been using methamphetamine.” Appellant does not challenge the district court's ruling that his counsel was not ineffective.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

[¶ 10] We review a trial court's evidentiary rulings for an abuse of discretion.

Evidentiary rulings are within the sound discretion of the trial court and include determinations of the adequacy of foundation and relevancy, competency, materiality, and remoteness of the evidence. This Court will generally accede to the trial court's determination of the admissibility of evidence unless that court clearly abused its discretion.

Brock v. State, 2012 WY 13, ¶ 23, 272 P.3d 933, 939–40 (Wyo.2012) (quoting Edwards v. State, 2007 WY 146, ¶ 7, 167 P.3d 636, 637 (Wyo.2007) ). “The ultimate issue that we decide in determining whether there has been an abuse of discretion is whether or not the court could have reasonably concluded as it did.” Edwards v. State, 973 P.2d 41, 45 (Wyo.1999) (quoting State v. McDermott, 962 P.2d 136, 138 (Wyo.1998) ).

DISCUSSION

[¶ 11] As noted above, Appellant claimed that he was acting in self-defense when he shot and killed Mr. Klakken. The basic rule relating to self-defense was set forth in Jury Instruction 23:

Instruction No. 23

It is lawful for a person who is being assaulted to defend himself from attack if he has reasonable grounds for believing and does believe that bodily injury is about to be inflicted upon him. In doing so he may use all force which would appear to a reasonable person, in the same or similar circumstances, to be necessary to prevent the injury which appears to be imminent.

The jury was also instructed, consistent with Wyoming law, that a self-defense claim is not available to an aggressor who provokes the conflict:

Instruction No. 28

Generally, the right to use self-defense is not available to an aggressor who provokes the conflict. However, if one provokes a conflict but thereafter withdraws in good faith and informs the adversary by words or actions of the desire to end the conflict and is thereafter pursued, that person then has the same right of self-defense as any other person. The person is justified in using force to the same extent that any other person would be who was acting in self-defense.

[¶ 12] Appellant contends that evidence relating to the victim's methamphetamine intoxication at the time of his death was admissible under W.R.E. 401 because it was relevant to Appellant's claim of self-defense. According to Appellant, the victim's methamphetamine intoxication was relevant because it “casts significant light on the specific nature of the threat to [Appellant].” Appellant claims that the exclusion of evidence relating to the victim's methamphetamine intoxication deprived the jury of a critical fact necessary to place Appellant's behavior in proper context. Appellant further contends that the district court's ruling deprived him of his constitutional right to present a defense.

[¶ 13] The State claims that evidence relating to the victim's methamphetamine...