State v. Jennings

• Decision Date: 03 February 2022
• Docket Number: 99337-8
• Citation: 502 P.3d 1255
• Parties: STATE of Washington, Respondent, v. Justin Nicholas JENNINGS, Petitioner.
• Court: Washington Supreme Court

502 P.3d 1255

STATE of Washington, Respondent,

v.Justin Nicholas JENNINGS, Petitioner.

No. 99337-8

Supreme Court of Washington.

Argued September 30, 2021

Filed: February 3, 2022

Jennifer L. Dobson, Nielsen Koch & Grannis, PLLC, 2200 6th Ave., Ste. 1250, Seattle, WA, 98121-1820, for Petitioner(s).

Theodore Michael Cropley, Pierce County Prosecuting Attorney's Office, 930 Tacoma Ave., S. Rm. 946, Tacoma, WA, 98402-2171, for Respondent(s).

Mark Bruns Middaugh, Attorney at Law, 600 University St., Ste. 3020, Seattle, WA, 98101-4105, Thomas C. Paynter, Attorney at Law, 1001 N. State St., Apt. 203, Bellingham, WA, 98225-5080, for Amicus Curiae on behalf of Wa. Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers.

MADSEN, J.

¶ 1 Justin Jennings was convicted of felony murder and unlawful possession of a firearm for the killing of Chris Burton. At trial, the court held that a toxicology report showing Burton had methamphetamine in his system at the time of death was inadmissible because it was irrelevant and speculative. Jennings appealed, arguing the exclusion of the report violated his constitutional right to present a defense. The Court of Appeals affirmed. Jennings sought review of that decision and also challenges his sentence in light of this court's recent decision in State v. Blake , 197 Wash.2d 170, 481 P.3d 521 (2021).

¶ 2 We affirm the Court of Appeals’ holding that the trial court's exclusion of the toxicology report did not violate Jennings’ right to present a defense. However, we clarify the test that applies to a claimed constitutional violation of the right to present a defense. In addition, we vacate Jennings’ sentence and remand to the trial court for resentencing in light of Blake .

FACTS

¶ 3 On May 6, 2017, Jennings went with his friend, Lance Redman, to retrieve Redman's car from a mobile home that Redman had moved out of the day before. When they arrived, Jennings and Redman approached Gary Tongedahl and Burton, who were working on a car in the front yard. According to Tongedahl, Jennings and Redman had bandanas pulled over their faces. Redman asked where his car was. Burton said that he did not know. Redman pulled out a gun and said that they needed to go inside to figure things out.

¶ 4 Both Jennings and Redman carried a can of bear mace in one hand and a gun in the other. According to Jennings, he was on high alert as he entered because he had been made aware of two incidents of assault that had occurred at the mobile home on May 4 and 5. All four men entered the mobile home. Inside, Burton and Redman continued to argue about the location of Redman's vehicle.

Redman had his gun clearly displayed as they argued. Redman and Burton charged at each other, and they began to wrestle. According to Jennings, both Redman and Burton appeared to be high on methamphetamine. Jennings could not see Redman's or Burton's hands as the two men wrestled.

¶ 5 During the altercation Jennings stepped forward and sprayed bear mace that struck both Redman and Burton. This caused Redman and Burton to separate. Burton turned and took a step toward Jennings. Jennings took a few steps back and then fired two shots at Burton. According to Albert Duane, who was also present at the time of the shooting, Jennings said, "I got you, dog," before running with Redman out the back door. 6 Report of Proceedings (June 7, 2018) at 990. Burton died shortly thereafter. A toxicology report revealed Burton had a high level of methamphetamine in his system.

¶ 6 Jennings was charged with murder in the second degree (count I), felony murder (count II), and unlawful possession of a firearm in the first degree (count III). Jennings pleaded guilty to the charge of unlawful possession of a firearm in the first degree.

¶ 7 At the pretrial conference, the State moved to exclude questions to the medical examiner regarding the impact that a high level of methamphetamine might have had on the victim as speculative. Jennings argued that the toxicology report was relevant because it corroborated his observation that the victim was high on methamphetamine at the time of the shooting. The trial court excluded the toxicology report under ER 403.

¶ 8 The jury found Jennings guilty of manslaughter in the first degree and felony murder, with each count carrying a firearm enhancement. The manslaughter conviction was vacated as it merged with the murder conviction. Jennings was assigned an offender score of 8 for the murder charge and a score of 7 for the unlawful possession of a firearm charge, which included two prior convictions for possession of a controlled substance.

¶ 9 Jennings appealed, arguing that the trial court's exclusion of the toxicology report violated his constitutional right to present a defense. The Court of Appeals affirmed, finding no violation of the right to present a defense. The court added that even if the trial court abused its discretion under ER 401 and 402, the error was harmless. State v. Jennings , 14 Wash. App. 2d 779, 790-92, 474 P.3d 599 (2020).

¶ 10 Jennings petitioned for review, arguing the Court of Appeals applied the wrong constitutional standard in determining whether his right to present a defense was violated and incorrectly decided that toxicology evidence was irrelevant to corroborate his self-defense claim. Jennings subsequently asked this court to vacate his sentence and remand for resentencing in light of Blake . We granted review. State v. Jennings , 197 Wash.2d 1010, 487 P.3d 515 (2021).

ANALYSIS

1. Standard of Review

¶ 11 In State v. Arndt , this court clarified the test for analyzing whether the Sixth Amendment right to present a defense has been violated. 194 Wash.2d 784, 797-98, 453 P.3d 696 (2019) ; U.S. CONST. amend. VI ; see also State v. Clark , 187 Wash.2d 641, 648-49, 389 P.3d 462 (2017). First it analyzed the trial court's evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion. Arndt , 194 Wash.2d at 798-812, 453 P.3d 696. Concluding the evidentiary rulings did not constitute abuse of discretion, the court considered de novo whether the exclusion of evidence violated the defendant's constitutional right to present a defense. Id . at 813, 453 P.3d 696.

¶ 12 In this case, the Court of Appeals acknowledged the two-part test as laid out in Arndt but stated, "[I]n this case we address the constitutional question first because if there were a constitutional violation, there is no need to address whether an evidentiary error has occurred." Jennings , 14 Wash. App. 2d at 789.

¶ 13 The State argues that the Court of Appeals applied the Arndt standard correctly when it analyzed the constitutional issue before addressing the trial court's evidentiary ruling. According to the State, "this Court made clear in Arndt that in all cases, both parts must be analyzed." Suppl. Br. of Resp't at 15 (citing Arndt , 194 Wash.2d at 797-98, 453 P.3d 696 ).

¶ 14 Although Arndt lays out different standards of review for Sixth Amendment questions and evidentiary rulings, at no point did the court state that both parts must be analyzed in every case. In fact, the court began by analyzing each of the trial court's evidentiary rulings and analyzed whether the exclusion of evidence violated the defendant's right to present a defense only after concluding those rulings were not erroneous. Arndt , 194 Wash.2d at 798-812, 453 P.3d 696.

¶ 15 The Court of Appeals’ concurrence succinctly explains why this order makes sense:

There are three possible scenarios. If the trial court abused its discretion in making an evidentiary ruling, and the ruling was prejudicial to the defendant, we would avoid the constitutional issue altogether. On the other hand, if the abuse of discretion constituted harmless error, we would address the constitutional standard. Lastly, if the trial court did not abuse its discretion, then we would review the constitutional issue.

Jennings , 14 Wash. App. 2d at 800-01, 474 P.3d 599 (Melnick, J., concurring) (footnote omitted).

2. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion by Excluding the Victim's Toxicology Report

¶ 16 Trial courts determine whether evidence is relevant and admissible, and appellate courts review the trial court's rulings for abuse of discretion. State v. Brockob , 159 Wash.2d 311, 348, 150 P.3d 59 (2006) (citing State v. Vreen , 143 Wash.2d 923, 932, 26 P.3d 236 (2001) ). A trial court abuses its discretion if " ‘no reasonable person would take the view adopted by the trial court.’ " State v. Atsbeha , 142 Wash.2d 904, 914, 16 P.3d 626 (2001) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting State v. Ellis , 136 Wash.2d 498, 504, 963 P.2d 843 (1998) ).

¶ 17 Relevant evidence is "evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence." ER 401. In addition, ER 403 states that "[a]lthough relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence."

¶ 18 In this case, the trial court ruled that the toxicology report would invite speculation and mislead the jury. The court relied on State v. Lewis , which held that an expert's testimony discussing the general effects of methamphetamine was speculative and irrelevant because the wide range of effects of methamphetamine on different individuals made it impossible for the expert to know how the drug might have affected the victim. 141 Wash. App. 367, 389, 166 P.3d 786 (2007) ; see also Gerlach v. Cove Apts., LLC , 196 Wash.2d 111, 123, 471 P.3d 181 (2020) (affirming the trial court's exclusion of an expert's testimony about BAC (blood alcohol concentration) results because it would be speculative and would risk prejudicing the jury).

¶ 19 The trial court here expressed concern that allowing the toxicology report would essentially allow an unqualified expert, ...