Lawson v. Jeter

• Decision Date: 07 August 1963
• Docket Number: No. 18105,18105
• Citation: 132 S.E.2d 276,243 S.C. 103
• Court: South Carolina Supreme Court
• Parties: Mrs. Sara LAWSON, Appellant, v. Mobley L. JETER and National Dairy Products Corporation, Southern Division, Sealtest Foods, of whom National Dairy Products Corporation, Southern Division, Sealtest Foods, is, Respondent.

Page 276

132 S.E.2d 276

243 S.C. 103

Mrs. Sara LAWSON, Appellant, v. Mobley L. JETER and National Dairy Products Corporation,

Southern Division, Sealtest Foods, of whom

National Dairy Products Corporation,

Southern Division, Sealtest

Foods, is, Respondent.

No. 18105.

Supreme Court of South Carolina.

Aug. 7, 1963.

James W. Workman, James M. Arthur, John D. Long, III, Union, for appellant.

Bruce W. White, Union, Butler & Chapman, Spartanburg, for respondent.

BRAILSFORD, Justice.

Plaintiff attempted to serve the summons in this action on the defendant National Dairy Products Corporation, Southern Division, Sealtest Foods, by delivery of a copy thereof to the defendant Mobley L. Jeter. Sealtest made a special appearance, challenging the jurisdiction of the court, and moved to quash the service of the summons and to strike its name therefrom upon the ground that Jeter was not its officer, agent, employee or legal representative on whom lawful service could be had.

This motion was heard by the court on affidavits and exhibits and was granted. This appeal followed. We quote from the order of the circuit court:

'The evidence before me is insufficient to justify a finding that said corporate defendant is doing business in Union County, South Carolina, or that Mobley L. Jeter is its agent for any purpose. In fact the evidence is overwhelmingly to the contrary. There is no contract establishing any agency relationship between them. But from the evidence I find that the corporate defendant has no interest in or control whatever over Mobley L. Jeter's equipment, his employees, or his means and methods of conducting his business. The relationship is simply that of buyer and seller. Mr. Jeter buys dairy products from the corporation and resells them to his customers as an ordinary merchant in the normal course of business. Title to the products pass to him upon delivery to him without this State and he pays the corporation for such products when billed for the same; but when and to whom and on what terms he resells such products are matters within his sole discretion. The mere fact that the brand name 'Sealtest' is displayed on Jeter's trucks in connection with his own name as distributor is, in my opinion, entirely insufficient to sustain plaintiff's contentions.

'The only other points of contact between Jeter and said corporation are when he delivers raw milk to its processing plants. But this is a service performed by Jeter for the benefit of milk producing farmers for which service they pay him certain compensation in accordance with agreements made entirely between him and them. Here again the corporation has no control whatsoever over Jeter's equipment, employees or means and methods of operation.

'So, I am constrained to conclude from the evidence before me and under the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Bargesser v. Coleman Company, 230 S.C. 562, 96 S.E.2d 825, that said corporate defendant is not engaged in business in Union County, that Mobley L. Jeter is not its agent for the purpose of serving process upon it or for any other purpose, and that it could not possibly be liable for any damages caused by the said Mobley L. Jeter in the conduct of his business * * *'

It is well settled that questions of fact arising on a motion to quash service of process for lack of jurisdiction of the person of the defendant are to be determined by the court. Bargesser v. Coleman Company, 230 S.C. 562, 96 S.E.2d 825. The findings of the circuit court on such issues are binding on this court unless wholly unsupported by the evidence or manifestly influenced or controlled by error of law. Bass v. American Products Export...