Lawson v. Washington

Decision Date12 July 2002
Docket NumberNo. 00-35458.,00-35458.
Citation296 F.3d 799
PartiesGregory LAWSON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. State of WASHINGTON; The Washington State Patrol; Annette M. Sandberg, in her official capacity and individual capacity; Lowell M. Porter, in his official and individual capacity, Defendants-Appellees.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit

Hugh J. McGavick, Law Office of Hugh J. McGavick, Olympia, Washington, for the plaintiff-appellant.

Carol A. Smith-Merkulov, Senior Counsel, Office of the Attorney General, Olympia, Washington, for the defendants-appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington; Franklin D. Burgess, District Judge, Presiding. D.C. No. CV-99-5419-FDB.

Before: REAVLEY,* B. FLETCHER, and TALLMAN, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge TALLMAN; Dissent by Judge BETTY B. FLETCHER.

OPINION

TALLMAN, Circuit Judge.

This civil rights case turns upon whether Gregory Lawson was constructively discharged from his employment as a cadet in the Washington State Patrol Academy's 82nd Trooper Basic Training Class. Lawson brought this action against the State of Washington, the Washington State Patrol, Chief Annette Sandberg, and Captain Lowell Porter (collectively "WSP"), pursuant to Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and Revised Code of Washington 49.60, alleging religious discrimination and failure to accommodate.1 The district court granted the WSP's motion for summary judgment on all claims. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.

I

We discuss the relevant facts in the light most favorable to Lawson, as we must when considering an adverse summary judgment. See Draper v. Coeur Rochester, 147 F.3d 1104, 1105 (9th Cir.1998).

Lawson was hired by the WSP in 1998. His basic training as a trooper cadet commenced at the WSP Academy in Shelton, Washington, on July 13, 1998. Lawson was issued a manual entitled Procedures, Rules and Regulations: 82nd Trooper Basic Training Class ("Manual") as part of his police academy training. The Manual states that "[a]ll cadets will assemble for flag formations [twice daily] unless otherwise assigned." The Manual states that if a cadet deviates from the rules he will be subject to discipline up to and including termination. For the first two days at the Academy, Lawson fully participated in flag formations and performed the required hand salutes.

Lawson says it was troubling for him to perform this duty because he is a Jehovah's Witness. He asserts that because of his religious beliefs he may not salute the flag of any state or nation. During the same two-day period Lawson also read a copy of the Trooper's Oath ("Oath"),2 to be taken upon successful completion of his Academy training. As a Jehovah's Witness, Lawson says he may only swear allegiance to his faith and to God. Lawson had twice previously applied for this position and had completed a written personal history and background questionnaire in which he had certified as true his affirmative answer to the question, "Are you willing to take an oath to support the Constitution of the United States and the Constitution of the State of Washington?"

Nonetheless, on the evening of his second day of training, July 14, 1998, Lawson sought out one of his Trooper Advisor Counselors ("TAC") at the Academy, Lenny Walker, to announce that he had decided to resign because of a conflict between his religious beliefs and his employment requirements. The Manual directs cadets to contact their TACs if they encounter personal problems. Walker asked Lawson to explain the problem. Lawson replied "that although it was the last thing that [he] wanted to do, [he] felt [he] had no choice but to resign from the academy." He informed TAC Walker that he could not salute the flag or take an oath of allegiance to a government because of his religious beliefs. Lawson then asked TAC Walker if there was something he could do besides salute the flag. Lawson suggested possible accommodations such as standing respectfully during formation or performing cleaning duties elsewhere. Walker replied that he did not know of anything that could be done. He then asked Lawson if he still wished to resign. Thinking that he had no alternative, and that he would be fired for insubordination and humiliated if he did not comply with his employment requirements, Lawson confirmed his decision to resign.

The following day Lawson met with Lieutenant Kenneth J. Irwin, Acting Commander of the WSP Academy, and informed him that his religious beliefs prevented him from saluting the flag and taking the Oath. Lieutenant Irwin did not discuss possible accommodations. Instead, he presented Lawson with a resignation letter, already prepared by the WSP, stating that he was resigning for personal reasons. Lawson says he signed the resignation letter because he believed the Academy would not make any exceptions to the rules on his behalf.

The same day Lawson participated in an exit interview conducted by Sergeant D. Devoe during which he completed an exit questionnaire. The questionnaire stated that the principle reason Lawson left the Academy was because of his religious beliefs. Specifically he stated:

As one of Jehovah's Witnesses [sic], it goes against my beliefs to salute any flag, or pledge allegiance to any country or state. This makes it impossible for me to give the oath to be a Trooper. My time away is also hard on my family.

Lawson suggested on the questionnaire that the WSP "make allowances for those with religious differences...." No possible accommodations were discussed during the exit interview.

After Lawson's resignation was accepted, he contacted Captain Lowell Porter, Commander of the WSP Human Resources Division, to request information regarding the WSP's official policy on religious accommodations. Lawson again explained the reason for his resignation. Captain Porter stated that the WSP would not offer him any accommodations and that if he wished to be a Washington State Trooper he would have to salute the flag and swear his allegiance by taking the Oath. Because Captain Porter refused to discuss any accommodations, Lawson tried to reach Chief Annette Sandberg. Chief Sandberg did not return his call.

Lawson subsequently filed a complaint with the Washington State Human Rights Commission and the EEOC.3 He then filed his federal civil rights complaint alleging federal and state claims. The district court granted the WSP's motion for summary judgment on all claims. Lawson's appeal followed.

II

We review de novo a district court's decision to grant summary judgment. See Balint v. Carson City, 180 F.3d 1047, 1050 (9th Cir.1999). Such review is governed by the same standard used by the trial court under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c). See Far Out Prods. v. Oskar, 247 F.3d 986, 992 (9th Cir.2001). We must therefore determine, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, whether there are any genuine issues of material fact, and whether the district court properly applied the relevant substantive law. See Balint, 180 F.3d at 1054.

III

Title VII makes it unlawful for an employer to discharge an employee because of the employee's religion.4 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). It is therefore an "unlawful employment practice ... for an employer not to make reasonable accommodations, short of undue hardship, for the religious practices of his employees...." Trans World Airlines v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 74, 97 S.Ct. 2264, 53 L.Ed.2d 113 (1977).

Title VII religious accommodation claims are analyzed under a two-part framework. Under the first part, Lawson must establish a prima facie case by showing that: (1) he had a bona fide religious belief, the practice of which conflicted with his employment duties as a WSP trooper cadet; (2) he informed the WSP of his beliefs and the conflict; and (3) the WSP "threatened him with or subjected him to discriminatory treatment, including discharge, because of his inability to fulfill the job requirements." Heller v. EBB Auto Co., 8 F.3d 1433, 1438 (9th Cir.1993). See also Tiano v. Dillard Dep't Stores, 139 F.3d 679, 681 (9th Cir.1998). Once an employee establishes a prima facie case, the burden of proof then shifts to the employer under the second part of the framework to "establish that it initiated good faith efforts to accommodate the employee's religious practices or that it could not reasonably accommodate the employee without undue hardship." Heller, 8 F.3d at 1438.

It is undisputed in this case that as a Jehovah's Witness, Lawson's bona fide religious beliefs conflict with the WSP requirements that he salute the flag and undertake the obligation of a commissioned law enforcement officer before he assumes his office to swear his allegiance to the United States and the State of Washington. See W.Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 643, 63 S.Ct. 1178, 87 L.Ed. 1628 (1943) (Black & Douglas, JJ., concurring) (finding "[t]he Jehovah's Witnesses, without any desire to show disrespect for either the flag or the country, interpret the Bible as commanding, at the risk of God's displeasure, that they not go through the form of a pledge of allegiance to any flag").

It is also undisputed that Lawson informed his employer of the conflicts between his religious beliefs and his employment duties. Pursuant to Heller, an employee need only inform his employer about his religious needs for the employer to understand the conflict between the employer's expectations and the employee's religious practices. 8 F.3d at 1439; Brown v. Polk County, 61 F.3d 650, 654 (8th Cir.1995) (rejecting an employer's claim that an employee may not assert Title VII protections because the employee did not explicitly ask for a religious accommodation) (citing Heller, 8 F.3d at 1439). According to Lawson, he notified TAC Walker and Lt. Irwin of the conflict before he signed the resignation...

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