Short v. Battle Ground Sch. Dist.

• Decision Date: 26 June 2012
• Docket Number: No. 42011–2–II.,42011–2–II.
• Citation: 115 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 627,281 Ed. Law Rep. 701,279 P.3d 902,169 Wash.App. 188
• Parties: Julie SHORT, Appellant, v. BATTLE GROUND SCHOOL DISTRICT, Rochonne Bria, individually and as its agent, Respondents.
• Court: Washington Court of Appeals

169 Wash.App. 188

279 P.3d 902

115 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 627

281 Ed. Law Rep. 701

Julie SHORT, Appellant,

v.BATTLE GROUND SCHOOL DISTRICT, Rochonne Bria, individually and as its agent, Respondents.

No. 42011–2–II.

Court of Appeals of Washington,

Division 2.

June 26, 2012.

Judith A. Lonnquist, Law Offices of Judith A. Lonnquist, P.S., Seattle, WA, for Appellant.

Gerald John Moberg, Jerry J. Moberg & Associates, Ephrata, WA, for Respondents.

HUNT, J.

[169 Wash.App. 190]¶ 1 Julie Short appeals the superior court's summary judgment dismissal of her religious discrimination, failure-to-accommodate, and retaliation claims against the Battle Ground School District and its superintendent, Rochonne Bria. Short argues that the superior court erred in granting summary judgment because (1) she presented substantial evidence of a prima facie case for each of her claims, and (2) the parties disputed genuine issues of material fact. Holding that Short failed to meet her burden on summary judgment, we affirm.

FACTS

I. Background

¶ 2 Julie Short is a devout Christian woman with deeply held religious beliefs. The Battle Ground School District employed Short from January 2007 through March 20, 2008. Although originally hired as the administration office receptionist, Short also worked for two and a half months as executive assistant to superintendent Rochonne Bria; in this position, Short worked closely with Bria, liked her job, and had no notable disputes with Bria.

¶ 3 On September 1, 2007, Bria reassigned Short to work as the assistant for Kelly O'Brien, an independent contractor who also served as the District's Public Information Officer. Although O'Brien supervised Short's day-to-day work,¹ Bria remained Short's “ultimate supervisor.” Clerk's Papers (CP) at 276. Short worked closely with O'Brien for several months, planning the District's dedication ceremony for a new middle school. At some point, however, Short overheard Bria make disparaging comments about O'Brien,² which Short relayed to O'Brien in answer to O'Brien's questions.

A. November 26, 2007 Meeting

¶ 4 On November 26, Bria called Short to her office where O'Brien was seated at a conference table. Bria instructed Short to report all conversations she had relayed to O'Brien. Short tried to explain that the situation was a misunderstanding, that O'Brien was her supervisor, and that she (Short) had simply answered O'Brien's questions honestly. Short reassured Bria that she had not told O'Brien anything untrue because lying would “violate her religious beliefs.” CP at 182.

¶ 5 According to Short, Bria then became physically threatening and intimidating—standing over Short, placing her hands on Short's shoulders, jabbing her finger in Short's face, and pacing around the office, yelling and cursing, with her arms flailing. Bria pressured Short to tell O'Brien that the information she (Short) had previously provided was untrue; but Short refused because to do so would require her to lie. Bria yelled at Short and told her to leave.

¶ 6 Thereafter, Bria ignored Short, refused to order supplies for her office, threatened “to take [her] to court,” and told her that she (Bria) would never have another conversation with her without another adult present. CP at 69. Between November 2007 and February 2008, Short discussed her working conditions and Bria's November 26 conduct with two school board members. Short did not expressly assert that she felt she was being “discriminated against” based on her religious beliefs or that she was experiencing a “hostile work environment.” CP at 72, 76. She did, however, “relate[ ]” the November 26 meeting to these board members, including how she had “explain[ed]” to Bria during that meeting that her (Short's) religious beliefs prohibited lying. CP at 78. According to Short, she did not file a formal complaint with the board members or explore more formal avenues for redress because staff involved in these procedures were “beholden” to Bria. CP at 72.

B. February 2008 Meetings

¶ 7 On February 21 and February 22, 2008, Bria held a series of meetings about the new middle school dedication ceremony; Short attended these meetings with Bria's assistant, Irene Melton. During the first meeting on February 21, Bria forbade Short and Melton from discussing the meeting with anyone, especially O'Brien. Bria commented that she had personally “diagnosed” O'Brien with a “multiple personality disorder,” that O'Brien had “ ‘eyes and ears' ” all over the District office, that she (Bria) suspected someone was already on the phone informing O'Brien that they were meeting, and that Short and Melton each needed to come up with a “ ‘cover story’ ” for the meeting. CP at 64–65. When Short suggested that they “tell the truth” about the meeting, Bria did not respond. CP at 65.

¶ 8 According to Short, during this meeting, Bria asked her only general information about the progress of the dedication ceremony and other mundane matters, such as ordering refreshments and plaques and printing invitations. Short did not feel the information they had discussed was in any way “confidential”; but she believed the information was “vital” to O'Brien's ability to perform her job as the District's Public Information Officer. CP at 176. So when Bria told Short that she could not discuss anything that they had talked about with O'Brien, Short asked Bria if she could tell O'Brien that they had simply met to discuss the dedication ceremony; Bria responded, “[N]o.” CP at 66. Short then asked if she could refer O'Brien to Bria if O'Brien had any questions; again, Bria flatly refused and said, “[N]o.” CP at 66. Finally, Short asked Bria how she should respond if O'Brien asked her directly about the meeting; Bria replied, “Make something up, lie.” CP at 62 (emphasis added).

[169 Wash.App. 194]¶ 9 During this meeting, Bria offered to transfer Short to another department in the District “at no loss of pay” ³ if Short cooperated with her order,⁴ which Short felt was Bria's attempt “to make [her] lie or withhold vital information from [O'Brien].” CP at 69 (emphasis added). Short responded by telling Bria that her goal was to come to work each day, to do a good job, and to “remain honest and true to [her] beliefs.” CP at 70 (emphasis added). Bria replied that Short was “ ‘not going to get through this and be honest’ ” and that she would “ ‘have to make a choice.’ ” CP at 175. When Short again refused “to lie to [her] supervisor [O'Brien],” Bria insisted that she, not O'Brien, was Short's supervisor and that Short should consult an organizational chart. CP at 175. According to Short, Bria did not merely tell her to “ ‘maintain a [District] confidence’ ”; instead, Bria “expressly and repeatedly direct[ed][her] to lie to [O'Brien],” which violated Short's religious beliefs. CP at 176.

¶ 10 Later that day, Bria called Short back to her office and showed her a document that Short believed was a “newly created organizational chart.” CP at 175. Short continued to refuse to lie to O'Brien; Bria responded by yelling at Short and threatening that her (Short's) reputation would be “ruined.” CP at 175. According to Short, Bria also suggested that, if Short did not comply with her directions, she would place Short under a “hostile supervisor” for her future performance evaluations. CP at 175.

C. March 2008

¶ 11 After this latter February 21 incident, Short felt Bria's conduct became “increasingly intolerable”: Bria continuedto yell at Short, to threaten Short, and to give her the “silent treatment.” CP at 177. Short also heard from other District employees that Bria had called her (Short) a “ ‘lying b*tch’ ” and had told them that she (Short) was “angling for [O'Brien's] job.” CP at 258. Short discussed Bria's conduct with her pastor and another parishioner at her church; she tried to work through the situation, but she was unable to do so. On March 2, Short asked to take leave because of the “treatment [she] was receiving from [Bria].” CP at 214. On March 20, while on leave, Short formally resigned.

II. Procedure

¶ 12 Short sued the District and Bria (collectively, the “District”) for religious discrimination, failure to accommodate her religious beliefs, and retaliation ⁵ under the Washington Law Against Discrimination (WLAD), chapter 49.60 RCW. The District moved for summary judgment, arguing that Short had failed to establish a prima facie case for each of her claims. The superior court granted the District summary judgment. Short appeals.

ANALYSIS

¶ 13 Short argues that the superior court improperly granted summary judgment to the District because genuine issues of material fact remained in dispute and she had presented evidence sufficient to establish a prima facie case for each of her claims. We disagree.

I. Standard of Review

¶ 14 We review summary judgment orders de novo, performing the same inquiry as the superior court. Hisle v. Todd Pac. Shipyards Corp., 151 Wash.2d 853, 860, 93 P.3d 108 (2004). Summary judgment is appropriate only if the pleadings, affidavits, depositions, interrogatories, and admissions on file demonstrate the absence of any genuine issues of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. CR 56(c); Davis v. W. One Auto. Group, 140 Wash.App. 449, 456, 166 P.3d 807 (2007). When ruling on a summary judgment motion, we consider all facts submitted and all reasonable inferences from them in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Marquis v. City of Spokane, 130 Wash.2d 97, 105, 922 P.2d 43 (1996). But where reasonable minds could reach only one conclusion from the admissible facts in evidence, summary judgment is proper. Haubry v. Snow, 106 Wash.App. 666, 670, 31 P.3d 1186 (2001).

¶ 15 To defeat an employer's motion for summary judgment in an employment discrimination case, an employee “must do more than express an opinion or make conclusory statements”; she must establish “specific and material facts” to support...