Lay v. Commissioner, Tennessee Department of Correction, No. M2005-02245-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. App. 7/10/2007)
| Decision Date | 10 July 2007 |
| Docket Number | No. M2005-02245-COA-R3-CV.,M2005-02245-COA-R3-CV. |
| Parties | RANDALL D. LAY v. COMMISSIONER, TENNESSEE DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTION |
| Court | Tennessee Court of Appeals |
Appeal from the Chancery Court for Davidson County; No. 03-3423-IV; Richard Dinkins, Chancellor.
Judgment of the Chancery Court Affirmed.
Randall D. Lay, Pro Se.
Robert E. Cooper, Jr., Attorney General and Reporter, and Arthur Crownover, II, Senior Counsel, for the State.
Frank G. Clement, Jr., J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which William C. Koch, Jr., P.J., M.S., and William B. Cain, J., joined.
Inmate appeals the dismissal of his Declaratory Judgment action in which he challenged the constitutionality of an amendment to Tennessee's statutory scheme governing parole eligibility. Finding the amendment is not a violation of the Ex Post Facto clauses of the Tennessee or United States constitutions, and that it does not violate due process, we affirm.
Randall D. Lay is an inmate incarcerated at the West Tennessee State Penitentiary operated by the Tennessee Department of Correction. He was sentenced to three years incarceration after pleading guilty to theft in September of 1992. He was permitted to serve that sentence through the "Community Alternative to Prison Program," but in March of 1993 he pled guilty to especially aggravated robbery and was given a fifteen year, standard 30% Range 1 sentence to run consecutive to his previous three years, for an effective sentence of eighteen years to be served at thirty percent.
On January 2, 1996, while incarcerated, Mr. Lay was placed in administrative segregation, also known as maximum security or maximum custody, due to having assaulted a member of the prison staff and for his extensive disciplinary history. He remained in maximum custody at the time the briefs were filed in this matter. On June 24, 1997, Mr. Lay had his first appearance before the parole board, which denied his request for parole. When the parole board denied his first request for parole, Mr. Lay was advised that his next opportunity for a hearing before the parole board would be June 1, 1999.
In the interim, however, on July 1, 1998, the Tennessee General Assembly enacted Chapter 743 of the 1998 Public Acts, which amended the statutory scheme governing parole eligibility. See 1998 Tenn. Pub. Acts 353. The amendment, which is at the center of this dispute and of which Mr. Lay complains, was codified in Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 40-28-115(h)(2) and 40-35-501 (1998).1 Generally stated, the relevant change to the statute provided that inmates who were in maximum custody for disciplinary violations were not eligible for parole while in maximum custody and for a period of two years thereafter. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-28-115(h)(2).
Following the enactment of the legislation at issue and the denial of his request for parole consideration in 1999, Mr. Lay filed for a Declaratory Judgment in the trial court contending that the amendment violates the "Bill of Pains and Penalties," "Separation of Powers," "Ex Post Facto," "Due Process of Law," and that it contradicts policies of the Tennessee Department of Correction.
The State of Tennessee filed a Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State Claim. The Chancery Court granted the State's Motion and dismissed the action, from which decision Mr. Lay appeals.
The purpose of a Tenn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(6) motion to dismiss is to determine whether the pleadings state a claim upon which relief can be granted. A Rule 12 motion only challenges the legal sufficiency of the complaint. It does not challenge the strength of the plaintiff's proof. See Bell ex rel. Snyder v. Icard, Merrill, Cullis, Timm, Furen & Ginsburg, P.A., 986 S.W.2d 550, 554 (Tenn. 1999). In reviewing a motion to dismiss, we must liberally construe the complaint, presuming all factual allegations to be true and giving the plaintiff the benefit of all reasonable inferences. See Pursell v. First American National Bank, 937 S.W.2d 838, 840 (Tenn. 1996); see also Trau-Med of Am., Inc. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 71 S.W.3d 691, 696-97 (Tenn. 2002). Thus, a complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his or her claim that would warrant relief. (emphasis added) See Doe v. Sundquist, 2 S.W.3d 919, 922 (Tenn. 1999); Fuerst v. Methodist Hospital South, 566 S.W.2d 847, 848 (Tenn. 1978). Then, such a determination becomes a question of law. Our review of a trial court's determinations on issues of law is de novo, with no presumption of correctness. Frye v. Blue Ridge Neuroscience Center, P.C., 70 S.W.3d 710, 713 (Tenn. 2002); Bowden v. Ward, 27 S.W.3d 913, 916 (Tenn. 2000); Ganzevoort v. Russell, 949 S.W.2d 293, 296 (Tenn. 1997).
Prior to 1998, there was no statutory prohibition on parole eligibility for inmates in maximum custody. The relevant statutes, Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 40-28-115(h)(2)2 and 40-35-501(i)(2) (1998), which are identical, now provide a statutory prohibition. The two identical statutes state:
The department of correction shall not certify an inmate for a parole grant hearing, other than an initial grant hearing, if, at the time the department of correction would otherwise have certified the inmate as eligible, the inmate is classified as maximum custody. This decertification shall continue for the duration of the classification, and for a period of two (2) years thereafter.
Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 40-28-115(h)(2) and 40-35-501(i)(2) (1998).
Mr. Lay contends the 1998 enactment of these statutes and their application to him constitute a violation of several vested rights.
We begin our analysis realizing there are two basic and potentially competing principles that directly pertain to several of Mr. Lay's claims. The first principle is that
maintaining institutional order and discipline in prison is an essential, compelling governmental interest. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 546, 99 S.Ct. 1861, 1878, 60 L.Ed.2d 447 (1979); Kikumura v. Hurley, 242 F.3d 950, 962 (10th Cir.2001); Harris v. Chapman, 97 F.3d 499, 504 (11th Cir.1996). The administration of a prison is an extraordinarily difficult undertaking, Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 566, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 2980, 41 L.Ed.2d 935 (1974), and the day-to-day operation of a penal facility is not susceptible to easy solutions. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. at 547, 99 S.Ct. at 1878.
Utley v. Tenn. Dep't of Corr., 118 S.W.3d 705, 712 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003). As this Court went on to explain in Utley:
The operation of prisons has been entrusted to the Executive and Legislative Branches of government and is within the province and professional expertise of correction officials. Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 827, 94 S.Ct. 2800, 2806, 41 L.Ed.2d 495 (1974); 713 Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 405, 94 S.Ct. 1800, 1807, 40 L.Ed.2d 224 (1974); Utley v. Rose, 55 S.W.3d at 563. The courts accord wide-ranging deference to correction officials in adopting and administering policies that, in the officials' judgment, are needed to preserve internal order and discipline and to maintain institutional security, Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Labor Union, Inc., 433 U.S. 119, 126, 97 S.Ct. 2532, 2538, 53 L.Ed.2d 629 (1977); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. at 548, 99 S.Ct. at 1879; Jaami v. Conley, 958 S.W.2d 123, 125 (Tenn.Ct.App.1997) (). Accordingly, the courts consistently decline to substitute their judgment for that of prison officials when it comes to difficult and sensitive matters of prison administration. O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 353, 107 S.Ct. 2400, 2407, 96 L.Ed.2d 282 (1987).
Preserving institutional order and discipline may require prison officials to adopt rules or policies that limit or reduce the constitutional rights retained by prisoners. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. at 546, 99 S.Ct. at 1878; Wilson v. Blankenship, 163 F.3d 1284, 1295 (11th Cir.1998); McLaurin v. Morton, 48 F.3d 944, 948 (6th Cir.1995). Prison officials must have the authority to discipline prisoners for violating these rules and policies. Garrity v. Fiedler, 41 F.3d 1150, 1153 (7th Cir.1994); Turner v. Johnson, 46 F.Supp.2d 655, 663-64 (S.D.Tex.1999). Accordingly, disciplinary proceedings involving infractions of prison rules and policies are within the expected scope of a prisoner's sentence. Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 485, 115 S.Ct. 2293, 2301, 132 L.Ed.2d 418 (1995).
The second of the two principles that pertain to claims asserted by Mr. Lay is that inmates "do not shed all their constitutional rights at the prison gates." Id. (citing Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. at 555, 94 S.Ct. at 2974).
While lawful incarceration brings about a necessary withdrawal of many privileges and rights, Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Labor Union, Inc., 433 U.S. at 125, 97 S.Ct. at 2537; Price v. Johnston, 334 U.S. 266, 285, 68 S.Ct. 1049, 1060, 92 L.Ed. 1356 (1948), prisoners retain a narrow range of constitutionally protected liberty and property interests. Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 530, 104 S.Ct. 3194, 3202, 82 L.Ed.2d 393 (1984); Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 467, 103 S.Ct. 864, 869, 74 L.Ed.2d 675 (1983). Thus, when a prison rule or policy offends a fundamental constitutional guarantee, the courts must discharge their duty to protect a prisoner's basic constitutional rights. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 84, 107 S.Ct. 2254, 2259, 96 L.Ed.2d 64 (1987); Utley v. Rose, 55 S.W.3d at 563 ().
There is no dispute that the Ex Post Facto Clauses of the federal and state constitutions apply to prisoners in Tennessee's penal...
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