Layman v. Newkirk Elec. Associates, Inc.
| Decision Date | 11 September 1998 |
| Docket Number | No. 4,Docket No. 105245,4 |
| Citation | 581 N.W.2d 244,458 Mich. 494 |
| Parties | William D. LAYMAN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. NEWKIRK ELECTRIC ASSOCIATES, INC., and Henkels & McCoy, Inc., Defendants-Appellees. Calendar |
| Court | Michigan Supreme Court |
Robison & Sims, P.C. (by John M. Sims), Albion, for plaintiff-appellant.
Plunkett & Cooney, P.C. (by Paul F. Paternoster) Detroit, for defendant-appellee Newkirk Electric Associates, Inc.
Martin L. Critchell, Detroit, for defendant-appellee Henkels & McCoy, Inc.
Daryl Royal, Dearborn, and Cooper, Bender, Mohr & Iddings, P.C. (by David J. Cooper), Tecumseh, for Michigan Trial Lawyers Association.
Lacey & Jones (by Gerald M. Marcinkoski), Birmingham, for Michigan Defense Trial Counsel.
We granted leave in this case to decide (1) whether the Worker's Compensation Appellate Commission improperly made fact findings in the absence of findings by the magistrate, and (2) whether, on remand from an appellate court, additional fact findings should be undertaken by the magistrate or the commission. We conclude that the commission exceeded its authority in this case and that the magistrate is the proper
person to make additional fact findings.
Plaintiff-appellant William D. Layman is a journeyman lineman who worked without physical restrictions for approximately thirty-five years, despite having a preexisting condition of spinal arthritis. In July 1991, his union hall assigned him to a job with defendant-appellee Newkirk Electric Associates, Inc.
On October 17, 1991, plaintiff was participating in a Newkirk project that involved tearing down large electrical cables. The assignment required him to work on utility poles from the elevated bucket of a bucket truck. He spent six to eight hours in that position. Because the distance between the utility poles was short, he remained in the bucket while the truck was moved from pole to pole.
The brakes on the bucket truck were malfunctioning, causing him to be thrown about inside the bucket whenever the truck stopped. Plaintiff was unable to anticipate which way the truck would lunge. As a result, his waist was repeatedly banged against the rim of the bucket. He was also unable to protect himself because his hands were occupied with preventing an overhead cable from falling on light fixtures and pedestrians.
Plaintiff finished the work day, but he had difficulty getting out of bed the following Monday morning because of soreness in his back. He never returned to work at Newkirk. Newkirk voluntarily paid worker's compensation benefits to plaintiff from October 1991, through March 1992, but not afterward, because its insurer disputed Newkirk's liability for benefits.
Plaintiff worked for defendant-appellee Henkels & McCoy, Inc., from June 29, 1992, to August 12, 1992. This job required him to climb utility poles with a hook and belt. Plaintiff was unable to perform all his duties. Other workers did some of the work for him, and it was necessary for him to take several aspirins each day in order to tolerate his pain. He turned down the jobs he was offered following his employment with Henkels & McCoy.
Plaintiff filed a claim for worker's compensation benefits on March 24, 1992. The case proceeded to a hearing before Magistrate B. Lloyd Blair in Detroit on July 21, 1993. At the hearing, plaintiff testified that he no longer was able to perform the jobs he had done in the past. He said he had difficulty even walking, and it was necessary for him to stop and rest whenever he walked as much as half a mile.
The medical testimony generally supported the conclusion that plaintiff has a bad back, but there was disagreement concerning the cause and the severity of his condition.
In a decision mailed August 16, 1993, the magistrate awarded open-ended benefits to plaintiff. He found that plaintiff was a believable witness, that his account of the October 17, 1991, incident was unrebutted, and that he suffered a work-related aggravation of a preexisting back condition on that date.
Defendant Newkirk appealed to the Worker's Compensation Appellate Commission. On June 14, 1995, the commission reversed the magistrate's decision, and denied plaintiff's claim for benefits. 1995 Mich. ACO 1389.
The Court of Appeals denied leave to appeal. 1 This Court granted plaintiff's application for leave to appeal. 2
This Court is asked to review a decision of the Worker's Compensation Appellate Commission. According to the Michigan Constitution, "Findings of fact in workmen's compensation proceedings shall be conclusive in the absence of fraud unless otherwise provided by law." Const. 1963, art. 6, § 28. Additionally, M.C.L. § 418.861a(3); M.S.A. § 17.237(861a)(3) provides:
Beginning October 1, 1986 findings of fact made by a worker's compensation magistrate shall be considered conclusive by the commission if supported by competent, material, and substantial evidence on the whole record. As used in this subsection, "substantial evidence" means such evidence, considering the whole record, as a reasonable mind will accept as adequate to justify the conclusion.
This Court recently stated in Goff v. Bil-Mar Foods, Inc. (After Remand): 3
[W]here a party claims that the WCAC has exceeded its power by reversing the magistrate, meaningful review must begin with the magistrate's decision, because if competent, material, and substantial evidence based on the whole record supports the magistrate's decision, the WCAC need go no further. If it does, the WCAC is exceeding its authority.
The magistrate recognized that Newkirk had voluntarily paid worker's compensation benefits to plaintiff between October 1991, and March 1992, and was contesting plaintiff's disability only after March 1992. After reviewing plaintiff's testimony and that of the medical experts, the magistrate found an October 17, 1991, injury date and a continuing disability from the injury.
John S. Warner, D.C., a chiropractor who began treating plaintiff before the incident with Newkirk, 4 testified that plaintiff suffered from either a compressed nerve root or a herniated disc at the L5-S1 interval. He said plaintiff should avoid bending and twisting and should lift no more than ten pounds.
Chiropractor Wallace Ross examined plaintiff on February 25, 1992, pursuant to a request by CNA Insurance Company. Dr. Ross detected arthritis throughout the spine. He estimated that the condition had been present for approximately ten years. He opined that the October 17, 1991, incident could have caused muscle strain, but that the condition would have been resolved after several weeks. He said plaintiff should not lift more than thirty-five pounds, and that his condition would improve if he obeyed restrictions and performed strengthening exercises.
Christopher Schaiberger, M.D., a neurologist, examined plaintiff on June 3, 1992, pursuant to a referral for a neurological examination of plaintiff's lower back and extremities. He found degenerative arthritis in the lumbar region, with spurring at L5-S1, and he expressed the opinion that these problems existed before the incident on October 17, 1991. He felt the injury could have originated with trauma or could have developed spontaneously. He recommended no bending, no twisting, and no lifting over fifty pounds without help.
Harvey Andre, M.D., who examined plaintiff on March 25, 1993, found degenerative arthritis at L3 and L4-5. He said plaintiff could perform only light work and that he should avoid stooping, bending, twisting, pushing and pulling, and should lift no more than five pounds.
The magistrate found plaintiff believable, his account of the accident unrebutted, and ruled that plaintiff suffered a work-related aggravation of a preexisting back condition on October 17, 1991. The magistrate explained:
There is agreement between Drs. Ross and Schaiberger that plaintiff has arthritic changes in his entire spine which predated October 17, 1991. I so find. And, although Dr. Schaiberger acknowledged that plaintiff's problems stemming from his arthritis could have originated spontaneously, I find that they did not. The theory of spontaneous initiation in this case flies in the face of plaintiff's activities of October 17, 1991. To find spontaneous origin here, one would have to completely ignore plaintiff's undisputed testimony that he was banged around waist height in the bucket of a bucket truck which turned out to have had an improperly functioning master brake cylinder. Accordingly, I find the experience of October 17, 1991, combined with plaintiff's arthritic condition and resulted in his current low-back disability.
All the experts agree plaintiff is disabled by arthritis and should be restricted from various activities which his job as a lineman would demand. I therefore find an injury date of October 17, 1991, and continuing disability from said injury.
I do not find that work plaintiff did for Henkels & McCoy, Inc. subsequent to leaving defendant, Newkirk Electric Associates, Inc., changed plaintiff's basic underlying condition. No specific injury or occurrence was alleged. Plaintiff was "carried" by co-workers and could only tolerate what little work he did by taking 12 to 16 aspirins per day. He definitely was disabled when he went to work for Henkels & McCoy, Inc., but this job did not contribute to or aggravate his underlying condition. I find no July, 1992 injury date.
On the basis of his findings, the magistrate awarded open-ended benefits to plaintiff.
Defendant Newkirk appealed to the Worker's Compensation Appellate Commission. Among other matters, Newkirk argued that the magistrate committed legal error requiring reversal by not applying the significant-manner standard of M.C.L. § 418.301(2); M.S.A. § 17.237(301)(2)....
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