Layne v. Campbell County Dept. of Social Services, 90-2623

• Decision Date: 12 August 1991
• Docket Number: No. 90-2623,90-2623
• Citation: 939 F.2d 217
• Parties: 58 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 41,419 Jennie L. LAYNE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CAMPBELL COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES; Cilla P. Brown; Judith E. Gilchrist, Defendants-Appellees, and County of Campbell, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fourth Circuit

Page 217

939 F.2d 217

58 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 41,419

Jennie L. LAYNE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CAMPBELL COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES; Cilla P.

Brown; Judith E. Gilchrist, Defendants-Appellees,

and

County of Campbell, Defendant.

No. 90-2623.

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Argued Feb. 6, 1991.

Decided July 25, 1991.

As Amended Aug. 12, 1991.

Terry N. Grimes, King, Fulghum, Snead, Nixon & Grimes, P.C., Roanoke, Va., for plaintiff-appellant.

William Sampson Kerr, Appomattox, Va., argued (Thomas S. Leebrick, Mosby, Jester & Leebrick, Lynchburg, Va., on the brief), for defendants-appellees.

Before HALL and MURNAGHAN, Circuit Judges, and SMITH, District Judge for the Eastern District of Virginia, sitting by designation.

OPINION

REBECCA BEACH SMITH, District Judge:

Jennie L. Layne ("Layne") brought this suit in federal court, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983, against her former employer, Campbell County Department of Social Services ("the Department"), and two of its employees in both their individual and official capacities: Cilla P. Brown ("Brown"), Director, and Judith E. Gilchrist ("Gilchrist"), Layne's supervisor at the time of her termination. ¹ These defendants allegedly violated Layne's rights to due process of law and freedom of speech, as secured by the United States and Virginia Constitutions, and breached her employment contract. The district court granted defendants' motion to dismiss with respect to all federal claims and declined to exercise jurisdiction over the pendent state law claims. Finding no reversible error, we affirm.

I.

Layne began employment with the Department in 1973. She filed an Equal Employment Opportunity ("EEO") complaint in August, 1986, claiming discrimination by the Department. For the three years prior to August, 1986, she received satisfactory job evaluations. Following the filing of the EEO complaint, she received three unsatisfactory evaluations, covering the period of July 1, 1986, through October 23, 1987. ² Layne claims these last three evaluations were made arbitrarily and in bad faith, in order to create a paper trail to justify her termination.

On November 6, 1987, Gilchrist sent Layne written notice of her termination, effective that day. Also on November 6, 1987, Brown sent Layne a memorandum informing her that she was fired for making a coercive statement to her supervisor on August 26, 1987, and because of "the cumulative nature of [her] unsatisfactory employment record." App. at 9. At the time of the termination, Layne allegedly had achieved permanent employment status and so could be terminated only for cause. ³

Layne filed a written grievance contesting her termination, pursuant to the Campbell County Grievance Procedure ("CCGP"). On May 30, 1988, and June 21, 1988, a three-member administrative panel heard her grievance and unanimously refused to reinstate her. Layne then filed this action, claiming that defendants deprived her of a valuable property right without due process of law and abridged her right to freedom of speech, in violation of the United States and Virginia Constitutions, and breached her employment contract.

The district court found no violation of Layne's right to procedural due process and, therefore, held that it was precluded from making further factual findings different from those of the administrative panel which heard her grievance. The court also found that Layne's substantive due process and first amendment rights had not been violated. Consequently, the court granted defendants' motion to dismiss and declined to exercise jurisdiction over the pendent state law claims.

Layne raises two issues on appeal. First, she argues that the decision of the state administrative panel concerning her termination does not preclude her from litigating this action in federal court, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983, because the CCGP failed to provide her an adequate opportunity to litigate her grievance. ⁴ Second, she asserts that her action against Brown and Gilchrist in their individual capacities should proceed because neither Brown nor Gilchrist were parties to the administrative hearing.

II.

The CCGP is a three-step procedure for processing a grievance, the final step of which is a hearing before an administrative panel. ⁵ At the panel hearing, each party has the opportunity to call witnesses and offer evidence. Although the panel's decision is final, either party may petition the state circuit court for implementation of the panel decision. The CCGP complies with the statutory requirements of the grievance procedure for state employees in Virginia mandated by Va.Code Ann. Sec. 2.1-114.5:1 (1987) (amended 1988, 1989, 1990, 1991). ⁶

In University of Tenn. v. Elliott, 478 U.S. 788, 106 S.Ct. 3220, 92 L.Ed.2d 635 (1986), the Supreme Court, in the context of a claim under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983, established the following test for determining when a federal court can review the factfinding of a state administrative agency:

[W]hen a state agency "acting in a judicial capacity ... resolves disputed issues of fact properly before it which the parties have had an adequate opportunity to litigate," federal courts must give the agency's factfinding the same preclusive effect to which it would be entitled in the State's courts.

Id. at 799, 106 S.Ct. at 3226 (quoting United States v. Utah Constr. & Mining Co., 384 U.S. 394, 422, 86 S.Ct. 1545, 1560, 16 L.Ed.2d 642 (1966)) (footnote omitted). ⁷

In the case at bar, all parties agree that the administrative panel acted in a judicial capacity and resolved disputed issues of fact properly before it. Virginia courts are precluded, by the grievance procedure, from reviewing the panel's factfinding. Therefore, if the CCGP provides an adequate opportunity to litigate, then the district court was correct in holding that it was precluded from making any further factual findings. Layne maintains that the CCGP does not afford an adequate opportunity to litigate; consequently, she asserts that she was deprived of her property interest in continued employment without due process of law. ⁸ Hence, according to Layne, a federal court is not precluded from reviewing the panel's decision.

Layne argues that an adequate opportunity to litigate must include the opportunity for court review of adverse agency findings. She supports that position with the following statement: "[I]t is clear that an 'adequate opportunity to litigate' includes giving both parties 'a full and fair opportunity to argue their version of the facts and an opportunity to seek court review of any adverse findings.' " Bradley v. Carydale Enterps., 710 F.Supp. 1063, 1067 (E.D.Va.1989) (quoting Utah Constr. & Mining Co., 384 U.S. at 422, 86 S.Ct. at 1560) (footnote omitted).

Layne's argument is misplaced. First, she relies on Bradley out of context. Bradley was a federal housing discrimination suit in which the court held that the findings of a state agency and a local commission were not entitled to res judicata effect in federal court because "[n]either body acted in a genuine judicial capacity, nor did it appear that state courts would accord preclusive effect to the Board's or Commission's findings." Bradley, 710 F.Supp. at 1069. ⁹

Second, Bradley has quoted Utah Construction out of context. ¹⁰ In Utah Construction, the Court listed the opportunity to seek court review as one of the facts of that particular case. 384 U.S. at 422, 86 S.Ct. at 1560. The Court did not say that in order to have an adequate opportunity to litigate, a party must have the opportunity to seek court review of adverse findings. See id. ¹¹ Importantly, when the Supreme Court relied upon Utah Construction in the later case of University of Tennessee, it quoted as controlling the general principle of Utah Construction, but made no mention of an opportunity to seek court review of adverse findings as an essential component of that principle. 478 U.S. at 799, 106 S.Ct. at 3226 (quoting 384 U.S. at 422, 86 S.Ct. at 1560); see supra at 218-19. ¹²

Finally, if the opportunity for state court review of adverse agency findings was always required in order to comport with due process, then the principle of University of Tennessee would be analytically and practically meaningless. In other words, if an opportunity for state court review of agency findings is mandated, then there is no preclusive effect of agency findings in state courts and, therefore, none required in federal courts under University of Tennessee. Conversely, if the absence of an opportunity for state court review means that the University of Tennessee test is not satisfied, then federal courts are not required to give preclusive effect to a state agency's factfinding. Under Layne's argument, then, there never would be a situation in which federal courts were required to give an agency's factfinding preclusive effect. Clearly, that is not what was contemplated by the Court in University of Tennessee. ¹³

Seventeen years after Utah Construction was decided, and three years before University of Tennessee, this court concluded: "[T]he Supreme Court has not ruled that judicial review of the substantive decision of the hearing officials is required by the due process clause. On the contrary, its decisions imply that an administrative hearing is sufficient." Detweiler v. Commonwealth of Va. Dep't of Rehabilitative Servs., 705 F.2d 557, 561 (4th Cir.1983) (citing Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 349-50, 96 S.Ct. 2074, 2079-80, 48 L.Ed.2d 684 (1976) (dictum); Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 181-86, 94 S.Ct. 1633, 1657-60, 40 L.Ed.2d 15 (1974); Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 603, 92 S.Ct. 2694, 2700, 33 L.Ed.2d 570 (1972)). The Supreme Court in University of Tennessee confirmed this implication that an administrative hearing alone may be sufficient.

In Detweiler, this court held that the Virginia grievance procedure satisfies an employee's right to procedural due process, even though it fails to...