Hooper v. North Carolina
Decision Date | 13 April 2005 |
Docket Number | No. CIV.1:04 CV 00014.,CIV.1:04 CV 00014. |
Citation | 379 F.Supp.2d 804 |
Parties | Deona Renna HOOPER, Plaintiff, v. STATE of North Carolina; North Carolina Central University; North Carolina Central University Campus Police; James H. Ammons, Nccu Chancellor in his official capacity; Chief Mcdonald Vick, Chief of Police in his individual and official capacity; Captain Victor O. Ingram, in his individual and official capacity; Captain Joseph N. Hilliard, in his individual and official capacity; and Lieutenant Michael Watlington, in his individual and official capacity, Defendants. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of North Carolina |
Curtis Scott Holmes, Richard F. Prentis, Jr., Stubbs, Cole, Breedlove, Prentis & Biggs, Patricia D. Evans, The Law Office of Florence A. Bowens, Durham, NC, for Plaintiff.
Joyce S. Rutledge, Kimberly D. Potter, Thomas J. Ziko, N.C. Department of Justice, Raleigh, NC, for Defendants.
Deona Renna Hooper ("Plaintiff") was terminated from employment with North Carolina Central University ("NCCU") in February 2002 upon the completion of an internal investigation regarding various allegations of misconduct. Plaintiff appealed her termination pursuant to university grievance procedures. The Chancellor of NCCU, Defendant James H. Ammons, upheld the investigatory finding that Plaintiff's termination was not based on sex discrimination or retaliation. Plaintiff then appealed to the Office of Administrative Hearings ("OAH"). On October 31, 2002, OAH dismissed Plaintiff's complaint in part, and Plaintiff made no appeal to state court despite being advised of her right to do so.
Plaintiff received a right-to-sue letter regarding her Title VII claim from the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission on October 3, 2003. Plaintiff filed her original federal complaint against the State of North Carolina, NCCU and agents thereof (collectively "Defendants") on January 12, 2004. On March 30, 2004, Defendants filed their first motion to dismiss. Plaintiff filed her first amended complaint as a matter of right on June 3, 2004. Defendants moved to dismiss, and the court granted that motion with leave to re-file the complaint.
Plaintiff filed a second amended complaint ("SAC") on October 29, 2004, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief, compensatory damages, punitive damages, and attorney's fees. Plaintiff's SAC asserts federal claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 as amended (42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.), Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 (20 U.S.C. § 1681 et seq.), and 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985 based on alleged gender discrimination and retaliation, and asserts various state law claims including violations of the North Carolina Constitution, breach of contract, wrongful discharge, intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress, and violations of the wire tapping statute. The matter before the court is Defendants' renewed motion to dismiss all except Plaintiff's Title VII claims pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b).
Defendants contend that the doctrine of collateral estoppel applies to bar Plaintiff from litigating her claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Title IX. Plaintiff asserts that the doctrine of collateral estoppel does not apply because NCCU's administrative process did not allow her to fully and fairly litigate and investigate her claims. Unreviewed administrative findings may have a preclusive effect in federal court only when the administrative process provides a full and fair opportunity to litigate a claim. Univ. of Tenn. v. Elliott, 478 U.S. 788, 799, 106 S.Ct. 3220, 92 L.Ed.2d 635 (1986) (); see United States v. Utah Const. & Min. Co., 384 U.S. 394, 422, 86 S.Ct. 1545, 16 L.Ed.2d 642 (1966) ( ).
The court's analysis in Dai v. Univ. of N.C., at Chapel Hill, 2003 WL 22113444, at *10-12 (M.D.N.C.2003), is helpful in determining the preclusive effect of NCCU's grievance process regarding Plaintiff. The plaintiff in Dai, a research associate professor, filed a claim with the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill's faculty grievance committee after his termination and alleged discrimination on the basis of his age and national origin. The grievance committee determined that Dai had not been the subject of discrimination because his allegations were "unsupported by substantial and credible evidence." Id. at *2. Dai appealed the grievance committee's decision to the university chancellor, then to the university's board of trustees, and finally to the Board of Governors. Dai then initiated a lawsuit in state court, which was removed to the federal district court. The federal district court found that, despite the fact that the grievance committee was not vested with the same inherent powers as are Administrative Law Judges ("ALJs") by N.C. Gen.Stat. § 150B-33, the grievance process afforded Dai a full and fair opportunity to litigate his claims. Id. ( ); see, e.g., Elliott, 478 U.S. at 791-92, 106 S.Ct. 3220 ( ); Layne v. Campbell County Dep't of Soc. Servs., 939 F.2d 217, 219 n. 5 (4th Cir.1991) ( ); Long v. Laramie County Cmty. Coll. Dist., 840 F.2d 743, 746-47 (10th Cir.1988) (, )cert. denied, 488 U.S. 825, 109 S.Ct. 73, 102 L.Ed.2d 50 (1988); Roberts v. County of Fairfax, 937 F.Supp. 541, 544 (E.D.Va.1996) ( ). In reaching its decision, the court noted that "[t]he key factor in each determination [of the cases cited and discussed] was whether the designated officials, regardless of their titles, made their determinations in the course of proceedings in which the employees had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issues presented." Dai, 2003 WL 22113444, at *11. In expanding on what constituted a full and fair opportunity to litigate, the Dai court cited Long, 840 F.2d at 751, for the proposition that the "opportunity to present documentary and testimonial evidence, [the opportunity to] cross-examine witnesses, and [the opportunity to] have advice of counsel [are] among the reasons for finding that the administrative agencies acted in a judicial capacity within the meaning of Elliott." Id.
Here, Plaintiff filed a complaint alleging sex discrimination and retaliation with NCCU's grievance committee.1 The grievance committee found that Plaintiff's termination was justified and her claims lacked merit. Plaintiff appealed the finding to the Chancellor, Defendant Ammons. Defendant Ammons reviewed the grievance committee's findings and issued his own findings, allegedly "including findings that plaintiff had failed to substantiate her allegations of sex discrimination and retaliation"; however, no evidence of his findings is before the court. (Defs.' Mem. Supp. Mot. Dismiss Second Am. Compl. at 4.)
Plaintiff alleges that the grievance committee's findings were deficient because, among other reasons, she was not allowed to examine witnesses directly, testimony was not under oath, there was no discovery process, she was prohibited from asking certain questions, she was prevented from presenting certain evidence, and the committee did not file findings of fact or conclusions supporting their decision to uphold Plaintiff's termination. Defendants seek to refute Plaintiff's contentions by claiming that Plaintiff had the opportunity to have the benefit of counsel, witnesses were examined and cross-examined, documentary evidence was introduced, and the proceedings were recorded. However, dismissal is inappropriate because Plaintiff has alleged facts sufficient to undermine the adequacy of the opportunity afforded her to litigate her claims through NCCU's grievance process. See Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73, 104 S.Ct. 2229, 81 L.Ed.2d 59 (1984) (). Accordingly, the court will deny Defendants' motion to dismiss Plaintiff's claims asserted under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Title IX. See also Hall v. Marion Sch. Dist., 31 F.3d 183, 190-92 (4th Cir.1994) ( ).
Plaintiff concedes that punitive damages are not available against government entities under Title VII and are not available in private actions enforcing Title IX. (Pl.'s Resp. Mot. Dismiss Second Am. Compl., p. 12.) Plaintiff...
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