Layson v. Jackson County

• Decision Date: 09 April 1956
• Docket Number: No. 45054,No. 1,45054,1
• Citation: 290 S.W.2d 109,365 Mo. 905
• Parties: Evelyn F. VAYSON, Respondent, v. JACKSON COUNTY, Missouri, Appellant, Kansas City, Missouri, a Municipal Corporation, Intervenor-Respondent
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

Page 109

290 S.W.2d 109

365 Mo. 905

Evelyn F. VAYSON, Respondent, v. JACKSON COUNTY, Missouri, Appellant, Kansas City, Missouri,

a Municipal Corporation, Intervenor-Respondent.

No. 45054.

Supreme Court of Missouri, Division No. 1.

April 9, 1956.

Motion for Rehearing or to Transfer to Court en Banc Denied

May 14, 1956.

J. Marcus Kirtley, County Counselor, Independence, Louis Wagner, Asst. County Counselor, Kansas City, for appellant.

Benj. M. Powers, City Counselor, J. L. Parks, Asst. City Counselor, Kansas City, for intervenor-respondent.

COIL, Commissioner.

The question presented is whether Jackson County was obligated to pay the entire compensation of the judges and clerks who served in the City of Kansas City at the November 4, 1952, general election or whether the county and city each was obligated to pay one half; at which general election Kansas City submitted to its voters four charter amendments and one municipal bond proposal.

Respondent, plaintiff below, was the assignee of seven warrants, each in the sum of $8, drawn by the Board of Election Commissioners of Kansas City, each payable to one of seven judges of election and directed to the treasurer of Jackson County for payment. Jackson County refused to pay the warrants when presented for the reason that, in the county's view, they were illegally drawn and void because each such draft represented the full amount due the respective judge of election rather than one half the amount so due.

The City of Kansas City intervened as a party defendant and is a respondent here. We have jurisdiction for the reason that Jackson County is a record party. Article V, Sec. 3, Constitution of Missouri 1945, V.A.M.S.

The trial court entered judgment for plaintiff for the face amount of each warrant. Jackson County has appealed and contends, in effect, that the trial court erred in rendering judgment for plaintiff because the county was liable for only one half the amount due each judge of election.

The question as presented here calls for the construction of certain language contained in these two sections of Chapter 117, RSMo 1949, V.A.M.S.:

'[117.140] In all cities to which this chapter applies the salaries of the election commissioners and assistants shall be paid one-half by the city and one-half by the county, or in the case of cities located in more than one county, such salaries shall be paid as is provided by section 117.150. The election commissioners shall each receive a salary of three thousand dollars per year, payable monthly. The members of the board designated as the chairman and the secretary, respectively, shall be paid an additional salary of six hundred dollars per year, payable monthly. The chief assistant employed by the board shall receive a salary not to exceed four thousand dollars per year, payable monthly. Other assistants, not exceeding three in number, shall receive a salary of not to exceed three thousand two hundred dollars per year, payable monthly. Other assistants, not exceeding ten in number, shall receive a salary of not to exceed two thousand nine hundred dollars per year, payable monthly; all other additional assistants, if any, shall receive not to exceed eight dollars per day for the time actually employed. Compensation for overtime services necessarily and actually performed by any persons employed at the office of the board may be paid at the rate of such employee's regular pay. Precinct judges and clerks shall receive as pay eight dollars for each day or part of day while on duty, except pay shall be allowed only for those days mentioned in this chapter. All expenses incurred by said board of election commissioners and all costs and expenses of registration and election in such cities shall be paid one-half out of the city treasury and one-half out of the county treasury, or in the case of cities located in more than one county all such expenses shall be paid as is provided by section 117.150.' (Our italics.)

'[117.170] At all general, county, state or other elections which include officers elected throughout a whole county, although other than state or county officers are also elected, and at all special elections for a county or state officer or member of congress or member of the legislature, each such county shall pay the judges and clerks of election for their services under this chapter in connection with the election held within each such respective county.'

It is apparent that the dispute is essentially between Kansas City and Jackson County and resolves itself into whether the following language of Section 117.140, supra, or the following language of Section 117.170, supra, was applicable to the facts: '[117.140] All expenses incurred by said board of election commissioners and all costs and expenses of registration and election in such cities shall be paid one-half out of the city treasury and one-half out of the county treasury, * * *.' '[117.170] At all general, * * * elections which include officers elected throughout a whole county, although other than state or county officers are also elected, * * * each such county shall pay the judges and clerks of election for their services * * *.'

Jackson County contends that compensation of judges and clerks is an expense of election within the language of Section 117.140, supra, while Kansas City contends that the November 4, 1952, election, being a general election which included officers elected throughout Jackson County, was controlled by the provisions of Section 117.170, supra, in so far as concerned payment of judges and clerks.

We bear in mind that these statutes relating to the payment of judges and clerks of election must be read in pari materia and, if possible, effect given to each clause and provision, Davenport v. Teeters, Mo.App., 273 S.W.2d 506, 510[1, 2]; that where one statute deals with a subject in general and comprehensive terms and another deals with the same subject in a more minute and definite way, the two should be read together and harmonized if possible, with a view to giving effect to a consistent legislative policy, but that to the extent of any repugnancy between them the definite prevails over the general, State ex rel. Buchanan County v. Fulks, 296 Mo. 614, 626, 247 S.W. 129, 132; and that we must, if possible, reconcile any apparent conflict in these two statutes with the general legislative purpose, State ex rel. McKittrick v. Carolene Products Co., 346 Mo. 1049, 1059, 144 S.W.2d 153, 155[2, 3].

We have no difficulty in harmonizing the provisions of the above-quoted sections and in arriving at the conclusion that the provisions of Section 117.170 were applicable to the instant facts. We agree with the county that the language of Section 117.140 (i. e., the words 'expenses of * * * election'), standing alone, included the compensation of judges of elections, and that there existed a seeming conflict between that section and Section 117.170 which specifically provided for the county to pay the expenses of the judges of election at all general elections. But when other relevant matters, including other sections of the same chapter of the statutes, are considered, we think that seeming conflict disappears.

Section 117.050 provided for the creation of a board of election commissioners in Kansas City and, among other things, prescribed their powers and duties. Subsection 6 of Section 117.050 gave the board of election commissioners the power to make rules and regulations for 'the registration of voters and the conduct of elections'. (Our italics.) Section 117.250 provided that the board of election commissioners 'shall provide all necessary ballot boxes and all registry records, poll books, tally sheets, ballots, blanks and stationery of every description, * * * and other equipment necessary and proper for the registry of voters and the conduct of such elections * * *.' (Our italics.) Those expressions, 'registration of voters' and 'conduct of elections', used in other sections of the same chapter considered in connection...