Layton v. State

• Decision Date: 09 January 2007
• Docket Number: No. 05-152.,05-152.
• Citation: 150 P.3d 173,2007 WY 1
• Parties: James Walter LAYTON, Appellant (Defendant), v. The STATE of Wyoming, Appellee (Plaintiff).
• Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

150 P.3d 173

2007 WY 1

James Walter LAYTON, Appellant (Defendant), v. The STATE of Wyoming, Appellee (Plaintiff).

No. 05-152.

Supreme Court of Wyoming.

January 9, 2007.

Representing Appellant: Kenneth M. Koski, State Public Defender; Donna D. Domonkos, Appellate Counsel. Argument by Ms. Domonkos.

Representing Appellee: Patrick J. Crank, Wyoming Attorney General; Paul S. Rehurek, Deputy Attorney General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Eric A. Johnson, Faculty Director, Jonathan Haidsiak, Student Director, and Rickey D. Turner, Jr., Student Intern, of the Prosecution Assistance Program. Argument by Mr. Turner.

Before VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL,^* KITE, BURKE, JJ.

GOLDEN, Justice.

[¶ 1] Appellant James Walter Layton appeals from the judgment and sentence entered after a jury found him guilty of five felonies. Layton seeks to have his convictions reversed based on a claimed violation of the Interstate Agreement on Detainers. Layton also challenges the validity of the district court's order requiring him to pay restitution for a stolen jeep and the personal property that was inside the jeep. We affirm.

ISSUES

[¶ 2] Layton presents the following issues for our review:

I. Whether all charges should have been dismissed under the Interstate Agreement on Detainers.

II. Whether the district court erroneously ordered restitution for the stolen vehicle which was recovered and the items within the vehicle which Appellant was never charged, nor admitted to, stealing.

FACTS

[¶ 3] Around midnight on August 11, 2003, Highway Patrol Trooper Theodore Bair encountered Layton at Fremont Toyota in Lander, Wyoming, as Layton was trying to steal a Pontiac Firebird. The two men fought as Trooper Bair tried to apprehend Layton, but Layton managed to escape and flee. Layton then stole a Jeep Grand Cherokee that was parked in front of a nearby trailer house and drove it to Davenport, Iowa, where he disposed of the vehicle.

[¶ 4] On August 25, 2003, the State of Wyoming charged Layton with four felonies arising out of the incident at Fremont Toyota (1) burglary based on Layton's unlawful entry into the Pontiac Firebird with the intent to commit a larceny, a violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-3-301(a) and (b) (LexisNexis 2005); (2) attempted larceny of the Pontiac Firebird, a violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-3-402(a) and (c)(i) (LexisNexis 2003);¹ (3) property destruction based on Layton's breaking of one of the Firebird's windows in order to gain entrance into the vehicle and steal it, a violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-3-201(a) and (b)(iii) (LexisNexis 2003); and (4) attempted first degree murder of Trooper Bair, a violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 6-2-101(a), 6-1-301 and 6-1-304 (LexisNexis 2005). The murder charge was accompanied by a habitual criminal enhancement pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-10-201(a)(ii) and (b)(ii) (LexisNexis 2005).

[¶ 5] By the time the State located Layton he was serving a prison sentence in an Oregon penitentiary. The State filed a detainer² against him for the pending criminal charges. Layton eventually requested final disposition of the Wyoming charges under Article III(a) of the Interstate Agreement on Detainers ("IAD"). On January 14, 2004, the State accepted temporary custody of Layton under the IAD for the purpose of prosecuting him on the pending charges.

[¶ 6] Before a preliminary hearing was held on the charges,³ the State filed an amended information that contained eight criminal charges. The amended information enhanced the original burglary count to aggravated burglary as defined by Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-3-301(c)(ii) (LexisNexis 2005) (Count 1), and included the felony larceny and felony property destruction counts that were contained in the original information (Counts 2 and 3). It also charged Layton with five additional counts: robbery based on the attempted larceny of the Firebird and the bodily injuries inflicted on Trooper Bair (Count 4), a violation of Wyo.Stat. Ann. § 6-2-401(a)(i) and (b) (LexisNexis 2005); attempted interference with a peace officer based on Layton's efforts to take Trooper Bair's firearm during their fight (Count 5), a violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 6-1-301 and 6-5-204(c) (LexisNexis 2005); burglary based on Layton's unlawful entry into the Jeep Cherokee with the intent to steal the vehicle (Count 6), a violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-3-301(a) and (b) (LexisNexis 2005); felony larceny for the theft of the Jeep Cherokee (Count 7), a violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-3-402(a) and (c)(i) (LexisNexis 2003); and wrongful taking or disposing of property based on Layton's disposing of the Jeep in Iowa (Count 8), a violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-3-403(a)(i) (LexisNexis 2003). The charges of aggravated burglary and robbery (Counts 1 and 4) were accompanied by a habitual criminal enhancement under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-10-201(a)(ii) and (b)(ii) (LexisNexis 2005). Layton ultimately waived his preliminary hearing on the charges and was bound over to district court. Layton appeared for arraignment on May 26, 2004, and the district court set his trial date for October 12, 2004.

[¶ 7] On September 9, 2004, Layton filed a motion to dismiss the criminal charges with prejudice, claiming a violation of his speedy trial and due process rights under the IAD. After a hearing on the motion, the district court dismissed with prejudice Counts 1, 2, and 3 of the amended information because of a violation of the 180-day speedy trial requirement of the IAD but declined to dismiss the remaining counts.⁴ In its ruling, the district court drew a distinction between the charges upon which the State's detainer was lodged and for which Layton was returned to Wyoming to stand trial (Counts 1 through 3, hereinafter "detainer charges") and those which were not the subject of that detainer (Counts 4 through 8, hereinafter "non-detainer charges").⁵ Relying on United States v. Sanders, 669 F.2d 609 (9th Cir.1982), and Espinoza v. State, 949 S.W.2d 10 (Tex.App. Ct.1997), the district court ruled that the 180-day time limit imposed by the IAD was inapplicable to the non-detainer charges.

[¶ 8] Layton's trial commenced as scheduled on October 12, 2004. After a two-day trial, the jury found Layton guilty on all five counts.⁶ The district court sentenced Layton to a combined prison term of not less than twenty-two and one-half (22½) years and not more than twenty-five (25) years, to be served consecutive to his Oregon sentence, and ordered him to pay restitution in the amount of $24,902.80. This appeal followed.

DISCUSSION

Interstate Agreement on Detainers

[¶ 9] Layton claims the district court erred in holding that the 180-day time limit provided by Article III of the IAD was not applicable to the non-detainer charges, Counts 4 through 8. Layton contends that the provision applies to those offenses because they arose out of the same criminal transaction as the original criminal charges referenced by the State's detainer.⁷ In this regard, Layton places significance on the fact that both the detainer and non-detainer charges were incorporated in the same charging document. Layton's claim is best described as an argument for a generous interpretation of the 180-day rule and the dismissal provision of the IAD. We reject Layton's argument.

[¶ 10] The question whether the district court erred in its determination that the IAD does not apply to the non-detainer charges is a question of statutory construction, which we review de novo. Odhinn v. State, 2003 WY 169, ¶ 13, 82 P.3d 715, 719 (Wyo.2003). We recently stated:

In construing statutes, our aim is to effectuate legislative intent. Director of Office of State Lands & Investments v. Merbanco, Inc., 2003 WY 73, 70 P.3d 241 (Wyo.2003). If the language is sufficiently clear, we do not resort to rules of construction. Id. We apply our general rule that we look to the ordinary and obvious meaning of a statute when the language is unambiguous. Id. We also construe a statute so as to give effect to all of its provisions. Id.

Odhinn, ¶ 14, 82 P.3d at 719.

[¶ 11] The IAD is a congressionally sanctioned compact among forty-eight states. Id., ¶ 17, 82 P.3d at 720 (citing Alabama v. Bozeman, 533 U.S. 146, 148, 121 S.Ct. 2079, 150 L.Ed.2d 188 (2001)). The IAD provides an expeditious, simplified method of orderly disposition of charges pending in one state against a person imprisoned in another state. Id. Wyoming's version of the IAD is contained in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-15-101 (LexisNexis 2005), and states in relevant part:

Article III

(a) Whenever a person has entered upon a term of imprisonment in a penal or correctional institution of a party state, and whenever during the continuance of the term of imprisonment there is pending in any other party state any untried indictment, information or complaint on the basis of which a detainer has been lodged against the prisoner, he shall be brought to trial at the next term of court[⁸] after he shall have caused to be delivered to the prosecuting officer and the appropriate court of the prosecuting officer's jurisdiction written notice of the place of his imprisonment and his request for a final disposition to be made of the indictment, information or complaint; provided that for good cause shown in open court, the prisoner or his counsel being present, the court having jurisdiction of the matter may grant any necessary or reasonable continuance....

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(d) Any request for final disposition made by a prisoner pursuant to paragraph (a) hereof shall operate as a request for final disposition of all untried indictments, informations or complaints on the basis of which detainers have been lodged against the prisoner from the state to whose prosecuting official the request for final disposition is specifically directed....

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Article V

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(c) . . . [I]n the event that an action on the indictment, information or complaint on the basis of which the detainer has been lodged is...