People v. Abrams

• Decision Date: 05 January 2018
• Docket Number: C077172
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. JOHN THOMAS ABRAMS, Defendant and Respondent.

THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. JOHN THOMAS ABRAMS, Defendant and Respondent.

C077172

COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT (Sacramento)

January 5, 2018

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

(Super. Ct. No. 14F04292)

While defendant John Thomas Abrams was serving a prison sentence in Nevada, the Sacramento County District Attorney (DA) filed a detainer, i.e., a request asking the institution in which defendant was incarcerated to either hold him for the DA or notify the DA when defendant's release was imminent. (Carchman v. Nash (1985) 473 U.S. 716, 719 (Carchman).) The detainer was based on a complaint filed by the DA charging defendant in Sacramento County with nine counts of lewd and lascivious acts with a minor.

The Interstate Agreement on Detainers (IAD, Pen. Code, § 1389 et seq.)¹ required the DA to bring defendant to trial on the complaint within 180 days after defendant asked the DA for a final disposition of the complaint, but when the DA did not meet the 180-day deadline, the DA dismissed the initial complaint charging lewd acts. However, the DA subsequently filed a second complaint against defendant asserting different charges based on the same underlying conduct: the second complaint did not charge defendant with lewd acts, it charged him with oral copulation, sexual penetration by a foreign object and sodomy. The trial court dismissed the second complaint, ruling that the IAD barred the second complaint (even though a detainer had not been filed regarding the second complaint or the specific charges asserted in the second complaint) because the second complaint was based on the same underlying conduct as the first complaint. We will reverse the judgment.

BACKGROUND

The DA filed a complaint against defendant in Sacramento County Superior Court case No. 12F06393 on October 11, 2012. The complaint asserted nine counts alleging lewd and lascivious acts with victim A.R. between July 12, 2012, and July 22, 2012 (§ 288, subd. (c)(1)). Counts one and two charged lewd acts based on alleged oral copulation at the Greenbrier Motel. Count three charged a lewd act based on alleged sexual penetration with a foreign object. Count four charged a lewd act based on alleged anal sex at the Greenbrier Motel. Count five charged lewd acts based on defendant allegedly kissing the minor's neck and mouth at the Greenbrier Motel. Count six charged a lewd act based on alleged oral copulation at Discovery Park. Counts seven and eight charged lewd acts based on alleged oral copulation at the Greenbrier Motel with M.C.present. And count nine charged a lewd act based on the alleged anal sex at the Greenbrier Motel with M.C. present.

The Nevada Department of Corrections acknowledged receipt of a detainer filed by the DA against defendant pursuant to the IAD. Defendant was serving a prison sentence in Nevada at the time for crimes unrelated to those in the case before us.

On July 9, 2013, defendant sent a request for disposition of indictments, informations or complaints to the DA and the Clerk of the Sacramento County Superior Court in relation to case No. 12F06393. Defendant requested final disposition of all untried indictments, informations or complaints on the basis of which detainers had been lodged against him pursuant to the IAD. The DA received defendant's request on July 23, 2013.

The DA sent Nevada a written request to transfer defendant to Sacramento for trial. Defendant was eventually transferred to Sacramento and arraigned on the complaint in case No. 12F06393, but the DA subsequently dismissed the complaint apparently because the DA failed to bring defendant to trial within the 180-day limit in section 1389.

The DA then filed a second complaint on June 26, 2014 (Sacramento County Superior Court case No. 14F04292), charging defendant with sexual offenses against Jane Doe which allegedly occurred between July 12, 2012, and July 22, 2012. Counts one and two charged oral copulation (§ 288a, subd. (c)(2)) at the Greenbrier Motel. Count three charged sexual penetration with a foreign object (§ 289, subd. (a)(1)). Count four charged sodomy (§ 286, subd. (c)(2)). Count five charged oral copulation at Discovery Park. Counts six and seven charged oral copulation at the Greenbrier Motel with M.C. present. And count eight charged sodomy (§ 286, subd. (c)(2)). While count eight alleged an act of sodomy with John Doe, this appears to be a drafting error because the People and defendant agreed the charges in case No. 14F04292 were based on the same acts as the charges in case No. 12F06393.

Defendant was arraigned on the complaint in case No. 14F04292, entered a not guilty plea, and then moved to dismiss the case pursuant to section 1389 on the ground that the conduct alleged in case No. 14F04292 was the same as the conduct alleged in dismissed case No. 12F06393. The People opposed the motion. The trial court said the question was how the IAD treats an act that can violate more than one statute, and acknowledged that the decision was difficult. The trial court recognized that cases cited by the parties held that only the specific charges subject to a detainer had to be dismissed, but the trial court said those cases did not appear to contain the same "identity of charges" as appears in this case. Nevertheless, the trial court ultimately focused on the fact that here, the conduct underlying the charges in each complaint were exactly the same. The trial court granted the motion to dismiss the second complaint pursuant to section 1389.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

This case concerns the interpretation of section 1389. That statute codified the IAD, a compact among 48 States, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, and the United States. (Carchman, supra, 473 U.S. at p. 719.) Because it is a congressionally-sanctioned interstate compact, the IAD is a federal law subject to federal construction. (Id. at p. 719.)

Our task is guided by well settled rules. We review de novo issues involving the interpretation of statutes. (People v. Mgebrov (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 579, 585.) Our goal is to ascertain and effectuate legislative intent. (People v. Ramirez (2009) 45 Cal.4th 980, 987.) In order to determine that intent, we begin by examining the language of the statute. (People v. Thomas (1992) 4 Cal.4th 206, 210.) We give " 'the words of the statute their usual and ordinary meaning. When the statutory language is clear, we need go no further. If, however, the language supports more than one reasonable interpretation, we look to a variety of extrinsic aids, including the objects to be achieved, the evils to be remedied, legislative history, the statutory scheme of which the statute is apart, contemporaneous administrative construction, and questions of public policy.' " (People v. Ramirez, supra, at p. 987.)

DISCUSSION

The Attorney General argues the trial court erred in dismissing the second complaint because the charges in that complaint are different from those in the complaint upon which the detainer was based.

The focus of the IAD is on detainers. "Adoption of the [IAD] was motivated in part by a practice of filing detainers based on untried criminal charges that had little basis. These detainers often would be withdrawn shortly before the prisoner was released. Even though unsubstantiated, the detainers would have a detrimental effect on the prisoner's treatment. Article III [of the IAD] enables a prisoner to require the State lodging the detainer either to drop the charge and resulting detainer or to bring the prisoner to trial. In this way, the prisoner can clear his record of detainers based on unsubstantiated charges." (Carchman, supra, 473 U.S. at pp. 729-730; United States v. Mauro (1978) 436 U.S. 340, 359-360 .) Accordingly, article I of section 1389 states that it is a purpose of the statute to encourage the expeditious and orderly disposition of charges outstanding against a prisoner. (Carchman, supra, at p. 720.) Article I recognizes that charges outstanding against a prisoner produce uncertainties which obstruct programs of prisoner treatment and rehabilitation. (§ 1389; Carchman, supra, at pp. 719-720.) The provisions of the IAD are triggered only when a detainer is filed with the custodial state by another state having untried charges pending against the prisoner. (United States v. Mauro, supra, at p. 343.)

Specifically, section 1389 provides that an official having custody of a prisoner shall promptly inform the prisoner of the source and contents of any detainer lodged against him or her and of his or her right to make a request for final disposition of an indictment, information or complaint on which the detainer is based. (§ 1389, art. III, subds. (a), (c), (d).) The prisoner shall be brought to trial within 180 days after causing tobe delivered written notice of the place of his or her imprisonment and his or her request for a final disposition to be made of the indictment, information or complaint, provided that the court may grant a necessary or reasonable continuance for good cause shown. (§ 1389, art. III, subd. (a).) If the prisoner is not brought to trial within 180 days, the court shall dismiss the indictment, information or complaint on which the detainer is based, and the related detainer shall cease to be of any force or effect. (§ 1389, art. V, subd. (c).) The language of section 1389 confirms that its provisions apply to matters on which a detainer is based. (See Layton v. State (Wyo. 2007) 150 P.3d 173, 177-178 (Layton); Grant v. United States (D.C. 2004) 856 A.2d 1131, 1139-1141; Espinoza v. State (Tex.Ct.App. 1997) 949 S.W.2d 10, 12-13 (Espinoza); Johnson v. State (Tex.Ct.App. 1995)...