Lazaro v. Burriss Electrical
Decision Date | 08 August 2018 |
Docket Number | 2018-UP-352 |
Parties | Decidora Lazaro, on behalf of the Estate of Antonio Lazaro, Employee, Appellant, v. Burriss Electrical, Employer, and South Carolina Guaranty Association, Carrier, Respondents. |
Court | South Carolina Court of Appeals |
THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.
Heard May 17, 2018
Preston F. McDaniel, of McDaniel Law Firm, of Columbia, for Appellant.
Brett Harris Bayne, of McAngus Goudelock & Courie, LLC, of Columbia, for Respondents.
Antonio Lazaro (Claimant) appeals the order of the Appellate Panel of the South Carolina Workers' Compensation Commission (the Commission) denying his request for a partial lump sum payment and adjustment of his average weekly wage and compensation rate. Claimant argues the Commission erred in denying his request for a partial lump sum payment by finding the award was not in his or his dependents' best interests, finding he was entitled to only 500 weeks of benefits, and considering evidence of his life expectancy following his injury. Claimant further argues the record shows he was entitled to an increase in his average weekly wage and compensation rate, and the Commission erred by comparing him to his employer's non-English speaking Hispanic employees in determining his average weekly wage. We affirm.
1. We find the Commission did not err in considering medical evidence in determining Claimant's life expectancy. See Lark v. Bi-Lo, Inc., 276 S.C. 130, 135, 276 S.E.2d 304, 306 (1981) ( ); S.C. Code Ann §1-23-380(5) (Supp. 2017) ( ); Ashley v. Ware Shoals Mfg. Co., 210 S.C. 273, 286, 42 S.E.2d 390, 396 (1947) (); id. at 287, 42 S.E.2d at 396 ("[I]f the total disability is such that there may be a change of condition or if a serious question is presented regarding the likelihood of the employee's living the length of time required to complete the installment payments the allowance of a lump sum settlement over the objection of the employer or carrier would constitute an abuse of discretion which the appellate courts are empowered to review."); Glover by Cauthen v. Suitt Constr. Co., 318 S.C. 465, 467 n.3, 458 S.E.2d 535, 537 n.3 (1995) ( ); S.C. Code Ann. § 19-1-150 (2014) ; Haselden v. Davis, 341 S.C. 486, 506, 534 S.E.2d 295, 306 (Ct. App. 2000) (, a factfinder is not bound by the life expectancy as indicated in the mortality table)aff'd, 353 S.C. 481, 579 S.E.2d 293 (2003).[1]
2. We find the Commission did not abuse its discretion in denying Claimant's request for a second partial lump sum payment because evidence supports the Commission's finding that this second lump sum payment was not in Claimant's or his dependents' best interests, and this request was tantamount to a total lump sum request.[2] See S.C. Code Ann. § 42-9-301 (2015) ( ); Thompson v. S.C. Steel Erectors, 369 S.C. 606, 612, 632 S.E.2d 874, 878 (Ct. App. 2006) (); § 42-9-301 ; Ashley, 210 S.C. at 287, 42 S.E.2d at 396 (); S.C. Code Ann. § 42-9-10 (2015) (prohibiting total lump sum payments in cases where a claimant has been awarded lifetime benefits).
3. We find the Commission did not err in refusing to increase Claimant's compensation rate. See Pilgrim v Eaton, 391 S.C. 38, 44, 703 S.E.2d 241, 243-44 (Ct. App. 2010) (...
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