LDS, Inc. v. Healy
| Decision Date | 22 January 1979 |
| Docket Number | No. 28100,28100 |
| Citation | 589 P.2d 490,197 Colo. 19 |
| Parties | LDS, INC., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Thomas V. HEALY, Henry L. Strauss and W. R. Bray, as members of the Real Estate Commission, Defendants-Appellees. |
| Court | Colorado Supreme Court |
Robert Dunlap, Colorado Springs, for plaintiff-appellant.
J. D. MacFarlane, Atty. Gen., David W. Robbins, Deputy Atty. Gen., Edward G. Donovan, Sol. Gen., Jacqueline Vermeulen, Asst. Atty. Gen., Denver, for defendants-appellees.
Appellant, a licensed real estate subdivision developer, brought this declaratory judgment action in the district court seeking a judicial determination that section 12-61-405, C.R.S. 1973, governing revocation of a subdivider's license, is facially unconstitutional. The district court declared the section to be constitutional and granted the appellee's motion for summary judgment. We reverse.
The appellant claims that the word "reputation" in subsection (1)(a) and the term "unethical practices" as used in subsection (1)(e) of the license revocation statute are void for vagueness. Those sections read:
(Emphasis added.)
We hold that these provisions are unconstitutionally vague.
The vagueness doctrine is grounded upon two closely-related principles of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. First, a statute is void for vagueness if its prohibitions are not sufficiently defined so as to give fair warning as to what conduct is prohibited. Where "men of common intelligence must guess at the law's meaning and differ as to its application," the law must fail. Connally v. General Construction Co., 269 U.S. 385, 46 S.Ct. 126, 70 L.Ed. 322 (1926); Weissman v. Board of Education of Jefferson County School District No. R-1, 190 Colo. 414, 547 P.2d 1267 (1976); People v. Blue, 190 Colo. 95, 544 P.2d 385 (1975); Trail Ridge Ford, Inc. v. Colorado Dealer Licensing Board, 190 Colo. 82, 543 P.2d 1245 (1975).
Second, a statute is too vague where it contains no explicit standards for application so that a danger of arbitrary and capricious enforcement exists. Where one is deprived of liberty or property for violating a statutory prohibition, due process requires that the prohibition be explicit enough to allow for meaningful judicial review. 1 See generally, Note, The Void-For-Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 109 U.Pa.L.Rev. 67 (1960); Note, Vagueness Doctrine in the Federal Courts: A focus on the Military, Prison, and Campus Contexts, 26 Stan.L.Rev. 855 (1974).
Applying these principles to the challenged provisions, we find that the word "reputation" renders subsection (1)(a) unconstitutional on its face. Reputation is not a standard of conduct, but is merely an opinion of the community. Clearly it provides no fair warning as to what conduct is prohibited. Where community opinion rather than a specific act can be relied upon to revoke a subdivider's license, there exists a danger of arbitrary and capricious revocation by the real estate board. Hence, we hold subsection (1) (a) to be invalid. To the extent Shaffer & Co. v. Prosser, 99 Colo. 335, 62 P.2d 1161 (1936) is inconsistent with this view, it is expressly overruled.
Nor can the term "unethical practices" as used in subsection (1)(e) pass constitutional muster. We find Trail Ridge Ford, supra, controlling on this issue. In that case, dealing with suspension of an automobile dealer's license, we found "unconscionability" to be too vague. We said:
Id. 190 Colo. at 84, 543 P.2d at 1246.
In the present case, "unethical practices" displays the same infirmity as did "unconscionability" in Trail Ridge Ford. We acknowledge that either the legislature or the real estate board could confine the term to proper constitutional specificity by promulgating a code of ethics to govern business practices of...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
People v. Ford
...v. Ford, found that criminal liability could not be premised on community opinion rather than a specific act, citing LDS, Inc. v. Healy, 197 Colo. 19, 589 P.2d 490 (1979). In Healy, we determined that a statute which permitted revocation of a subdivider's license on the basis of his reputat......
-
Exotic Coins, Inc. v. Beacom, s. 82SA465
...and capricious enforcement. Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 92 S.Ct. 839, 31 L.Ed.2d 110 (1972); LDS, Inc. v. Healy, 197 Colo. 19, 589 P.2d 490 (1979). In analyzing a penal statute for vagueness, we use a well-established test: if the statute fairly describes the conduct......
-
People v. Taggart
...is required in statutory drafting. E. g., Colorado Auto & Truck Wreckers Ass'n. v. Dept. of Revenue, supra; LDS, Inc. v. Healy, 197 Colo. 19, 589 P.2d 490 (1979); People v. Blue, 190 Colo. 95, 544 P.2d 385 (1975). "Tortured" and "cruelly punished" do not refer to the mens rea of the crime o......
-
People in Interest of C. M.
...statutory terms which constitute the basis of the underlying prosecution, requisite standing exists. See, e. g., L.D.S., Inc. v. Healy, 197 Colo. 19, 589 P.2d 490 (1979); People v. Vinnola, 177 Colo. 405, 494 P.2d 826 (1972). Neither a detailed charging document nor a fully developed factua......
-
Moral Character of the Liquor Licensee or Applicant
...Lounge, Inc. v. City and County of Denver, 890 P.2d 164 (Colo. App. 1994); CRS § 12-46-103(1.7), (4.5). 11. JRM, Inc., supra, note 4. 12. 589 P.2d 490 (Colo. 1979). 13. Hartman v. Wadlow, 545 P.2d 738 (Colo. App. 1975). 14. CRS § 12-47-137(2)(a). 15. Wadlow v. Hartman, 551 P.2d 201 (Colo. 1......