Leach v. State

Decision Date26 April 2012
Docket NumberNo. CR 11–932.,CR 11–932.
Citation2012 Ark. 179,402 S.W.3d 517
PartiesRaymond David LEACH III, Appellant v. STATE of Arkansas, Appellee.
CourtArkansas Supreme Court

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Randy Rainwater, Attorney at Law, Mena, for appellant.

Dustin McDaniel, Attorney General, Karen Virginia Wallace, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.

JIM GUNTER, Justice.

Appellant, Raymond David Leach III, was convicted of capital murder and sentenced to life in prison without parole. On appeal, he claims five points warrant reversal of his conviction: that the circuit court erred in not allowing appellant to cross-examine Tyler Prine regarding threats he allegedly made to another witness; that the circuit court erred in denying appellant's motion for directed verdict on capital murder; that the circuit court erred in denying appellant's motion to suppress his statement; that the circuit court erred in allowing inadmissible evidence; and that the circuit court erred in allowing a law-enforcement officer to give his opinion. Because appellant was sentenced to life in prison without parole, our jurisdiction is pursuant to Arkansas Supreme Court Rule 1–2(a)(2). We affirm.

On July 17, 2009, at approximately 3:00 a.m., Officer Bo Hayes with the Polk County Sheriff's Department responded to an emergency call of a possible murder at an intersection in Cove, Arkansas. Upon arriving, he discovered four people, including appellant, gathered near a pick-up truck. Christopher Casey, who had been stabbed in the neck, face, and chest, was found in the driver's seat of the pick-up truck. The other three people present—Tammy Shepard,1 Jack Shepard, and Tyler Prine—all indicated to Officer Hayes that appellant had stabbed Casey. Appellant was placed under arrest and later charged with premeditated and deliberate capital murder.

Appellant's jury trial was held in Polk County Circuit Court in June 2011 where the following evidence was presented. Jack Shepard testified that when he left his home between 2:30 and 2:45 a.m. to go to work on July 17, 2009, he noticed Tyler Prine's truck blocking the road. Prine was Shepard's cousin by marriage and lived nearby. When Shepard stopped, he saw Prine and a “skinny dude” whom he identified in court as appellant; both were drunk; and appellant appeared agitated, walking in circles and throwing his hands in the air. Shepard testified that he saw appellant toss something into the back of the truck. Prine then walked over to Shepard and said that appellant had just stabbed and killed the driver of the truck. Shepard exited his truck to go check on the driver. Shepard stated that he heard appellant repeatedly say that he had stabbed the driver because Prine wanted appellant to do so and that he and Prine needed to take the truck and get rid of the body. After Shepard found the driver slumped over the steering wheel and bleeding profusely, he returned to his house to retrieve his wife, Tammy Shepard, who was a nurse, and to call 911.

Tyler Prine testified that after work on July 16, 2009, he went to a party where he drank alcohol and smoked marijuana. He stated that appellant was there and was “pretty drunk.” Prine testified that he left the party with appellant and Casey to go to Kevin Burkett's house, was unsure how long they stayed, but remembered passing out in his truck and asking appellant and Casey to take him home. With Prine in the middle of the truck, Casey drove, and appellant was seated by the passenger door. Prine said that when they were near his house, appellant jumped over Prine and began punching Casey. When Prine attempted to grab appellant, Prine realized that appellant had a knife. Prine and appellant jumped out of the truck. Appellant asked what he ought to do with the knife, and Prine said to put it in the tool box. Prine testified that he asked appellant why he had stabbed Casey and that appellant said that he thought Prine wanted him to do so. Prine denied asking appellant to kill Casey. After Shepard came back with his wife, they all waited for the police to arrive. Prine stated that he told the police the knife was in the tool box.

Buck Bailey of the Polk County Sheriff's Office testified that he transported appellant, who was “very intoxicated,” to the jail but that despite appellant's intoxication, he followed orders. Special Agent Gordon Diffee with the Arkansas State Police testified that he collected evidence from the crime scene, including a butterfly knife with a six-inch blade found in the truck's tool box, and that he took photographs of the scene and appellant. During Agent Diffee's interview with appellant, he claimed that he had been drinking heavily and taking prescription drugs on the evening of July 16, 2009; that he did not remember getting in the truck with Prine and Casey; that he did not remember stabbing Casey; and that he did not kill anyone. He also admitted that he owned several knives, including a butterfly knife with a six-inch blade. Dr. Paul DeYoub, who performed a court-ordered psychological examination of appellant, testified that appellant admitted that he owned the knife that Agent Diffee had recovered from the crime scene.

The State also presented the testimony of Joshua Kyle, who testified that he saw appellant at a party on the evening of July 16, that appellant was “extremely intoxicated,” and that he “talked all night about killing somebody.” Kyle stated that appellant was talking like he could “whop [sic] anybody's butt and no one [could] stop him.”

Forensic experts testified that there was blood on the knife found in the tool box of Prine's truck and on the pants appellant was wearing when he was arrested. DNA tests matched the blood on those items to Casey within all scientific certainty. The medical examiner testified that Casey died from multiple stab wounds, including a nonsurvivable stab wound to the chest that perforated his heart. The medical examinerstated that the wounds could have been made with the knife found in the tool box.

The jury returned a verdict of guilty on capital murder, and the court sentenced appellant to life in prison. The judgment and commitment order was filed on June 22, 2011, and appellant filed a timely notice of appeal the following day.

I. Denial of Directed Verdict

Appellant argues that the circuit court erred in denying his motion for directed verdict on capital murder because the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant acted with the premeditated and deliberate purpose to cause death and that he caused Casey's death. He asserts that the evidence established that appellant was intoxicated at the time of the offense, that he could not form the requisite mental state, and that there was no evidence to support a finding of premeditation or causation.

We have held that a motion for a directed verdict is a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence. Arnett v. State, 353 Ark. 165, 122 S.W.3d 484 (2003). Although appellant raises his challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence in his second point on appeal, double-jeopardy concerns require that this court review sufficiency arguments first. Williams v. State, 2011 Ark. 432, 385 S.W.3d 157. The test for such motions is whether the verdict is supported by substantial evidence, direct or circumstantial. Id. Substantial evidence is evidence of sufficient certainty and precision to compel a conclusion one way or another and pass beyond mere suspicion or conjecture. Id. On appeal, we review the evidence in the light most favorable to the State and consider only the evidence that supports the verdict. Id. Moreover, we have held that the credibility of witnesses is a matter for the jury's consideration. Id. Where the testimony is conflicting, we do not pass upon the credibility of the witnesses and have no right to disregard the testimony of any witness after the jury has given it full credence, where it cannot be said with assurance that it was inherently improbable, physically impossible, or so clearly unbelievable that reasonable minds could not differ thereon. Id.

A defendant commits capital murder, if, with the premeditated and deliberate purpose of causing the death of another person, he causes the death of any person. Ark.Code Ann. § 5–10–101(a)(4) (Supp.2011). Premeditated and deliberate murder occurs when the killer's conscious object is to cause death, and he forms that intention before he acts and as a result of a weighing of the consequences of his course of conduct. Evans v. State, 2011 Ark. 33, 378 S.W.3d 82. Premeditation is not required to exist for a particular length of time. Carmichael v. State, 340 Ark. 598, 12 S.W.3d 225 (2000). It may be formed in an instant and is rarely capable of proof by direct evidence but must usually be inferred from the circumstances of the crime. Pearcy v. State, 2010 Ark. 454, 375 S.W.3d 622. Similarly, premeditation and deliberation may be inferred from the type and character of the weapon, the manner in which the weapon was used, the nature, extent, and location of the wounds, and the accused's conduct. Robinson v. State, 363 Ark. 432, 214 S.W.3d 840 (2005).

We are convinced that there was sufficient evidence from which a jury could conclude, without speculation or conjecture, that appellant acted with the premeditated and deliberate purpose to cause the death of Christopher Casey and that he did in fact cause Casey's death. Considering only the evidence that supports the verdict, the State established that prior to Casey's death, appellant bragged to JoshuaKyle that he was going to kill someone. Several hours later, Tyler Prine was in the cab of the truck sitting between appellant and Casey when appellant began stabbing Casey repeatedly with a knife. Prine and Shepard, who had stopped to help, both heard appellant admit that he had stabbed Casey and saw appellant toss the knife into the back of the truck. Moreover, Shepard heard appellant tell Prine that they needed to take the truck and get rid of the...

To continue reading

Request your trial
15 cases
  • Jackson v. State
    • United States
    • Arkansas Supreme Court
    • May 16, 2013
    ...of the evidence that a custodial statement was given voluntarily and was knowingly and intelligently made. E.g., Leach v. State, 2012 Ark. 179, 402 S.W.3d 517. In order to determine whether a waiver of Miranda rights is voluntary, this court looks to see if the confession was the product of......
  • Steinbuch v. Univ. of Ark.
    • United States
    • Arkansas Supreme Court
    • December 5, 2019
    ...individual-capacity claims, that argument is unpreserved as it is being advanced for the first time on appeal. See Leach v. State , 2012 Ark. 179, at 16, 402 S.W.3d 517, 528.8 To the extent that Steinbuch brought the civil-conspiracy claim against any appellees in their official capacities,......
  • Leach v. State
    • United States
    • Arkansas Supreme Court
    • April 9, 2015
    ...was found guilty by a jury of capital murder and sentenced to life imprisonment without parole. This court affirmed. Leach v. State, 2012 Ark. 179, 402 S.W.3d 517.Subsequently, appellant timely filed in the trial court a verified, pro se petition for postconviction relief pursuant to Arkans......
  • Her v. State
    • United States
    • Arkansas Supreme Court
    • October 14, 2021
    ...denied.1 Voluntary intoxication caused by drugs or alcohol is not an affirmative defense to criminal prosecution. Leach v. State , 2012 Ark. 179, 402 S.W.3d 517. ...
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT