League of Cal. Cities v. Superior Court of San Diego Cnty.

• Decision Date: 28 October 2015
• Docket Number: D067969
• Citation: 241 Cal.App.4th 976,194 Cal.Rptr.3d 444
• Court: California Court of Appeals
• Parties: LEAGUE OF CALIFORNIA CITIES, Petitioner, v. The SUPERIOR COURT of San Diego County, Respondent; San Diegans for Open Government et al., Real Parties in Interest.

241 Cal.App.4th 976

194 Cal.Rptr.3d 444

LEAGUE OF CALIFORNIA CITIES, Petitioner,

v. The SUPERIOR COURT of San Diego County, Respondent;San Diegans for Open Government et al., Real Parties in Interest.

D067969

Court of Appeal, Fourth District, Division 1, California.

Filed October 28, 2015

Best Best & Krieger, San Diego, Shawn D. Hagerty, Matthew L. Greenand Rebecca J. Andrewsfor Petitioner.

No appearance for Respondent.

Briggs Law, San Diego, Cory J. Briggsand Anthony N. Kimfor Real Parties in Interest.

Opinion

McINTYRE, J.

The California Public Records Act (Gov. Code, § 6250 et seq., the Act) provides that “a party” may file a petition for the issuance of an extraordinary writ to challenge an order of the trial court either directing or refusing disclosure under the Act. (Gov. Code, § 6259, subd. (c); undesignated statutory references are to this code.) In this case, a nonparty to the action filed a petition for an extraordinary writ in this court arguing it was a real party in interest that would be irreparably damaged by the trial court's order to disclose records allegedly protected from disclosure by the attorney-client privilege and attorney work product doctrine. We conclude the term “a party,” as used in the Act, is not limited to an actual party to the action. Accordingly, the nonparty here has standing to file the instant petition challenging the trial court's order.

We further conclude the trial court erred by not conducting an in camera review of the documents as requested by the party asserting the documents were exempt from disclosure. Accordingly, we grant the petition and remand the matter for further proceedings.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Jan L. Goldsmith is the San Diego City Attorney. League of California Cities (League) is an association of 473 California cities and their public officials, which, among other purposes, advocates to protect and restore local control for cities to provide for the public health, safety, and welfare of their residents. The League engages in legal advocacy through its Legal Advocacy Program. The League's Legal Advocacy Committee (LAC) administers the Legal Advocacy Program by reviewing pending appellate cases to determine if the cases involve issues that may impact cities on a statewide basis. The LAC then makes recommendations to the League on whether it should participate in the action or weigh in as amicus curiae on behalf of California cities. The San Diego City Attorney is a permanent member of the LAC.

Real Party in Interest, San Diegans for Open Government (SDOG), submitted a request under the Act to the City of San Diego (the City) seeking “[a]ny and all e-mails sent to or from [Jan Goldsmith's personal e-mail account] ... between January 1, 2008 and December 31, 2013, and that pertain in any way to the official business of the City of San Diego.” Among other records, the City asserted an exemption to the disclosure of e-mails between a purported legal assistant for the League and attorney members of the League (the e-mails) on the grounds they were not public records because they did not concern city business, or were otherwise privileged.

SDOG filed a petition for writ of mandate seeking declaratory and injunctive relief against the City and Goldsmith to compel disclosure of the e-mails. In a minute order, the trial court directed the City to provide SDOG with a privilege log identifying the documents not produced, along with the legal objection for not producing the documents. The City produced a privilege log, identifying and bates-numbering nonresponsive, privileged or exempt documents, which included the e-mails. After SDOG challenged some of the claimed exemptions, the City prepared a further privilege log addressing these documents.

After considering the parties' briefing, the trial court declined to perform an in camera review of the e-mails. It found the City failed to meet its burden of demonstrating that the e-mails were privileged or exempt under the Act, and ordered the City to produce the e-mails by a certain date.

The League filed the instant petition for a peremptory writ of mandate or prohibition in the first instance, or an alternative writ or order to show cause seeking to vacate that part of the court's order requiring disclosure of the e-mails. We stayed the trial court's order and issued an order to show cause.

DISCUSSION

I. Standing

Subdivision (c) of section 6259provides that a court order either directing or refusing disclosure is not an appealable judgment or order, “but shall be immediately reviewable by petition to the appellate court for the issuance of an extraordinary writ. Upon entry of any order pursuant to this section, a partyshall, in order to obtain review of the order, file a petition within 20 days after service upon him or her of a written notice of entry of the order, or within such further time not exceeding an additional 20 days as the trial court may for good cause allow.” (Italics added.)

The League concedes it was not “a party” to the trial court proceedings, but asserts it has standing to seek writ relief in this court because it holds the privilege to prevent the disclosure of confidential communications with its counsel and is directly and prejudicially affected by the trial court's order to disclose the e-mails. SDOG disagrees, noting that the right to challenge an order under the Act is limited to a “party,” which it interprets as meaning an actual party to the action rather than a real party in interest. (§ 6259, subd. (c).)

The issue before us is one of statutory interpretation. Our task is to determine the intent of the lawmakers so as to effectuate the purpose of the statute. (POET, LLC v. State Air Resources Bd.(2013) 218 Cal.App.4th 681, 749, 160 Cal.Rptr.3d 69.) We first scrutinize the actual words of the statute, giving them their usual, ordinary meaning. (Ibid.) If the statutory language is clear and unambiguous, meaning it is susceptible to only one reasonable construction, courts adopt the literal meaning of that language, unless that literal construction would frustrate the purpose of the statute or produce absurd consequences. (Ibid.) When statutory language is ambiguous, we must select the construction that comports most closely with the apparent intent of the Legislature, with a view to promoting rather than defeating the general purpose of the statute. (Ibid.) In interpreting ambiguous wording we are guided by the fundamental principle that courts construe those words in the context and with reference to the entire scheme of law of which they are a part. (Ibid.) In resolving statutory ambiguity courts also may be aided by the ostensible objects to be achieved by the legislation, the evils to be remedied, the legislative history, and public policy. (Ibid.) We start our review by examining the Act.

“Prior to 1984, review of a trial court order either directing disclosure of a public record or refusing disclosure was by appeal. In 1984, however, the Legislature substituted a writ procedure for the appellate process by amending section 6259to provide as follows: ‘In an action filed on or after January 1, 1985, an order of the court, either directing disclosure by a public official or supporting the decision of the public official refusing disclosure, is not a final judgment or order within the meaning of Section 904.1 of the Code of Civil Procedurefrom which an appeal may be taken, but shall be immediately reviewable by petition to the appellate court for the issuance of the extraordinary writ of review as defined in Section 1067 of the Code of Civil Procedure.’ ” (Times Mirror Co. v. Superior Court(1991) 53 Cal.3d 1325, 1332–1333, 283 Cal.Rptr. 893, 813 P.2d 240.)

In 1990, the Legislature amended section 6259again to “eliminate the reference to the ‘writ of review,’ and to provide instead that superior court orders under the [Act] ‘shall be immediately reviewable by petition to the appellate court for issuance of an extraordinary writ.’ ” (Powers v. City of Richmond(1995) 10 Cal.4th 85, 111–112, 40 Cal.Rptr.2d 839, 893 P.2d 1160.) The Legislature made this change to expedite the review process and thereby make the appellate remedy more effective. (Id.at p. 112, 40 Cal.Rptr.2d 839, 893 P.2d 1160.) The 1990 amendment also added two new provisions: (1) that “a party” must file a petition for extraordinary writ within 10 days after receipt of notice of the trial court order; and (2) no stay of the trial court order shall be permitted “unless the petitioning party demonstrates it will otherwise sustain irreparable damage and probable success on the merits.” (Stats. 1990, ch. 908, § 2, subd. (c), p. 3855.) A 1993 amendment later increased the time for filing the writ petition from 10 days to 20 days. (Powers v. City of Richmond,at p. 112, fn. 18, 40 Cal.Rptr.2d 839, 893 P.2d 1160.)

A petitioner must have standing in order to invoke the power of a court to grant writ relief. (Waste Management of Alameda County, Inc. v. County of Alameda(2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 1223, 1232, 94 Cal.Rptr.2d 740(Waste Management).) “Code of Civil Procedure section 1086expresses the controlling statutory requirements for standing for mandate: ‘The writ must be issued in all cases where there is not a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy, in the ordinary course of law. It must be issued upon the verified petition of the party beneficially interested.’ ” (Brotherhood of Teamsters & Auto Truck Drivers v. Unemployment Ins. Appeals Bd.(1987) 190 Cal.App.3d 1515, 1521, 236 Cal.Rptr. 78.) Code of Civil Procedure section 1069, governing certiorari proceedings (Code Civ. Proc., § 1067), similarly requires the petition be made by “the party” beneficially interested.

Despite the clear references in these statutes to “the party,” our high court noted it is well established that one who petitions for an extraordinary writ need not have been a party to the action below if the one seeking relief demonstrates a beneficial interest in the litigation or...