League v. State
| Decision Date | 19 January 1900 |
| Citation | 56 S.W. 262 |
| Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
| Parties | LEAGUE v. STATE.<SMALL><SUP>1</SUP></SMALL> |
Appeal from district court, San Augustine county; Tom C. Davis, Judge.
Action by the state against J. C. League. From a judgment for the state, defendant appeals. Reformed and affirmed.
Robt. M. Franklin, for appellant. T. S. Smith, Atty. Gen., D. E. Simmons, Asst. Atty. Gen., and John Thomson, Dist. Atty., for the State.
This was a suit brought by the state of Texas against J. C. League for the recovery of the delinquent taxes upon certain land situated in San Augustine county. The suit was brought under chapter 103 of the General Laws of 1897 (page 132) for the taxes assessed against the land for the years 1884 to 1888, inclusive, and for the year 1896 and other years as to some of the tracts of land, and judgment was rendered in favor of the state for the aggregate amount of the taxes for all of said years, together with a penalty of 10 per cent. thereon, interest, and costs. The delinquent list for San Augustine county was properly made up in accordance with the law, and embraced the lands described in the judgment, and all necessary steps were taken as prescribed by the law in order to maintain the suit. The delinquent tax record showed that the taxes had been assessed as set out in the exhibit attached to the petition, which appears also in the statement of facts. It appeared that the surveys upon which the taxes were sought to be recovered had been assessed for certain of the years as the property of unknown owners, and for other years as the property of certain individuals other than the defendant, all of which is particularly shown by the exhibit which is referred to as a part of this statement. None of the surveys were assessed as the property of the defendant, but from the year 1888 they were assessed as the property of unknown owners, with one or two exceptions. The defendant became the owner of the lands in 1889, and was the owner thereof when the suit was brought. The several surveys were sold for the taxes of 1884, and were bought by the state. Appellant contends that it was not proved that he was the owner of the land. It is true that it does not appear in the statement of facts that he was, but there was no motion for a new trial for the want of proof of such fact. It was in no way called to the attention of the court below, and the objection is urged here now for the first time. It was also an admitted fact on the trial of the case. The statute requires the pleadings of the defendant, except those of law, to be verified by the affidavit of the defendant, his agent or attorney. The answer of the defendant, verified by the affidavit of his attorney of record, shows that he claims to own the lands by purchase since about the year 1889. While it is true that a general denial was pleaded by the defendant, the purpose of the statute in requiring the pleadings to be sworn to is to have the true issues in the case presented; and the admission of the defendant in his sworn answer that he is the owner of the land obviated the necessity of proving that fact. Computed separately, the several sums adjudged as taxes, interest, penalties, and costs, separating the year 1884 from all the other years, which are stated in the aggregate, are as follows:
Taxes for the year 1884 ..................... $ 97 55
Interest on 1884 taxes ...................... 74 31
Penalty on 1884 taxes ....................... 17 07
Taxes from 1885 to 1896, inclusive........... 723 93
Interest on taxes 1885 to 1896, inclusive ... 365 23
Penalty on taxes 1885 to 1896, inclusive .... 103 50
Cost of sale ................................ 2 50
Clerk's fees and printer's costs ............ 72 50
Collector's fees ............................ 69 00
_________
Total judgment, exclusive of
court costs ........................... $1,525 60
The district court had jurisdiction of the suit for the foreclosure of the lien for the delinquent taxes on the land described in the petition. The suit was brought in strict compliance with the statute, and, unless the statute is in contravention of the constitution, jurisdiction was properly exercised. By the constitution of 1869 a sale of land for taxes was prohibited, except by a decree of some court of competent jurisdiction. Const. 1869, art. 12, § 21. It is contended that, because the constitution of 1876 drops this restriction of the constitution of 1869, and directs provision by the first legislature for the speedy sale of a sufficient portion of all lands and other property for the taxes due thereon, and every year thereafter for the sale of all lands and other property upon which the taxes have not been paid, the sale of property for taxes is prohibited except by a summary sale by the collector. Const. 1876, art. 8, §§ 11, 13, 15, 16, as well as article 2, § 1, are cited in support of the contention, it being claimed that a sale of land for taxes by a decree of court is an interference with the executive department of the state government. In further support of this construction of the constitution the various tax laws passed since its adoption are referred to, providing for the summary seizure and sale of property for delinquent taxes as a legislative construction of the constitution. But the direction to the legislature to make provision for a speedy sale does not restrict the manner of sale, but rather leaves that to the discretion of the legislature. The constitution certainly does not, either in terms or by implication, prohibit legislation providing for the foreclosure of the lien for taxes in the courts and a sale thereof by judicial decree. The legislature clearly had the power to provide such manner for the collection of taxes. Legislation under the constitution of 1869, providing for summary seizure and sale, was held unconstitutional, because such sales were prohibited. There is no prohibition against judicial sales in the constitution of 1876.
Taxes are made a lien upon the property against which they are assessed, and the property, not the owner...
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