Leal v. State

• Citation: 452 S.W.3d 14
• Decision Date: 13 November 2014
• Docket Number: No. 14–13–00208–CR.,14–13–00208–CR.
• Parties: Jonathan Albert LEAL, Appellant v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee.
• Court: Court of Appeals of Texas

452 S.W.3d 14

Jonathan Albert LEAL, Appellant

v.The STATE of Texas, Appellee.

No. 14–13–00208–CR.

Court of Appeals of Texas, Houston (14th Dist.).

Nov. 13, 2014.

Discretionary Review Refused Mar. 25, 2015.

Review Granted Mar. 25, 2015.

Mark W. Stevens, Galveston, for Appellant.

Allison Lindblade, Galveston, for the State.

Panel consists of Chief Justice FROST and Justices DONOVAN and BROWN.

OPINION

MARC W. BROWN, Justice.

Appellant Jonathan Albert Leal was stopped for failing to yield the right of way. Appellant was arrested on suspicion of driving while intoxicated (DWI) and, over his explicit refusal, compelled by the arresting officer to submit to a warrantless intrusion into his veins. Appellant was convicted of felony DWI. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. §§ 49.04, 49.09(b) (West 2011 & Supp.2014).

Appellant presents this court with two issues for review. The first issue is whether the traffic stop was supported by reasonable suspicion. The second issue is whether, under Missouri v. McNeely, ––– U.S. ––––, 133 S.Ct. 1552, 185 L.Ed.2d 696 (2013), and based solely on the arresting officer's application of the repeat-offender provision of the implied-consent statute, see Tex. Transp. Code Ann. § 724.012(b)(3)(B) (West 2011), the State was justified in obtaining a blood sample from appellant's veins without a warrant.

With regard to appellant's first issue, we hold that the officer in this case had sufficient evidence to justify the warrantless temporary detention of appellant. With regard to appellant's second issue, we hold that the intrusion into appellant's veins was an unreasonable warrantless search in violation of the Fourth Amendment. We therefore reverse the trial court's judgment and remand to the trial court for a new trial consistent with this opinion.

I. Facts and Procedural Background

Early in the morning of April 2, 2012, Jacob Hodges¹ was on patrol driving east in the right lane of West Main Street in League City, Galveston County, Texas. Hodges observed appellant approaching West Main Street from an apartment complex parking lot. Appellant was driving a white sport utility vehicle (SUV) approaching from the south at a high rate of speed. Immediately prior to turning onto West Main Street, appellant applied his brakes. This caused the SUV to visibly rock forward, compressing the front suspension. The front end of appellant's SUV entered West Main Street. Hodges had to slam on his brakes in order to avoid a collision.

As a result of this near collision, Hodges initiated a traffic stop. During the course of the traffic stop, Hodges saw a bottle of rum behind the passenger's seat of appellant's SUV. Hodges noticed that appellant's eyes were red and watery. He also noticed the faint odor of alcohol on appellant's breath. In response to Hodges's questioning, appellant admitted to drinking three mixed drinks. Hodges administered a battery of standardized field sobriety tests. Based on appellant's performance on the sobriety tests and Hodges's personal observations, Hodges concluded that appellant was under the influence of alcohol.

Hodges arrested appellant and transported him to the League City jail.

At the jail, Hodges gave appellant the requisite statutory warning regarding the implied-consent statute and the consequences of refusing to submit to the taking of a blood or breath specimen. See Tex. Transp. Code Ann. § 724.015 (West Supp.2014). The warning was given orally and in writing. After receiving the statutory warning, appellant refused to submit to the taking of both a blood and a breath specimen.² Hodges then reviewed appellant's criminal history and discovered that appellant had two prior DWI convictions. Per the implied-consent statute, Hodges was required to obtain a specimen of appellant's blood. See Tex. Transp. Code Ann. § 724.012(b)(3)(B). Hodges transported appellant to Clear Lake Regional Hospital where a nurse drew appellant's blood. According to Hodges's offense report, appellant was “very uncooperative” at the hospital; three people had to hold appellant down while the nurse took his blood. Hodges did not obtain a search warrant to draw appellant's blood.

Appellant was indicted for operating a motor vehicle in a public place while intoxicated. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 49.04(a). The indictment alleged two prior DWI convictions. Appellant stipulated to the validity of the two prior convictions. Appellant filed a motion to suppress challenging the legality of the traffic stop. After conducting a hearing, the trial court denied the motion to suppress.

The case was tried before a jury. Appellant's blood alcohol content, which was nearly three times the legal limit, was admitted into evidence. The jury found appellant guilty of the charged offense, and the trial court assessed punishment at eight years' confinement. The sentence was suspended and appellant was placed on community supervision.

The trial court's judgment was signed on February 15, 2013. Appellant filed his notice of appeal on the same day. On March 8, 2013, appellant filed a motion for new trial, asserting various grounds not pertinent to this appeal. On April 22, 2013, five days after the Supreme Court decided McNeely, appellant filed a supplemental motion for new trial in which he challenged the validity of the warrantless blood draw under McNeely. The trial court held a hearing on appellant's motion for new trial and ultimately denied the motion. On appeal, appellant challenges (1) the legality of the traffic stop and (2) the legality of the warrantless blood draw.

II. Standard of Review

A trial court's denial of a motion to suppress and a trial court's denial of a motion for new trial are both reviewed under the abuse of discretion standard. Okonkwo v. State, 398 S.W.3d 689, 694 (Tex.Crim.App.2013) ; Ex parte Moore, 395 S.W.3d 152, 158 (Tex.Crim.App.2013). A trial court abuses its discretion if no reasonable view of the record could support its ruling. Okonkwo, 398 S.W.3d at 694. We view the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court's ruling. Id. ; Moore, 395 S.W.3d at 158. At a hearing on the motion, the trial court is the sole judge of witness credibility and the weight given to witness testimony. Okonkwo, 398 S.W.3d at 694 ; Moore, 395 S.W.3d at 158. We must afford almost total deference to the trial court's findings of historical facts as well as mixed questions of law and fact that turn on an evaluation of credibility and demeanor. Okonkwo, 398 S.W.3d at 694 ; Abney v. State, 394 S.W.3d 542, 547 (Tex.Crim.App.2013). When the trial court does not make explicit findings of fact, we assume the trial court made implicit findings of fact supported by the record. Okonkwo, 398 S.W.3d at 694 ; Ford v. State, 158 S.W.3d 488, 493 (Tex.Crim.App.2005).

We review de novo (1) questions of law based on undisputed facts and (2) mixed questions of law and fact that do not turn on an evaluation of credibility and demeanor. Jones v. State, 437 S.W.3d 536, 538 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 2014, pet. filed) ; see Oles v. State, 993 S.W.2d 103, 106 (Tex.Crim.App.1999) ; Guzman v. State, 955 S.W.2d 85, 89 (Tex.Crim.App.1997). Additionally, we review de novo the trial court's application of the law of search and seizure to the trial court's express or implied determination of historical facts. Shepherd v. State, 273 S.W.3d 681, 684 (Tex.Crim.App.2008). Finally, we review de novo indisputable evidence contained in a video recording. State v. Duran, 396 S.W.3d 563, 570–71 (Tex.Crim.App.2013) ; see Carmouche v. State, 10 S.W.3d 323, 332 (Tex.Crim.App.2000).

III. Discussion

We begin our discussion with a general overview of the Fourth Amendment. We then analyze whether Hodges had reasonable suspicion that appellant committed the traffic violation of failing to yield the right of way. Finally, we analyze whether the warrantless intrusion into appellant's veins was justified under an exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement.

A. The Fourth Amendment

The Fourth Amendment provides: “The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. The ultimate touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness. Riley v. California, ––– U.S. ––––, ––––, 134 S.Ct. 2473, 2482, 189 L.Ed.2d 430 (2014). Reasonableness generally requires the obtaining of a judicial warrant. Id. A warrantless search is reasonable only if it falls within a specific exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement. Id.

A defendant who alleges a search or seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment must produce some evidence that rebuts the presumption of proper police conduct. Amador v. State, 275 S.W.3d 872, 878 (Tex.Crim.App.2009). To satisfy this burden, the defendant must establish that the search or seizure occurred without a warrant. Id. Once the defendant makes this showing, the State must prove that the search or seizure was conducted pursuant to a warrant or was reasonable. Id. Here, the State seized and searched appellant without a warrant. Therefore, we must determine whether the warrantless temporary detention of appellant was reasonable and, if so, whether the warrantless intrusion into appellant's veins was reasonable.

B. The traffic stop was reasonable.

The warrantless temporary detention of appellant was reasonable. A warrantless temporary detention, such as the traffic stop in this case, is lawful when the officer has reasonable suspicion to believe that an individual is violating the law. Ford, 158 S.W.3d at 492. Reasonable suspicion exists if the officer has specific articulable facts that, when combined with rational inferences from those facts, would lead him to reasonably suspect that a person has engaged, is engaging, or soon will be engaging in criminal...