Leal v. State

• Decision Date: 25 June 2015
• Docket Number: NO. 14–13–00208–CR,14–13–00208–CR
• Citation: 469 S.W.3d 647
• Parties: Jonathan Albert Leal, Appellant v. The State of Texas, Appellee
• Court: Texas Court of Appeals

469 S.W.3d 647

Jonathan Albert Leal, Appellant

v.The State of Texas, Appellee

NO. 14–13–00208–CR

Court of Appeals of Texas, Houston (14th Dist.).

Majority and Concurring Opinions on Remand filed June 25, 2015

Discretionary Review Refused January 27, 2016

Mark W. Stevens, Galveston, TX, for appellant.

Allison Lindblade, Galveston, TX, for state.

Panel consists of Chief Justice Frost and Justices Donovan and Brown.

MAJORITY OPINION ON REMAND

Marc W. Brown, Justice

Appellant Jonathan Albert Leal appealed the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress and motion for new trial. In our original opinion reversing the trial court's judgment, we held that the warrantless blood draw violated Leal's Fourth Amendment rights. Leal v. State, 452 S.W.3d 14, 32 (Tex. App.–Houston [14th Dist.] 2014), vacated and remanded, 456 S.W.3d 567 (Tex.Crim.App.2015). On its own motion, the Court of Criminal Appeals granted review of our decision, vacated our judgment, and remanded the case to us to address only “whether appellant preserved his claim that the warrantless blood draw violated his Fourth Amendment rights.” Leal, 456 S.W.3d at 568. Although we implicitly held in our original opinion that Leal preserved his claim, we now explicitly conclude and explain that he did so.

As a preliminary matter, because our original opinion disposed of the merits of Leal's primary arguments, we do not address them again here. See Keehn v. State, 245 S.W.3d 614, 614 n. 1 (Tex.App.–Fort Worth 2007), aff'd, 279 S.W.3d 330 (Tex.Crim.App.2009) ; see, e.g., Weatherford v. State, 840 S.W.2d 727, 728–29 (Tex.App.–Eastland 1992, pet. ref'd) (considering on remand only the issues explicitly raised by Court of Criminal Appeals). We therefore incorporate our original opinion by reference.

In order for a complaint to be presented on appeal, a timely request, objection, or motion must have been made to the trial court stating the grounds for the ruling with sufficient specificity to make the trial court aware of the complaint, and the trial court must have expressly or implicitly ruled on the request, objection, or motion. Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a)(1)(A). The complaining party must have clearly conveyed to the trial court the particular complaint raised on appeal, including the precise and proper application of law as well as the underlying rationale. Pena v. State, 285 S.W.3d 459, 463–64 (Tex.Crim.App.2009). Error preservation does not involve a hyper-technical or formalistic use of words or phrases; rather, straightforward communication in plain English is sufficient. Id. at 464. The party must let the trial judge know (1) what he wants; (2) why he thinks he is entitled to it; and (3) do so clearly enough for the judge to understand him at a time when the judge is in the proper position to do something about it. Id. We consider the context in which the complaint was made and the parties' shared understanding at that time. Id. A defendant who presents an argument to the trial judge in time for the judge to rule on it has preserved the issue for appellate review. See Clarke v. State, 270 S.W.3d 573, 580 (Tex.Crim.App.2008). “A trial court's ruling on a matter need not be expressly stated if its actions or other statements otherwise unquestionably indicate a ruling.” Rey v. State, 897 S.W.2d 333, 336 (Tex.Crim.App.1995).

Leal's claim was preserved when the trial court implicitly overruled his amended motion to suppress. Leal timely filed an amended motion to suppress objecting to the warrantless blood draw on Fourth Amendment grounds. See Porath v. State, 148 S.W.3d 402, 409 (Tex.App.–Houston [14th Dist.] 2004, no pet.) (motion to suppress is a specialized objection to the admission of evidence). Specifically, citing Missouri v. McNeely, ––– U.S. ––––, 133 S.Ct. 1552, 185 L.Ed.2d 696 (2013), which had not yet been decided, Leal claimed that the repeat-offender provision of the implied-consent statute violated the Fourth Amendment. The record shows that the trial court was aware of Leal's objection; however, the trial court did not explicitly rule on the amended motion at the suppression hearing. Leal renewed his objection at trial when the State offered a report containing an analysis of Leal's blood.¹ The trial court then admitted the report and allowed the analyst to testify regarding Leal's blood alcohol content. Based on the trial court's action in allowing the State to present evidence of Leal's blood alcohol content to the jury, the court implicitly overruled Leal's amended motion to suppress, and Leal preserved his claim that the warrantless blood draw violated his Fourth Amendment rights. See Rey, 897 S.W.2d at 336–37 ; see, e.g., Cantu v. State, 994 S.W.2d 721, 730–31 (Tex.App.–Austin 1999, pet. dism'd) (error was preserved when trial court did not expressly rule on defendant's objection to expert witness's qualifications, but permitted expert to answer the question if he knew); Riddle v. State, No. 02–02–00231–CR, 2003 WL 21983252, at *3 (Tex.App.–Fort Worth Aug. 21, 2003, pet. ref'd) (mem. op.; not designated for publication) (error was preserved when trial court did not expressly rule on portion of defendant's motion to suppress dealing with inventory search, but allowed officer to testify before the jury about the inventory search).

Furthermore, Leal presented his claim to the trial court in his supplemental motion for new trial. Leal was sentenced on February 14, 2013. He timely filed a motion for new trial on March 8, 2013. See Tex. R. App. P. 21.4(a). The original motion did not challenge the legality of the warrantless blood draw. The Supreme Court decided McNeely on April 17, 2013. On April 22, 2013, Leal filed a supplemental motion for new trial citing McNeely and claiming that the warrantless blood draw violated his Fourth Amendment rights. Under rule 21.4(b), the supplemental motion was not timely filed. See Tex. R. App. P. 21.4(b). On April 26, 2013, at the new-trial hearing, Leal asked for and was given leave to supplement his original motion for new trial. The State did not object. See State v. Moore, 225 S.W.3d 556, 569 (Tex.Crim.App.2007) (trial court retains authority to allow untimely amendment to original motion for new trial within seventy-five-day period, so long as the State does not object). At the hearing, Leal's counsel argued, based on the Supreme Court's holding in McNeely, that the warrantless blood draw violated Leal's Fourth Amendment rights. The State presented counter-arguments on the merits of Leal's claim, demonstrating the parties' shared understanding that Leal's constitutional rights were at stake. See Pena, 285 S.W.3d at 464. The trial court denied Leal's motion for new trial in an order dated May 21, 2013.

In sum, Leal timely presented his complaint to the trial court in both his amended motion to suppress and his supplemental motion for new trial. See Pena v. State, 353 S.W.3d 797, 807 (Tex.Crim.App.2011) (complaint is timely if made as soon as ground of objection becomes apparent). Leal's complaint was adequately specific to put the trial court on notice of his Fourth Amendment challenge to the warrantless blood draw. See, e.g., Gillenwaters v. State, 205 S.W.3d 534, 537 (Tex.Crim.App.2006) (although motion for new trial did not mention “vague” or “vagueness,” defendant's complaint was adequately specific when he claimed on several occasions during trial that the statute was “unconstitutionally vague”). The trial court ruled on Leal's complaint when it admitted, over objection, evidence obtained as a result of the warrantless blood draw and denied Leal's supplemental motion for new trial. See Tex. R. App. P. 33.1 ; Rey, 897 S.W.2d at 336. We therefore conclude that Leal preserved his claim that the warrantless blood draw violated his Fourth Amendment rights. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court's judgment and remand to the trial court for a new trial consistent with our original opinion. See Leal, 452 S.W.3d at 32.

(Frost, C.J., concurring)

CONCURRING OPINION ON REMAND

Kem Thompson Frost, Chief Justice

Appellant moved to suppress evidence of his blood-alcohol concentration by challenging the legality of a traffic stop that eventually led to his arrest for driving while intoxicated (DWI). Appellant later amended his motion to suppress to challenge the warrantless blood draw on Fourth Amendment grounds. On original submission and over my dissent, this court reversed appellant's DWI conviction and remanded for a new trial.¹ Addressing an issue of first impression in this court, the majority concluded that the trial court should have suppressed evidence of appellant's blood-alcohol content because law enforcement officers obtained the evidence by means of a warrantless blood draw, which violated appellant's Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures.²

On its own motion, the Court of Criminal Appeals granted review of this court's decision, vacated the judgment, and remanded with instructions for this court to address whether appellant preserved error on his claim that the warrantless blood draw violated his Fourth Amendment rights.³ On remand, the majority concludes that appellant preserved error, that the trial court's judgment should be reversed, and that the case should be remanded for a new trial. I agree, but for different reasons.

Preservation–of–Error Analysis

Appellant preserved error by making a timely, specific complaint in the trial court and securing an adverse ruling.⁴ Specifically, appellant moved the trial court to suppress evidence of his blood-alcohol content, identifying grounds for this relief in a written motion to suppress. Before the suppression hearing, appellant amended the motion to include additional grounds for relief. Though the parties' arguments at the hearing focused on another ground in the motion, to preserve error a movant need not discuss all the grounds at the hearing.⁵ All that is required is specificity, timeliness, and an adverse ruling. The record...