Leaster v. Com.
| Decision Date | 11 March 1982 |
| Citation | 432 N.E.2d 708,385 Mass. 547 |
| Parties | Bobby Joe LEASTER v. COMMONWEALTH (and two companion cases 1 ). |
| Court | United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court |
Michael J. Traft, Asst. Dist. Atty., for the Commonwealth.
Robert F. Muse, Boston, for Bobby Joe Leaster.
Benjamin Hiller, Cambridge, for Leonard Lacy.
Lois M. Lewis, West Newton, for George P. McLaughlin.
Before HENNESSEY, C. J., and ABRAMS, NOLAN and LYNCH, JJ.
In each of these three cases the petitioner, who is serving a life sentence for murder in the first degree, sought postconviction relief for asserted error in his conviction by filing in the Superior Court a motion under Mass.R.Crim.P. 30, 378 Mass. 900 (1979). 2 In each case a Superior Court judge denied the motion after hearing. Subsequently each petitioner sought to appeal the Superior Court ruling by leave of a single justice of this court, as required by G.L. c. 278, § 33E. 3 In each case leave to appeal was denied by the single justice and the petitioner claimed an appeal to the full court from the denial. The Commonwealth moved before the full court to dismiss these appeals, and these motions to dismiss are now before us.
The Commonwealth argues that the unequivocal words of § 33E require these dismissals. We agree. The special function of the single justice mandated by the statute would be futile and meaningless if his or her rulings were subject to appeal before the full court.
Despite our conclusion that the Commonwealth's motion to dismiss these appeals must be allowed, we recognize the weight of certain arguments of the petitioners. Rule 30 was adopted in 1979 as the exclusive vehicle for postconviction relief. Simultaneously, through the cooperation of the Legislature, statutory provisions for postconviction relief by means of writ of error were repealed. See former statute G.L. c. 250, §§ 1, 2, 9, 10, 11, and 12 (repealed by St.1979, c. 344, § 13). The petitioners observe that the statutory repeal eliminated substantial privileges of postconviction full court review, as a matter of right, which had been available for many decades to persons convicted of first degree murder as well as lesser crimes. The petitioners also argue the incongruity that, by reason of the combined effect of rule 30 and § 33E, appellate review by the full court of Superior Court rulings on postconviction motions are available, without leave from a single justice, as to all criminal convictions except the most serious (murder in the first degree).
Against these arguments of the petitioners stand the compelling facts that the murder convictions of these three petitioners like all first degree murder convictions appealed to us, have received not only the direct appellate review available in all criminal matters but also have received the plenary review under § 33E, which is designed to avoid miscarriage of justice and which is peculiarly available in first degree murder cases. Commonwealth v. Leaster, 362 Mass. 407, 287 N.E.2d 122 (1972). Commonwealth v. Lacy, 371 Mass. 363, 358 N.E.2d 419 (1976). Commonwealth v. McLaughlin, 352 Mass. 218, 224 N.E.2d 444, cert. denied, McLaughlin v. Massachusetts, 389 U.S. 916, 88 S.Ct. 250, 19 L.Ed.2d 268 (1967). This logical underpinning is a refutation, if such is needed, of the argument that the Legislature could not have intended, despite the unequivocal language of § 33E, inhibition of post-conviction relief in first degree murder cases. Further, review should not be afforded by the full court through our powers under G.L. c. 211, § 3, since we deal here with matters in which the Legislature has expressly limited such review. Contrast Commonwealth v. Dunigan, --- Mass. ---, 425 N.E.2d 369, Mass.Adv.Sh. (1981) 1539, 1543. We also observe that a number of other jurisdictions have similar "gatekeeper" restrictions on postconviction relief in criminal matters. See, e.g., Conn.Gen.Stat.Ann. § 52-470 (West Supp.1981); Ga Code Ann. § 50-127(11) (Supp.1981); Maine Rev.Stat.Ann. tit. 15, § 2131 (Supp.1981).
We have every confidence that the...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Com. v. Zezima
... ... We agree that one convicted of murder in the second degree need not seek leave from a single justice to appeal the denial of a motion for a new trial. Greene v. Commonwealth, 385 Mass. 1008, 1009, 432 N.E.2d 706 (1982). See Leaster v. Commonwealth, 385 Mass. 547, 549, 432 N.E.2d 708 (1982). This is true even if the defendant was convicted of a crime committed before July 1, 1979, on an indictment charging murder in the first degree, and therefore has received full review under G.L. c. 278, § 33E, as mandated by Commonwealth ... ...
-
Dickerson v. Latessa, 88-1764
... ... Pisa, 384 Mass. 362, 365-66, 425 N.E.2d 290, 293 (1981). The determination of the gatekeeper judge under section 33E is unreviewable. Leaster v. Commonwealth, 385 Mass. 547, 548, 432 N.E.2d 708, 709 (1982) ... Noncapital defendants, on the other hand, are allowed under ... ...
-
Commonwealth v. Billingslea
... ... Leaster v. Commonwealth , 385 Mass. 547, 548-549, 432 N.E.2d 708 (1982). A single justice of the Supreme Judicial Court is in the best position to conduct ... ...
-
Com. v. Latimore
... ... c. 278, § 33E (1994 ed.). That process places unreviewable authority in one judge to deny full court review. See Leaster v. Commonwealth, 385 Mass. 547, 548, 432 N.E.2d 708 (1982). When this case was here on appeal in 1979, the error in the jury instructions (not argued by then defense counsel) was not as clearly a ground for reversal of the conviction under G.L. c. 278, § 33E, as it was a ground for reversal on ... ...