Leatherock v. Lawter

• Decision Date: 02 March 1915
• Docket Number: Case Number: 7072
• Citation: 1915 OK 122,45 Okla. 715,147 P. 324
• Parties: LEATHEROCK v. LAWTER et al.
• Court: Oklahoma Supreme Court

1915 OK 122

147 P. 324

45 Okla. 715

LEATHEROCK v. LAWTER et al.

Case Number: 7072

Supreme Court of Oklahoma

Decided: March 2, 1915

Syllabus

¶0 1. STATUTES--Enactment--Local and Special Laws--Superior Court. Chapter 87, Sess. Laws 1913, is general in its nature, and does not violate section 32, art. 5, of the Constitution, which requires notice to be given of the intended introduction of local and special laws and verified proof of such publication to be filed with the Secretary of State.

2. STATUTES--Title and Subject-Matter--Statute Abolishing Superior Court. The title to a bill may be general, and need not specify every clause in the statute; it being sufficient if they are referable to and cognate to the subject expressed.

3. STATUTE--Validity--Time of Taking Effect--Statute Abolishing Superior Court. It is competent for the Legislature to fix a date in the future upon which an act shall become effective, provided that said date is not less than 90 days from the date of adjournment; and in cases where an emergency is declared to exist, they may be made effective from and after their passage and approval.

Original proceeding for writ of prohibition by R. E. Leatherock against J. W. Lawter and another. Writ granted.

Kane, C. J., dissenting.

Chas. A. Holden, for petitioner.

M. L. Holcombe and J. W. Lawter, for defendants.

HARDY, J.

¶1 The petitioner, R. E. Leatherock, seeks by this proceeding to prohibit the respondent J. W. Lawter, as judge of the superior court of Custer county, from further proceeding in a certain cause therein pending, in which petitioner is defendant, and alleges, in support of this petition, that the respondent Lawter is without authority to act because said superior court of Custer county has been abolished. To this petition respondent files answer and admits the pendency of said suit, and asserts his right to entertain jurisdiction of said cause as judge of said superior court, for the reason that the act attempting to abolish said court is unconstitutional and void.

¶2 The act creating the superior court of Custer county was approved March 12, 1910 (Sess. Laws 1910, p. 78). The validity of said act was upheld by this court in the case of Chickasha Cotton Oil Co. v. Lamb & Tyner, 28 Okla. 275, 114 P. 333. The act abolishing this court is chapter 87, Sess. Laws 1913, p. 140. The validity of this act is assailed: (1) Because it is urged that same is local and special, and is invalid for the reason that no notice of its intended introduction was published and proof thereof filed with the Secretary of State in compliance with section 32, art. 5, of the Constitution. Under this proposition it is urged that the case of Hatfield v. Garnett, 146 P. 24, ante, decided January 26, 1915, is decisive of this proposition. We do not think that case is conclusive here, and think a distinction can be drawn between the two. The court was there considering the validity of chapter 77, Sess. Laws 1913, with reference to superior courts in general, in which the Legislature had undertaken to classify the different counties of the state by population on the basis of the federal census of 1910 for the purpose of establishing courts and in passing upon the act then under consideration the court held that because of the fact that the legislature had undertaken to pass a general law which classified the counties of the state in an arbitrary and capricious manner, and without any real and substantial distinctions in the different classes, and because said act did not operate uniformly upon all of the different counties within the classes, and because it was not prospective in its operation and did not make provision for future changes in population of the various counties of the state, it must therefore be held to be local and special. The court did not determine in that case whether a law passed by the Legislature creating a single superior court was general or special, and did not have that question under consideration. Neither could the case of Chickasha Cotton Oil Co. v. Lamb & Tyner, supra, be said to be conclusive upon this proposition, because in that case the court expressly declined to determine whether the act then under consideration was general or special, and because of the fact that the Legislature observed all of the requirements of the Constitution contained in section 32, art. 5, thereof, for the enactment of a special and local law, and in doing so gave notice of the intended introduction of said bill. The court upheld it on that ground, saying:

"We prefer, however, not to decide at this time whether an act creating a court of the character here involved is local or special, for this cause has been advanced upon the docket and an early hearing given, in order to expedite a decision; and this court, with the great volume of business now pressing upon it for attention, has not been able to thoroughly examine all the authorities bearing upon such question under other Constitutions with provisions relative to the power of the Legislature to create courts similar to the provisions of the Constitution of this state, nor to consider fully the force of said provisions of our Constitution in their relation to the other provisions of the Constitution. If we assume, without deciding, that this act, in so far as it creates a court with its territorial jurisdiction confined to one county having a population not greater or unlike other counties of the state, is to that extent a local law, still this act can and should be sustained; and we, therefore, proceed in our consideration of the questions raised upon the hypothesis that said act is to this extent local."

¶3 The question as to whether an act creating a superior court for one county, or an act abolishing such a court, is general or local and special, is not presented squarely to the court for determination. Section 1, art. 7, Const. (section 186, Williams' Ann. Const.) provides:

"The judicial power of this state shall be vested in the Senate, sitting as a court of impeachment, a Supreme Court, district court, county courts, court of justices of the peace, municipal courts, and such other courts, commissions or boards, inferior to the Supreme Court, as may be established by law."

¶4 By this section it will be seen that the judicial power of this state is vested in the courts named in said section, and in such other courts, commissions, or boards as may be created by the Legislature, subject to this one qualification, that they must be inferior to the Supreme Court. The power of the Legislature under this section to establish superior courts has already been determined in favor of that power in Burks v. Walker, 25 Okla. 353, 109 P. 544, and Chickasha Cotton Oil Co. v. Lamb & Tyner, supra. In the last-named case, in discussing this provision of the Constitution, and the character of the superior courts created by the act then under consideration, the court says:

"Although the territorial jurisdiction of the superior court of Custer county is confined to the limits of a county, it is not a county court, nor a part of the county government. It does not deal with the business affairs of the county; its functions are purely judicial. It exercises one of the high powers of the state government, to wit, judicial power, and, owing to the extent of its jurisdiction, is, as a court of original jurisdiction, one of high character. It has original jurisdiction in all offenses against the state committed within its territorial jurisdiction and of all civil cases, except private matters. Its jurisdiction of subject-matter is more comprehensive than that of the district courts. The mere fact that its presiding officer is selected by a single county and is paid by that county does not make such officer a county officer. Some of the members of the House of Representatives and of the state Senate are elected by the voters of a single county, and, in the redistricting of this state for judicial purposes, it may occur that some of the district courts of the state will be confined to districts coextensive with the boundaries of a single county; but we think it could not be contended with any show of reason that such facts would render these respective officers county officers. The character of this office is to be determined by the nature of the powers which it contains and the duties it imposes."

¶5 In the case of Waterman et al. v. Hawkins, Chancellor, 75 Ark. 120, 86 S.W. 844, the court said:

"Statutes establishing or abolishing separate courts relate to the administration of justice, and are either local or special in their operation. Though such an act relates to a court exercising jurisdiction over limited territory, it is general in its operation, and affects all citizens coming within the jurisdiction of the court. Whether an act of the Legislature be a local or general law must be determined by the generality with which it affects the people as a whole, rather than the extent of the territory over which it operates; and, if it affects equally all persons who come within its range, it can be neither special nor local, within the meaning of the Constitution."

¶6 In State ex rel. Donham v. Yancy, 123 Mo. 391, 27 S.W. 380, the Supreme Court of Missouri had under consideration a similar question, and in passing upon the proposition, said:

"Whether an act of the Legislature be a local or a general law must be determined by the generality with which it affects the people as a whole, rather than the extent of the territory over which it operates, and if it affects equally all persons who come within its range, it can neither be special nor local within the meaning of the Constitution. Moreover, the general power of the Legislature to establish criminal courts in counties having a population exceeding 50,000 is clearly recognized by section 31, art. 6, of the Constitution, as by prohibiting the establishing of criminal courts in such counties, by express terms, having a

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