LeBlanc v. Stuart

• Decision Date: 12 April 1972
• Docket Number: Civ. A. No. 6327.
• Citation: 342 F. Supp. 773
• Parties: Alice C. LeBLANC v. Douglas S. STUART, Administrator of the Estate of Alide J. LeBlanc.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Vermont

342 F. Supp. 773

Alice C. LeBLANC v. Douglas S. STUART, Administrator of the Estate of Alide J. LeBlanc.

Civ. A. No. 6327.

United States District Court, D. Vermont.

April 12, 1972.

James L. Morse, Wilson, Curtis, Bryan, Quinn & Jenkins, Burlington, Vt., for plaintiff.

Wick, Dinse & Allen, Robert H. Erdmann, Burlington, Vt., for defendant.

Opinion and Order

HOLDEN, Chief Judge.

This is a diversity action by a widow against the administrator of the estate of her deceased husband. The plaintiff seeks to recover for injuries sustained as a result of an automobile accident which plaintiff alleges was caused by the negligence of her deceased husband.

The automobile accident which gave rise to this action allegedly occurred on or about June 30, 1968, in Vermont. It is undisputed that at the time of the accident the plaintiff and the deceased were husband and wife and were domiciled in Rhode Island, and that plaintiff is presently a resident of Rhode Island.

Defendant has moved for summary judgment on the grounds that plaintiff is the spouse of the decedent and was the spouse of decedent on the date of the accident and that, as such, she may not maintain an action for personal injuries against her spouse arising out of his negligence under the law of Vermont or the law of Rhode Island.

The first question for decision is whether the ability or disability of a wife to sue her husband's estate in tort should be governed by Vermont law or Rhode Island law.¹

Since federal courts must apply the conflicts of law rule of the forum in a diversity case, Klaxon Co. v. Stentor-Electric Mfg. Co., Inc., 313 U.S. 487, 61 S.Ct. 1020, 85 L.Ed. 1477 (1941), we direct our attention to the law of Vermont on that subject.

The plaintiff contends that the Vermont conflicts rule governing tort situations is that rights and liabilities of the parties to an action arising from a motor vehicle accident is governed by the law of the place where the accident occurred. Goldman v. Beaudry, 122 Vt. 299, 301, 170 A.2d 636 (1961).

The Vermont Supreme Court has not had a further opportunity of reassessing the conflict of laws principle enunciated in the Goldman case. But see, Jacques v. Jacques, 128 Vt. 140, 259 A.2d 779, 780. Many states have rejected the long established rule that the lex loci delecti is the sole and determinant factor in conflicts relating to the substantive rights of the parties to a tort action. Beaulieu v. Beaulieu, 265 A.2d 610 (Me. 1970); Woodward v. Stewart, 104 R.I. 290, 243 A.2d 917, 923-924 (1968), cert. den. Wzcarra-Delgadillo v. United States, 393 U.S. 957, 89 S.Ct. 387, 21 L. Ed.2d 371 (1968); Melk v. Sarahson, 49 N.J. 226, 229 A.2d 625 (1967); Reich v. Purcell, 67 Cal.2d 551, 63 Cal.Rptr. 31, 432 P.2d 727 (1967); Johnson v. Johnson, 107 N.H. 30, 216 A.2d 781 (1966); McSwain v. McSwain, 420 Pa. 86, 215 A.2d 677 (1966); Griffith v. United Airlines, Inc., 416 Pa. 1, 203 A.2d 796 (1964); Thompson v. Thompson, 105 N.H. 86, 193 A.2d 439, 440 (1963); Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743, 191 N.E.2d 279 (1963).

The cases rejecting the strict application of the lex loci doctrine generally adopt the concept of principal contacts as the dominant consideration.

The doctrine of these cases is in keeping with the Second Restatement approved and adopted since Goldman v. Beaudry.

(1) The rights and liabilities of the parties with respect to an issue in tort are determined by the local law of the state which, with respect to that issue, has the most significant relationship to the occurrence and the parties under the principles stated in § 6.

(2) Contacts to be taken into account in applying the principles of § 6 to determine the law applicable to an issue include:

(a) The place where the injury occurred.

(b) the place where the conduct causing the injury occurred,

(c) The domicil, residence, nationality, place of incorporation and place of business of the parties, and

(d) the place where the relationship, if any, between the parties is centered.

These contacts are to be evaluated according to their relative importance with respect to the particular issue.

1 Restatement 2d, Conflict of Laws § 145 (1971).

The Vermont Supreme Court has previously adopted the center of gravity approach to choice of law problems in contracts cases. Pioneer Credit Corp. v. Carden, 127 Vt. 229, 245 A.2d 891 (1968); Boston Law Book Co. v. Hathorn, 119 Vt. 416, 127 A.2d 120 (1956).

The question of family immunity had no bearing on the Goldman decision. In the context of the present motion this consideration is a controlling factor. At the time of the injury in/suit the family domicile of the plaintiff and her deceased husband was in Rhode Island.

In Emery v. Emery, 45 Cal.2d 421, 289 P.2d 218, 223 (1955), Justice Traynor expressed the dominant consideration in the choice of law which confronts the court here. ". . . (T)hat disabilities to sue and immunities from suit because of a family relationship are more properly determined by reference to the law of the state of the family domicile." And—"this law determines whether the estate of a deceased spouse is immune from suit in tort by the surviving spouse." 1 Restatement (Second) Conflict of Laws, § 169, Comment b. (1971).

The trend of the recent decisions of the Supreme Court of Vermont has been strongly influenced by the Restatement of the Law on this subject. The court is persuaded that this course of the law should govern the disposition of the defendant's motion. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co. v. Continental Casualty Co. (C.A.2), 219 F.2d 645, 647.

Vermont's only relationships with the action are the fortuitous circumstance that the tort occurred in this state and the appointment of a Vermont resident as administrator of the deceased husband's estate. We think the fact that the family domicile is in Rhode Island gives Rhode Island a more significant interest in the particular issue before us, disabilities and immunities from suit in intra-family torts.

Having made the choice that Rhode Island law applies, the second question is whether the plaintiff could maintain an action against the estate of her deceased husband in that state. We think that Rhode Island law clearly precludes the maintenance of this suit.

The court's reading of the law of Rhode Island establishes that a wife cannot maintain an action for negligence against her husband. Zarrella v. Miller, 100 R.I. 545, 217 A.2d 673, 675 (1966); Trotti v. Piacente, 99 R.I. 167, 206 A.2d 462, 463 (1965); Castellucci v. Castellucci, 96 R.I. 34, 188 A.2d 467, 469 (1963); Oken v. Oken, 44...