Odom v. Penske Truck Leasing Co.

• Citation: 415 P.3d 521
• Decision Date: 13 March 2018
• Docket Number: Case Number: 116554
• Parties: Perry ODOM and Carolyn Odom, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. PENSKE TRUCK LEASING CO., Defendant-Appellee, and Hendrickson USA, LLC, Defendant.
• Court: Supreme Court of Oklahoma

415 P.3d 521

Perry ODOM and Carolyn Odom, Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v. PENSKE TRUCK LEASING CO., Defendant-Appellee,andHendrickson USA, LLC, Defendant.

Case Number: 116554

Supreme Court of Oklahoma.

Decided: March 13, 2018

Daniel E. Bryan, III and Lane Claussen, Hornbeek, Vitali & Bruan, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for Plaintiffs-Appellants.

L. Earl Ogletree and Cameron Ross Capps, Wiggins, Sewell & Ogletree, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for Defendant-Appellee.

Solicitor General Mithun S. Mansinghani and Assistant Solicitor General Michael K. Velchik, Office of the Attorney General, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for the State of Oklahoma.

COMBS, C.J.:

¶1 The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit (Tenth Circuit) certified a question of state law to this Court under the Revised Uniform Certification of Questions of Law Act, 20 O.S. 2011 §§ 1601 - 1611. The question certified is:

Under the dual-capacity doctrine, an employer who is generally immune from tort liability may become liable to its employee as a third-party tortfeasor, if it occupies, in addition to its capacity as an employer, a second capacity that confers obligations independent of those imposed on it as an employer.

What is the effect of Oklahoma's Administrative Workers' Compensation Act (AWCA), Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 85A, § 1 et seq., on the dual-capacity doctrine? In particular, does the AWCA's exclusive-remedy provision bar an employee from bringing a tort suit against a stockholder of his employer, even if the tort liability would arise from duties independent of the employment relationship? In other words, does this provision abrogate the dual-capacity doctrine as to an employer's stockholder?

I.CERTIFIED FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2The underlying facts in this matter are set out in the certification order from the Tenth Circuit. In answering a certified question, the Court does not presume facts outside those offered by the certification order. Siloam Springs Hotel, LLC v. Century Sur. Co. , 2017 OK 14, ¶ 2, 392 P.3d 262 ; Howard v. Zimmer, Inc. , 2013 OK 17, n.5, 299 P.3d 463 ; In re Harris , 2002 OK 35, ¶ 4 n.5, 49 P.3d 710. Although this Court will neither add nor delete such facts, we may consider uncontested facts supported by the record. Siloam Springs Hotel, LLC , 2017 OK 14 at ¶ 2, 392 P.3d 262 ; Howard , 2013 OK 17 at n.5, 299 P.3d 463 ; McQueen, Rains, & Tresch, LLP v. Citgo Petroleum Corp. , 2008 OK 66, n.4, 195 P.3d 35.

¶3 Plaintiff-Appellant Perry Odom was an employee of Penske Logistics, LLC. Penske Logistics, LLC is a wholly owned subsidiary of Defendant-Appellee Penske Truck Leasing Co. (PTLC). After a trailer owned by PTLC fell on Odom and injured him, he filed a claim against his employer, Penske Logistics, LLC, pursuant to the Administrative Workers' Compensation Act (AWCA), 85A O.S. §§ 1 - 125. However, Perry Odom and his wife Carolyn Odom (collectively, the Odoms) also filed a lawsuit against PTLC in federal district court, alleging PTLC's tortious negligence caused Perry Odom's injury.

¶4 PTLC moved to dismiss the Odoms' federal district court action. PTLC argued the exclusive remedy provision of the AWCA, 85A O.S. Supp. 2013 § 5, barred the Odoms from suing a stockholder of Perry Odom's employer in district court, even if the alleged tort liability arose from duties independent of the employment relationship. The federal district court found that PTLC was the sole stockholder of Penske Logistics, and that dismissal was warranted pursuant to 85A O.S. Supp. 2013 § 5.

¶5 The Odoms appealed the district court's ruling to the Tenth Circuit. After briefs were submitted, the court held oral argument on November 13, 2017. On November, 22, 2017, the court certified its question of law to this Court. In its certification order, the Tenth Circuit noted the application of 85A O.S. Supp. 2013 § 5 to suits by an injured employee against an employer's stockholder appears to be a first impression issue in Oklahoma.

¶6 The Tenth Circuit cited Shadid v. K 9 Univ., LLC , 2017 OK CIV APP 45, 402 P.3d 698, for the proposition that 85A O.S. Supp. 2013 § 5 abrogated the dual-capacity doctrine as to employers, but concluded potential application to stockholders remains ambiguous from the statutory language read in context with the interpretation of Arkansas' very similar provision. The Tenth Circuit concluded by noting the wide-ranging consequences for tort law should 85A O.S. Supp. 2013 § 5 be interpreted to bar all suits by an injured employee against any stockholder of the employer for independent acts, and indicated it did not wish to make such an interpretation given the ambiguity of the relevant provision.

II.REQUIREMENTS FOR ANSWERING CERTIFIED QUESTIONS

¶7 This Court has the power to answer certified questions of law if the certified questions are presented in accordance with the provisions of the Revised Uniform Certification of Questions of Law Act, 20 O.S. 2011 §§ 1601 - 1611. Siloam Springs Hotel, LLC v. Century Sur. Co. , 2017 OK 14, ¶ 14, 392 P.3d 262 ; Gov. Emps. Ins. Co. v. Quine , 2011 OK 88, ¶ 13, 264 P.3d 1245. This Court's discretionary power to answer is set out in 20 O.S. 2011 § 1602, which provides:

The Supreme Court and the Court of Criminal Appeals may answer a question of law certified to it by a court of the United States, or by an appellate court of another state, or of a federally recognized Indian tribal government, or of Canada, a Canadian province or territory, Mexico, or a Mexican state, if the answer may be determinative of an issue in pending litigation in the certifying court and there is no controlling decision of the Supreme Court or Court of Criminal Appeals, constitutional provision, or statute of this state.

Accordingly, in assessing whether a certified federal question of law should be answered by this Court, both factors mentioned by 20 O.S. 2011 § 1602 should be addressed: 1) would the answer be dispositive of an issue in pending litigation in the certifying court; and 2) is there established and controlling law on the subject matter? Siloam Springs Hotel, LLC , 2017 OK 14 at ¶ 14, 392 P.3d 262 ; Quine , 2011 OK 88 at ¶ 13, 264 P.3d 1245.¹ In this matter, it appears the question certified would be both dispositive to the underlying suit in the federal courts, and there is no controlling Oklahoma precedent on the subject matter given the recent adoption of the AWCA and changes made to the exclusive remedy provision.

¶8 This Court also possesses discretionary authority to reformulate the question(s) certified. Siloam Springs Hotel, LLC , 2017 OK 14 at ¶ 15, 392 P.3d 262 ; McQueen, Rains & Tresch, LLP v. Citgo Petroleum Corp. , 2008 OK 66, ¶ 1 n.1, 195 P.3d 35 ; Tyler v. Shelter Mut. Ins. Co. , 2008 OK 9, ¶ 1 n.1, 184 P.3d 496. This authority is set out in 20 O.S. 2011 § 1602.1, which provides: "[t]he Supreme Court of this state may reformulate a question of law certified to it." The certification order from the Tenth Circuit acknowledges this Court's power to reformulate the question certified as we see fit.

¶9 As we are constrained by those facts presented in the certification order, this Court's examination is confined to resolving questions of law. Quine , 2011 OK 88 at ¶ 14, 264 P.3d 1245 ; Russell v. Chase Inv. Servs. Corp., 2009 OK 22, ¶ 8, 212 P.3d 1178. The question presented to this Court by the Tenth Circuit concerns the interpretation and application of the AWCA, 85A O.S. §§ 1 - 125 ; specifically, the AWCA's exclusive remedy provision codified at 85A O.S. Supp. 2013 § 5. Statutory interpretation presents a question of law. Corbeil v. Emricks Van & Storage, Guar. Ins. , 2017 OK 71, ¶ 10, 404 P.3d 856 ; Legarde-Bober v. Okla. State Univ. , 2016 OK 78, ¶ 5, 378 P.3d 562 ; Fulsom v. Fulsom , 2003 OK 96, ¶ 2, 81 P.3d 652.

III.ANALYSIS

¶10 At issue in this matter is the interpretation of 85A O.S. Supp. 2013 § 5(A), which provides:

The rights and remedies granted to an employee subject to the provisions of the Administrative Workers' Compensation Act shall be exclusive of all other rights and remedies of the employee, his legal representative, dependents, next of kin, or anyone else claiming rights to recovery on behalf of the employee against the employer, or any principal, officer, director, employee, stockholder, partner, or prime contractor of the employer on account of injury, illness, or death. Negligent acts of a co-employee may not be imputed to the employer. No role, capacity, or persona of any employer, principal, officer, director, employee, or stockholder other than that existing in the role of employer of the employee shall be relevant for consideration for purposes of this act, and the remedies and rights provided by this act shall be exclusive regardless of the multiple roles, capacities, or personas the employer may be deemed to have. For the purpose of extending the immunity of this section, any operator or owner of an oil or gas well or other operation for exploring for, drilling for, or producing oil or gas shall be deemed to be an intermediate or principal employer for services performed at a drill site or location with respect to injured or deceased workers whose immediate employer was hired by such operator or owner at the time of the injury or death.

The Tenth Circuit wishes to know the effect of this provision on the dual-capacity doctrine, specifically with regard to stockholders of an employer.

1. The dual-capacity doctrine previously permitted suits by employees against employers if the employer occupied a second capacity that conferred upon them obligations independent of those imposed upon them as an employer.

¶11 In order to answer the question certified, it is helpful to discuss this Court's prior application of the dual-capacity doctrine under the now-repealed Oklahoma Workers' Compensation Act (OWCA). Recognizing that the OWCA did not prohibit an employee from maintaining a common-law action against a negligent third person, in Weber v. Armco, Inc. this Court explained the dual- ...