Ledbetter v. Hunter

• Decision Date: 29 June 2004
• Docket Number: No. 49A02-0309-CV-770.,49A02-0309-CV-770.
• Citation: 810 N.E.2d 1095
• Parties: Marsha LEDBETTER, Appellant-Plaintiff, v. Robert HUNTER, M.D., Lawrence Benken, M.D., and Ball Memorial Hospital, Appellees-Defendants.
• Court: Indiana Appellate Court

810 N.E.2d 1095

Marsha LEDBETTER, Appellant-Plaintiff, v. Robert HUNTER, M.D., Lawrence Benken, M.D., and Ball Memorial Hospital, Appellees-Defendants.

No. 49A02-0309-CV-770.

Court of Appeals of Indiana.

June 29, 2004.

Michael L. Hanley, Vernon J. Petri & Associates, Mary A. Findling, Findling Garau Germano & Pennington, P.C., Indianapolis, IN, Attorneys for Appellant.

Mark K. Reeder, Pamela G. Schneeman, Riley Bennett & Egloff, LLP, Indianapolis, IN, Attorneys for Ball Memorial and Robert Hunter, M.D.

James W. Brauer, Stewart & Irwin, P.C., Indianapolis, IN, Attorney for Lawrence Benken, M.D.

OPINION

RILEY, Judge.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Appellant-Plaintiff, Marsha Ledbetter (Ledbetter), appeals the trial court's Order in favor of Appellees-Defendants, Robert Hunter, M.D. (Hunter), Lawrence Benken, M.D. (Benken), and Ball Memorial Hospital (the Hospital) (collectively, Appellees), dismissing Ledbetter's medical malpractice claim under the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Indiana Constitution.

We reverse and remand for further proceedings.

ISSUE

Ledbetter raises one issue on appeal, which we restate as follows: whether the trial court erred in dismissing Ledbetter's medical malpractice claim, holding that the statute of limitations for minors, contained in the Indiana Medical Malpractice Act, did not violate the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Indiana Constitution.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Trenda Ledbetter (Trenda) was born at the Hospital in Muncie, Indiana, on November 25, 1974. Prenatal care was provided and the birth was attended by Hunter and Benken. Trenda alleged that medical malpractice by the attending physicians triggered birth complications, causing serious and permanent physical and mental injuries. On April 22, 1994, within two years of her eighteenth birthday, Trenda filed a medical malpractice claim against the Appellees, who subsequently moved to dismiss Trenda's Complaint, contending that her claim was barred by the Indiana Medical Malpractice Act's statute of limitation. On August 11, 1994, after hearing oral argument on the motions, the trial court entered judgment granting the motions of the Appellees.

Trenda appealed. On June 30, 1995, this court reversed the trial court's Order dismissing Trenda's claim and remanded this cause to the trial court to determine whether the Indiana statute of limitations for medical malpractice as applied to minors is constitutional under the Indiana Constitution's Privileges and Immunities Clause, as discussed in Collins v. Day, 644 N.E.2d 72 (Ind.1994). The next day, on July 1, 1995, Trenda died. On July 2, 1997, her mother was substituted as plaintiff.

On March 22, 2002, Ledbetter filed her brief on remand in opposition to the Appellees' motion to dismiss. On May 28, 2002, Appellees filed their response briefs. Subsequently, on June 27, 2002, Ledbetter filed a reply brief. On August 12, 2003, after conducting a hearing, the trial court ordered Ledbetter's Complaint dismissed with prejudice.

Ledbetter now appeals. Additional facts will be provided as necessary.

DISCUSSION AND DECISION

Ledbetter contends that the trial court erred by finding that the statute of limitations with regard to minors, as contained in the Indiana Medical Malpractice Act, did not violate the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Indiana Constitution. Specifically, she argues that the application of the Collins two-pronged test reveals the unconstitutionality of the statute of limitations as it applies to minor victims. In support of her contention, Ledbetter first advances the result of various Nonparty Requests for Production upon numerous medical malpractice insurance carriers to demonstrate that the state interest underlying the Medical Malpractice Act's statute of limitations — the threat of a reduction in available healthcare services — either never was, or no longer is, compelling. Secondly, Ledbetter asserts that not all minor victims of medical malpractice are treated the same. In particular, Ledbetter alleges that the statute creates two subclasses of minor medical malpractice victims: those with parents who choose to file a claim on behalf of their minor child and those minors whose claims are extinguished because their parents fail to act.

I. Standard of Review

When a party challenges a statute based upon a violation of the Indiana Constitution, our standard of review is well-settled. "Every statute stands before us clothed with the presumption of constitutionality until clearly overcome by a contrary showing." Boehm v. Town of St. John, 675 N.E.2d 318, 321 (Ind.1996). The party challenging the constitutionality of the statute bears the burden of proof, and all doubts are resolved against that party. Id. If there are two reasonable interpretations of a statute, we will choose the interpretation that permits upholding the statute. Hochstedler v. St. Joseph County Solid Waste Management Dist., 770 N.E.2d 910, 917 (Ind.Ct.App.2002), trans. denied.

Moreover, we review the constitutionality of statutes with the understanding that "[t]he legislature has wide latitude in determining public policy, and we do not substitute our belief as to the wisdom of a particular statute for those of the legislature." Boehm, 675 N.E.2d at 321. Therefore, we do not declare a statute to be unconstitutional merely because we "consider it born of unwise, undesirable, or ineffectual policies." Johnson v. St. Vincent Hospital, Inc., 273 Ind. 374, 381, 404 N.E.2d 585, 591 (Ind.1980). Nevertheless, we are also mindful of our duty to enforce the Constitution as written and intended. Boehm, 675 N.E.2d at 321. Accordingly, "[w]here a law or the application of a law is challenged on constitutional grounds, the judiciary has the authority, as well as the duty, to explore the constitutional ramifications of the law." Id.

II. History of the Statute of Limitations

Prior to Trenda's birth in 1974, the statute of limitations that applied to all claims of medical malpractice was contained in Ind.Code § 34-4-19-1. This statute provided that a medical malpractice victim had two years from the date of the negligent act or omission in which to file suit. However, by the time Trenda was born, our supreme court had issued its decision in Chaffin v. Nicosia, 261 Ind. 698, 310 N.E.2d 867 (1974), which made Indiana's legal disability tolling provision applicable to minors claiming injuries resulting from medical malpractice. Under the tolling provision, a minor could initiate a suit up to two years after reaching the age of majority. Our supreme court stated as its rationale that:

[I]t makes practical sense particularly with respect to infants, who, because of their youth, cannot be expected to articulate their physical and mental condition or to realize and act timely to preserve their legal rights. It is not difficult to conceive of situations where the results of medical malpractice upon an infant could remain undiscovered for a number of years.

Id. at 871.

For religious reasons, Ledbetter did not file suit on Trenda's behalf at the time of her birth and, for similar reasons, declined to do so at any time thereafter. Nevertheless, Ledbetter understood that under Indiana law, Trenda could decide up to two years after her eighteenth birthday whether to sue Appellees. Ledbetter informed Trenda of her right to sue when she reached the age of majority.

However, in 1975, the statute of limitations, as stipulated in Chaffin, unexpectedly changed with the passage of the Indiana Medical Malpractice Act. Under the Act, a medical malpractice claim must be filed within two years of the date of the act, omission, or neglect, except that a minor less than six years of age has until the minor's eighth birthday to commence a suit. See I.C. § 34-18-7-1-1(b). Additionally, the statute included a retroactive clause, applicable to Trenda's claim, which changed her statute of limitations from her twentieth birthday to her eighth birthday. Unaware of the change in the law, Trenda, once she reached eighteen, commenced the instant case in accordance with the two-year statute of limitations in effect on the date of her birth.

II. Indiana Medical Malpractice Act

Ledbetter now contends that the statute of limitations with regard to minors, as included in the Indiana Medical Malpractice Act, violates the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Indiana Constitution under the Collins v. Day, 644 N.E.2d 72 (Ind.1994), analysis. The Privileges and Immunities Clause provides that "[t]he General Assembly shall not grant to any citizen, or class of citizens, privileges or immunities, which, upon the same terms, shall not equally belong to all citizens." Ind. Const. Art. I, § 23.

In its landmark decision of Collins, our supreme court abandoned the traditional Fourteenth Amendment scrutiny analysis in favor of an independent analysis of Indiana's equal privileges clause. Prior to Collins, Indiana's equal privileges clause and the federal Constitution's privileges and immunities clause were considered coextensive and thought to protect identical rights. See Johnson, 404 N.E.2d at 600. In 1994, the Collins court concluded that nothing compels the application of a federal equal protection analytical methodology to claims under article I, § 23 of the Indiana Constitution, and that courts should give the Indiana provision independent interpretation and application. See Collins, 644 N.E.2d at 75. As such, our supreme court held that the Indiana Privileges and Immunities Clause imposes two requirements upon statutes that grant unequal privileges or immunities to differing classes of persons. Id. at 80.

First, the disparate treatment accorded by the legislation must be reasonably related to inherent characteristics which distinguish the unequally treated classes. Second, the preferential treatment must be uniformly applicable and equally available to all persons similarly situated. Finally, in determining

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