LeDuc v. State, 47953
| Citation | 365 So.2d 149 |
| Decision Date | 22 November 1978 |
| Docket Number | No. 47953,47953 |
| Parties | John Wallace LeDUC, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Court of Florida |
Brooks Taylor, Crestview, for appellant.
Robert L. Shevin, Atty. Gen., and Wallace E. Allbritton, Asst. Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, for appellee.
This is a capital case brought to us to review two sentences of death imposed by the Circuit Court of Okaloosa County, Florida. John Wallace LeDuc pleaded guilty to the rape and murder of a nine-year-old girl. A jury, convened to recommend sentence to the trial court on the two criminal charges, unanimously recommended a death penalty as to both. The trial judge independently sentenced LeDuc to death on both charges, and the convictions and sentences were properly brought to us for review. 1
After LeDuc's appeal was filed in this Court, we relinquished jurisdiction to the trial court to prepare written findings as to the aggravating and mitigating factors which bore on the court's decision to impose the death penalty. 2 The trial judge declined to provide more express findings than appeared in his original pronouncement at the time of sentencing, except to specifically note that none of the mitigating factors enumerated by the Florida Statutes "or otherwise" were present. The original sentence order was silent with respect to mitigating circumstances.
LeDuc's counsel offers only one alleged infirmity with respect to LeDuc's convictions and sentences the failure of the trial judge to certify LeDuc as a mentally disordered sex offender under Chapter 917, Florida Statutes (1975). He suggests that the trial judge abused his discretion in failing to certify LeDuc, relying on our decision in Dorman v. State, 279 So.2d 854 (Fla.1973).
During oral argument before this Court, we ascertained that the sentencing jury and the trial court had neither seen nor considered a series of psychiatric reports prepared in 1961 by the Devereux School of California where LeDuc had been confined and treated for psychiatric disturbances as a youth. On motion of LeDuc's counsel after argument, we again relinquished jurisdiction to the trial court for consideration of this report in connection with LeDuc's motion for certification. At a hearing conducted for that purpose the trial judge found nothing in the report to change his original denial of certification, and he again returned the case to us for review.
We reviewed in detail the test of all psychiatric reports in the record, including two presented by court-appointed psychiatrists prior to LeDuc's pleas, and we find no basis to conclude that the trial judge abused his discretion in failing to certify LeDuc under the statute. See Huckaby v. State, 343 So.2d 29 (Fla.1977).
Even though LeDuc's counsel has not challenged the legal sufficiency of LeDuc's convictions and sentences on any basis, we are obligated by law and rule of this Court to ascertain whether they are proper. 3 As regards the convictions, our scope of review is obviously limited by the fact that LeDuc pleaded guilty to both charges against him, on the advice of counsel, in exchange for a recommendation of mercy from the prosecutor. The pleas were intelligently made, and the trial court's inquiry as to their voluntariness and the underlying factual foundations was thorough. We are satisfied that both convictions are legally proper and must stand.
As regards the death sentences which were imposed, our review is channeled by the statute, which requires the advisory jury and the trial judge to evaluate and weigh specific factors enumerated as mitigating and aggravating circumstances. Here the advisory jury heard a summary of the evidence of the crimes, plus an argument by defense counsel to the general effect that LeDuc was mentally disturbed. The prosecutor, in his closing remarks, briefly listed the aggravating circumstances shown by the evidence he had placed in the record and pointed out that no evidence of mitigation had been introduced. Nonetheless, in accordance with his bargain, the prosecutor recommended a life sentence. In final closing argument, defense counsel repeated his argument that no one could have committed so terrible a crime unless he was mentally disturbed.
The jury unanimously recommended the death penalty on both charges. The trial judge did not expressly find any mitigating circumstance to be present or absent, and he essentially relied on the atrocity of the crime as an aggravating circumstance sufficient to warrant imposition of the death penalty. 4
The primary standard for our review of death sentences is that the recommended sentence of a jury should not be disturbed if all relevant data was considered, unless there appear strong reasons to believe that reasonable persons could not agree with the recommendation. 5 On the record placed before the jury in this case, a recommended sentence of death was certainly reasonable. 6 Indeed, the only data on which a life recommendation could have been made would have had to be grounded on the nonevidentiary recommendation of the prosecutor and the emotional plea of defense counsel.
The trial judge was cognizant at the time of sentencing of the reports of two psychiatrists who interviewed LeDuc to determine his competence to stand trial, although the jury was not apprised of their existence. As earlier noted these reports were rendered prior to acceptance by the court of LeDuc's guilty pleas. One of the psychiatric reports states the impression that LeDuc "is a very schizoid individual," but finds "no classical indicia of psychosis." Each report concluded that appellant was sane at the time of the offense and had sufficient mental capacity to assist counsel with his defense. In each examination LeDuc admitted to previous episodes of criminal conduct. This evidence before the trial judge was insufficient to compel a finding of the existence of the statutory mitigating circumstances related to mental disturbance, i. e., "The capital felony was committed while the defendant was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance" (Section 921.141(6)(b)), or "The capacity of the defendant to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law was substantially impaired" (Section 921.141(6)(f)).
While admittedly not available to the trial judge at the time of sentencing, additional psychiatric information which might bear upon the enumerated mitigating circumstances was considered by the judge at the time we relinquished jurisdiction for consideration of the report of the Devereux Foundation as bearing on the original Motion to Certify as a mentally disordered sex offender. At the hearing held to consider this additional information the court reviewed not only the Devereux Foundation report but also the reports of the court-appointed psychiatrists as well as certain other evidence presented by the State relative to LeDuc's military service record. It is important to note that at the conclusion of the hearing, the trial judge not only reaffirmed his original ruling...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Combs v. State
...adopted the same deferential standard for jury recommendations of death. Ross v. State, 386 So.2d 1191, 1197 (Fla.1980); LeDuc v. State, 365 So.2d 149, 151 (Fla.1978), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 885, 100 S.Ct. 175, 62 L.Ed.2d 114 (1979).4 Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 92 S.Ct. 2726, 33 L.Ed.......
-
Grossman v. State
...held that a jury recommendation of death should be given great weight. Ross v. State, 386 So.2d 1191, 1197 (Fla.1980); LeDuc v. State, 365 So.2d 149, 151 (Fla.1978), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 885, 100 S.Ct. 175, 62 L.Ed.2d 114 (1979).2 Appellant, who is 6'3"' and 225 pounds, was approximately ......
-
Ford v. Strickland
...862 (1980); Hargrave v. State, 366 So.2d 1 (Fla.1978), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 919, 100 S.Ct. 239, 62 L.Ed.2d 176 (1979); LeDuc v. State, 365 So.2d 149, 152 (Fla.1978), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 885, 100 S.Ct. 175, 62 L.Ed.2d 114 (1979).30 Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.150(a) provides: ......
-
Mann v. Dugger
...no mitigating circumstances to counterbalance the four valid aggravating circumstances." Id. at 185 (emphasis added). In LeDuc v. State, 365 So.2d 149 (Fla.1978), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 885, 100 S.Ct. 175, 62 L.Ed.2d 114 (1979), the supreme court stated that "[t]he primary standard for our ......