Lee County v. Robertson

• Citation: 48 S.W. 901,66 Ark. 82
• Parties: LEE COUNTY v. ROBERTSON
• Decision Date: 24 December 1898
• Court: Supreme Court of Arkansas

48 S.W. 901

66 Ark. 82

LEE COUNTY v. ROBERTSON

Supreme Court of Arkansas

December 24, 1898

Appeal from Lee Circuit Court HANCE N. HUTTON, Judge.

STATEMENT BY THE COURT.

In October, 1895, the quorum court of Lee county levied a tax of three mills for "old indebtedness." The old indebtedness had been bonded; the principal of the bonds being due in twenty years, with interest payable semi-annually. Under the levy of 1895 for old indebtedness there was raised a sum sufficient to pay the interest on said indebtedness which had accrued, and leave a balance in the hands of the county treasurer of $ 2,722.43, to the credit of old indebtedness. In October, 1896, the quorum court, on motion of one of its members, ordered that $ 2,500 unexpended balance in the hands of the county treasurer to the credit of old indebtedness "be reappropriated for the use of the county general purposes in the payment of outstanding warrants of Lee county," and the treasurer was ordered to transfer the same accordingly, etc. Before this order was made, however, J. T. Robertson, a citizen and taxpayer of Lee county, appeared and asked to be made a party to the proceedings, and to be allowed to file his objections to same, which he did through his counsel, and was heard in opposition to the motion, after which the order was entered as indicated supra, whereupon said Robertson filed his affidavit and prayer for appeal to the circuit court, which was granted. The case was tried in the circuit court upon the transcript and certain other records of the county court and quorum court and oral testimony of the county clerk, which showed that the bonds issued to cover the old indebtedness of the county--i. e. indebtedness prior to the constitution of 1874--were still outstanding and unpaid; that all of the accrued interest on said indebtedness had been paid out of the fund produced from the three mills levy of October, 1895 and that there was a balance after such payment, in the hands of the treasurer, of $ 2,722.43. The circuit court reversed the order of the county court, and the county appeals.

Judgment affirmed.

McCulloch & McCulloch, for appellant.

A private citizen has no appeal from the decisions of the county or quorum court, except when it acts judicially and in adversary proceedings. 40 Ind. 217; 5 Sneed, 515; 8 Humph. 634. Cf. 51 Ark. 159; 52 Ark. 99; 53 Ark. 287. The acts of the quorum court in levying taxes and appropriating the revenue of the county are entirely administrative, and not judicial. Cooley, Tax. 244; 110 U.S. 321. A taxpayer can object to a levy only in so far as it effects him. Sand. & H Dig. § 6423. The clause of the constitution placing limitations upon the management of public funds should be construed liberally to conform with the general spirit of the constitution. 59 Ark. 513; 60 Id. 343; 51 Ark. 534. Sec. 11, art. 17, Const. of 1874, applies to only those tax levies made by the legislature for state purposes. 40 P. 130; 109 N.Y. 100.

Jas. P. Brown, for appellee.

As to right of appeal from judgments of the county court, see 34 Ark. 240; 36 Ark. 378. Appellee was made a party below without objection, and it is now too late to interpose same. The constitution declares that money raised by taxation for a specific purpose shall not be diverted to any other. Const. art. 6, § 11; 46 Ark. 156.

OPINION

WOOD, J., (after stating the facts.):

Two questions are presented:

1. Did the quorum court have the power to appropriate for "county general purposes" an unexpended balance of a fund in the county treasury which had been levied and collected for the purpose of paying the "old indebtedness" of the county (i. e. indebtedness which was incurred prior to the adoption of the constitution of 1874)? The order of the quorum court was in plain violation of art. 16, § 11, of the constitution, which declares that "no moneys arising from a tax for one purpose shall be used for any other purpose." Here the court was proposing to use a fund for "county general purposes" which had been levied and collected for the specific and entirely different purpose of paying "old indebtedness." It is true that the quorum court in its order of reappropriation (1896) found and recited that the tax had been levied "to pay interest on the old indebtedness," and the circuit court also found that the levy was "to pay interest on the bonds." The order of the court in 1895 making the appropriation is as follows: "It was moved and seconded that a tax of three mills be levied for old indebtedness on each dollar valuation under assessment of 1895, which motion was put by the presiding judge, and there was a tax of three mills duly levied for old indebtedness." No order or finding of any subsequent court that the appropriation was to pay the interest on the "old indebtedness" could change or affect the order made by the court making the levy. But even if the court making the levy had ordered same to pay "the interest on old indebtedness," instead of to pay "the old indebtedness," still the result would have been the same, and the order of the quorum court under consideration would still have been in direct conflict with the provision of the constitution supra. For the balance of the fund in the hands of the treasurer was sought to be used, by the order reappropriating same, not to pay interest on "old indebtedness," but for "county general purposes." The...