Mason v. Purdy

• Decision Date: 13 April 1895
• Citation: 40 P. 130,11 Wash. 591
• Parties: MASON ET AL. v. PURDY, COUNTY TREASURER.
• Court: Washington Supreme Court

40 P. 130

11 Wash. 591

MASON ET AL. v. PURDY, COUNTY TREASURER.

Supreme Court of Washington

April 13, 1895

Appeal from superior court, Whatcom county; John R. Winn, Judge.

Action by J. R. Mason and others against E. W. Purdy, as county treasurer in and for Whatcom county, to enjoin the payment of certain county warrants. There was judgment for defendant and plaintiffs appeal. Affirmed.

Dorr Hadley & Hadley, for appellants.

Newman & Howard and Black & Leaming, for respondent.

HOYT C.J.

It is conceded by the appellants that the judgment rendered by the superior court in this cause must be affirmed if the funds arising from the annual tax levy made by the board of county commissioners in any given year can be applied to the payment of obligations other than those incurred during the fiscal year following such levy, but they contend that they cannot be so applied. The provisions of the constitution upon which they rely to establish this contention are contained in sections 5, 8, art. 7; and the provisions of the statute which they claim to have been enacted in harmony with such constitutional provisions are contained in section 63 of the revenue law of 1893. The following is a copy of said sections of the constitution:

"Sec. 5. No tax shall be levied except in pursuance of law, and every law imposing a tax shall state distinctly the object of the same, to which only it shall be applied."

"Sec. 8. Whenever the expenses of any fiscal year shall exceed the income, the legislature may provide for levying a tax for the ensuing fiscal year sufficient with other sources of income to pay the deficiency as well as the estimated expenses of the ensuing fiscal year."

And the part of said section 63 of the revenue act of 1893 relied upon is substantially as follows: The county taxes shall be levied by the county commissioners at the time of their meeting in October of each year. Such taxes shall be based upon an itemized statement of the estimated county expenses for the ensuing year, which statement shall be included in the published proceedings of the said board; and no greater levy of county tax shall be made upon the taxable property of any county than will be equal to the amount of such estimated expenses, with an excess of 15 per cent. of the same. And it is contended that thereby the legislature has provided the object for which county taxes shall be levied as required by section 5 of article 7 of the constitution, and that such object is the payment of the expenses for the ensuing fiscal year, and that the application of any funds derived from such levy to any other purpose than the payment of such expenses would be in violation of said section of the constitution. And section 8 of article 7 is relied upon to aid this contention, it being claimed that thereunder the legislature is given authority to provide by special levy for other obligations of the several counties.

If the section of the constitution last mentioned referred to taxation for county purposes, as claimed by appellants, it would greatly strengthen their contention as to the force to be given to the other section, and to the provisions of the statute above set out. But to us it seems clear that this section has no reference whatever to taxation for county purposes. This is so evident from the language used that the inference to be drawn therefrom can be little aided by argument. By other provisions of the constitution the legislature is prohibited from enacting special laws; hence, if it enacts upon the subject of county taxation it must do so by a statute applying to a class of counties, and, as the revenue of only a single county may have been insufficient to meet its expenses, the fact of a deficiency in a single county would require of the legislature the passage of a law which would authorize the levy of a tax in all of the counties of the state. Such legislation would be so absurd that it could not have been contemplated by the framers of the constitution. Besides, there is no way provided by which the legislature could be informed as to the condition of the finances of the several counties. From these facts, and from the fact that the language is apt and accurate when applied to state expenses, revenue, and taxation, and entirely inapt and inaccurate when applied to those of counties, it must be held that it applies only to those of the state. It follows that that portion of the argument of the appellants founded upon the language of this section is without force. For the same reason, it might well be contended that that portion of the argument founded upon said section 5 was also without force. Its language is applicable and accurate when applied to taxation by the state, and, at least to a degree, inaccurate and inapplicable when applied to taxation by counties. The law by which counties are authorized to levy a tax is not, strictly speaking, a law imposing a tax; and the authority of the legislature to enact such a law is much better sustained by that part of section 9 of said article 7, which provides that, "for all corporate purposes, all municipal corporations may be vested with authority to assess and collect taxes, and such taxes shall be uniform in respect to persons and property within the jurisdiction of the body levying the same," than it is by the language of said section 5. But it is not necessary to decide as to the application of this section, for the reason that in our opinion the object for which the tax shall be levied as therein provided is not the expenses of the county or state for any particular time, but has reference to the purpose for which the money is to be raised, as it relates to the business of the county or state. If it applies to counties, it was thereby made the duty of the legislature, in providing for a levy for their purposes, to specify the general objects for which the levy might be made; for instance, that a certain amount might be levied for general county purposes, a certain amount for school purposes, and a certain amount for roads and bridges. This is the more reasonable construction, and is the one which has been adopted by the legislature, as it has specially provided in all the acts relating to the levy of taxes by counties that there shall be separate amounts levied for each of the objects above stated. For these and other reasons, it is our opinion that the contention of the appellants that the object of the tax levied by the board of county commissioners within the meaning of this constitutional provision, was the payment of all the county expenses for the ensuing fiscal year, and not the payment of the different classes of county expenses, as therein provided for and segregated, cannot be sustained. It follows from what we have said that, under the constitution, the legislature was at liberty to provide for the levy of taxes by the board of county commissioners for the payment of obligations already incurred by the county, as well as those thereafter to be incurred.

The only remaining question is to decide whether or not it has done so. This question can only be properly decided by taking into consideration the circumstances so existing in the...