Lee v. BK Schaumburg Inc.
| Decision Date | 01 July 2020 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 18-cv-3593 |
| Parties | BUM HOON LEE, Plaintiff, v. BK SCHAUMBURG INC. & HYE JOO CHOI, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois |
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Before the Court is Defendant BK Schaumburg Inc. and Defendant Hye Joo Choi (collectively, "Defendants") motion for summary judgment. For the reasons set forth below, Defendants' motion for summary judgment [47] is denied. The case is set for a telephonic status hearing on July 14, 2020 at 9:00 a.m. The Courtroom Deputy will enter a separate order containing the call-in information.
These facts are taken from the parties' respective Local Rule 56.1 statements and supporting exhibits [49]; [51]; [52]. The Court construes the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, here Plaintiff. "When we cite as undisputed a statement of fact that a party has attempted to dispute, it reflects our determination that the evidence cited in the response does not show that the fact is in genuine dispute." NAR Business Park, LLC v. Ozark Automotive Distributors, LLC, --- F. Supp. 3d ---, 2019 WL 7401503, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 30, 2019) (quotation marks and citation omitted).
Plaintiff Bum Hoon Lee ("Plaintiff") is a former employee of Defendant BK Schaumburg Inc. ("BKS"). [49, ¶¶ 8, 10.] Defendant BKS is apparently part of a larger chain of grocery stores, see [49-2 at 7-8]; Defendant Hye Joo Choi ("Defendant Choi") was the store manager of the BKS's Schaumburg location. [49, ¶ 4.]
Plaintiff was hired to work at BKS by Mr. Cho Yong Kwan ("Mr. Cho"). [Id., ¶ 9.] Mr. Cho determined Plaintiff's position ("produce manager"), pay (starting wage of $12/hour), presumptive hours, and job responsibilities. [Id., ¶ 9-12]; [51-2 at 26-27.] BK executives also directed that employees should not, under normal circumstances, work more than 60 hours per week. [51-2 at 26-27, 43-44.] Defendant Choi did not hire Plaintiff or determine his job description, responsibilities, the number of hours he should work, or wage. [49, ¶ 9-12]; [51-2 at 26-27, 43-44.] Whether she possessed hiring and firing authority in general is disputed.
Plaintiff was hired to work ten hours per day, six days a week, for a total of 60 hours per week. [52, ¶¶ 2-3.] But Plaintiff claims that he actually worked well in excess of 60 hours per week for two reasons. First, sometimes emergencies would pop up at the store that would require him to stay late; for example, if the power failed, he would stay late to help preserve any perishable merchandise. [51-2 at 43:4-14.] Second, Plaintiff attended the "early market" to procure produce three days a week. [52, ¶¶ 2-3.] He would start his day at 2:30 a.m. on early market days, but still had to work a full shift at the store until 6:00 p.m. [Id., ¶ 2.] He claims that Defendant Choi directly ordered him to stay late notwithstanding the fact that he had already worked several hours on the early-morning shift.1 [Id., ¶ 1.] The parties do not, apparently, contest that Plaintiff received fullovertime pay for his normal 60-hour-a-week schedule, or any emergency work. [51-1, ¶¶ 18-21]; [51-2 at 43:11-14]; see also, generally, [49-6 (paystubs reflecting that Plaintiff was regularly paid more than twenty hours of overtime per week)]; contra [52, ¶ 4]. Plaintiff claims, however, that he was not paid at all for the 15-20 hours per week he spent at the early market.2 [52, ¶¶ 2-3.] Plaintiff explained in his deposition that his store has a biometric timeclock that uses his handprint to punch him in and out. [51-2 at 41, 45-46.] On early market days, then, he claims to have clocked in upon returning from the market, after he had done several hours of work. See [id. at 46.]
Plaintiff's operative complaint alleges four counts against both Defendants: violation of the overtime provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq. (Count I); violation of the minimum wage provisions of the Illinois Minimum Wage Law (IMWL), 820 ILCS 105/1 et seq. (Count II); violation of the overtime provisions of the IMWL (Count IV); and violation of the Illinois Wage Payment and Collection Act (IWPCA), 820 ILCS §115/3 et seq. (Count V).3 Before the Court is Defendants' motion for summary judgment.
Summary judgment is proper where "the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Rule 56 makes clear that whether a party asserts that a fact is undisputed or genuinelydisputed, the party must support the asserted fact by citing to particular parts of the record, including depositions, documents, or affidavits. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1). A party can also support a fact by showing that the materials cited do not establish the absence or presence of a genuine dispute or that the adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact. Id. In determining whether summary judgment is appropriate, the Court must construe all facts in a light most favorable to the non-moving party (here, Plaintiff) and draw all reasonable inferences in that party's favor. Majors v. Gen. Elec. Co., 714 F.3d 527, 532 (7th Cir. 2013) (citation omitted). But Plaintiff "is only entitled to the benefit of inferences supported by admissible evidence, not those 'supported by only speculation or conjecture.'" Grant v. Trs. of Ind. Univ., 870 F.3d 562, 568 (7th Cir. 2017) (citation and quotation marks omitted). Rule 56(a) "mandates the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against any party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party would bear the burden of proof at trial." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). In other words, the moving party may meet its burden by pointing out to the court that "there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case." Id. at 324.
It is not the role of the Court to scour the record in search of evidence to defeat a motion for summary judgment; instead, the nonmoving party bears the responsibility of identifying evidence to defeat summary judgment. Harney, LLC, 526 F.3d at 1104. To avoid summary judgment, the nonmoving party must go beyond the pleadings and "set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). For this reason, the Seventh Circuit has called summary judgment the "put up or shut up" moment in a lawsuit—"when a party must show what evidence it has that would convince a trier of fact to accept its version of events." See Steen v. Myers, 486 F.3d 1017, 1022 (7th Cir.2007). In other words, the party opposing summary judgment "must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). "The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the plaintiff's position will be insufficient; there must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the plaintiff." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252.
This case arises under the federal FLSA and its state analogue the IMWL. The parties do not dispute that the IMWL is interpreted analogously to the FLSA, at least regarding the provisions at issue here. [48 at 4]; [51 at 6]; see also Dominguez v. Quigley's Irish Pub, Inc., 790 F. Supp. 2d 803, 811 (N.D. Ill. 2011). The FLSA requires a subject employer to pay its employees a minimum hourly wage, and to compensate its employees at one and one-half time the regular rate for a work week longer than forty hours. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 206, 207. Plaintiff also brings suit under the IWPCA, which requires employers to promptly pay their employees.
Plaintiff seeks to hold Defendant Choi individually liable for any wage-and-hour violation. Defendant Choi counters that she cannot be held liable under the FLSA (and by extension IMWL) because she was not Plaintiff's employer. Neither party addresses the employer standard under the IWPCA.
The FLSA defines "employer" to include "any person acting directly or indirectly in the interest of an employer in relation to an employee." 29 U.S.C. § 203(d). This definition "'contemplates several simultaneous employers who may be responsible for compliance with the FLSA.'" Pietrzycki v. Heights Tower Service, Inc., 290 F. Supp. 3d 822, 850-51 (N.D. Ill. 2017) (quoting Villareal v. El Chile, Inc., 776 F. Supp. 2d 778, 784 (N.D. Ill. 2011)). Though the Courtmust "construe this statute broadly" to effectuate its remedial goals, Secretary of Labor v. Lauritzen, 835 F.2d 1529, 1543 (7th Cir. 1987) (Easterbrook, J., concurring) (citing Rutherford Food Corp. v. McComb, 331 U.S. 722, (1947); Tony and Susan Alamo Foundation v. Secretary of Labor, 471 U.S. 290, 296 (1985)), courts "have stopped short of applying the definition precisely as written." Schneider v. Cornerstone Pints, Inc., 148 F. Supp. 3d 690, 696 (N.D. Ill 2015) (citing Donovan v. Agnew, 712 F.2d 1509, 1510 (1st Cir. 1983)); see also Lauritzen, 835 F.2d at 1543 (Easterbrook, J., concurring) () (citations omitted). A statutory "employer" must at least have "had supervisory authority over the complaining employee" and been "responsible in whole or part for the alleged violation." Riordan v. Kempiners, 831 F.2d 690, 694 (7th Cir. 1987).
In assessing whether an individual is an "employer," the Court assesses "the 'economic reality' of the working relationship." Perez v. Super Maid, LLC, 55 F. Supp. 3d 1065, 1075 (N.D. Ill. 2014). "Relevant factors include whether the alleged employer: '(1) had the power to hire and fire the employees; (2)...
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