Lee v. DeBerry

• Decision Date: 01 June 1951
• Docket Number: No. 16510,16510
• Citation: 219 S.C. 382,65 S.E.2d 775
• Court: South Carolina Supreme Court
• Parties: LEE v. DE BERRY et al.

Page 775

65 S.E.2d 775

219 S.C. 382

LEE v. DE BERRY et al.

No. 16510.

Supreme Court of South Carolina.

June 1, 1951.

Neil Brooks, Sol., U. S. Dept. of Agriculture, Washington, D. C., Ben Scott Whaley, U. S. Atty., Charleston, Russell D. Miller, Asst. U. S. Atty., Florence, for appellants.

Willcox, Hardee, Houck & Palmer, Florence, for respondent.

FISHBURNE, Justice.

The issue in this case was brought before the court of common pleas for Florence County pursuant to the provisions of Sections 361-368 of the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938, 52 Stat. 62-64, 7 U.S.C.A. §§ 1361-1368. The case is one of novel impression in this court, and, under the Federal Act referred to, relates to the tobacco acreage allotment for tobacco growers.

The controversy arises out of the fact that the plaintiff, S. E. Lee, who will hereafter be referred to as respondent, had for a number of years prior to 1949, been engaged in farming in Florence County on certain lands owned by him; and also on another tract in that county which he leased, known as the Kuker lands. The Kuker lands were sold in the year 1948. Prior to the sale, the tobacco acreage allotment of the respondent had been established with respect to his lands and the Kuker Tract, as 24.6 Acres. By reason of the sale, it became necessary for this allotment to be apportioned between the respondent's lands and the Kuker lands.

For the year 1949, the Florence County Committee apportioned twenty acres as the tobacco acreage allotment for respondent's lands, and four and six-tenths acres to the Kuker lands. Respondent contends that he was entitled to 21.2 acres, which would have reduced the Kuker apportionment to 3.4 acres.

Under the Act, quotas in each county are allotted by the County Committee elected by the farmers in the county. In the event of dissatisfaction with the allotment, it may be reviewed by a Review Committee, also composed of farmers but the findings of fact by the Review Committee, if supported by the evidence, are made final and conclusive.

Due to the adverse ruling of the County Committee, respondent duly appealed from its decision to the Review Committee. In accordance with the regulations of the Secretary of Agriculture, a hearing was held by the Review Committee, testimony of all witnesses presented, the exhibits offered were received, and the entire record reviewed. Thereafter, the Review Committee made its findings of fact and affirmed the action of the County Committee. Respondent thereupon commenced this action in the state court, as allowed by the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938, to compel the Review Committee to re-classify his allotment and to establish his tobacco acreage allotment at 21.2 acres instead of at 20 acres. The complaint is based upon the contention that the Kuker Tract contains only 23.7 acres of cropland rather than 34.7 acres of cropland as found by the County Committee and affirmed by the Review Committee, and that an apportionment based on the lower figure for the Kuker Tract would give the respondent 21.2 acres for which he contends.

The lower court sustained this claim of respondent, and ordered the matter remanded to the County Committee, with directions to establish the respondent's tobacco acreage allotment at 21.2 acres and reduce the Kuker tract allotment to 3.4 acres.

The scope of judicial review in a proceeding of this kind under the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938, as amended, is limited by the explicit provisions of the Act to questions of law. The court is directed to affirm the determination of the Review Committee if its findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence. If so supported, such findings are made conclusive. Sec. 366 of the Act, 7 U.S.C.A. § 1366.

It is generally held by the Federal Courts (similar to our own decisions on appeal from the findings of administrative boards) that the requirement that there must be substantial evidence, does not require that there be proof beyond a reasonable doubt, but only such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. For cases supporting this generally recognized rule, see Merchants Warehouse Co. v. United States, 283 U.S. 501, 508, 51 S.Ct. 505, 75 L.Ed. 1227; Swayne & Hoyt, Ltd. v. United States, 300 U.S. 297, 57 S.Ct. 478, 81 L.Ed. 659; Rudd v. Fairforest Finishing Co., 189 S.C. 188, 200 S.E. 727; Consolidated Edison Co. v. National Labor Relations Bd., 305 U.S. 197, 59 S.Ct. 206, 83 L.Ed. 126. And see the kindred authorities in Annotation, 123 A.L.R., 612-646.

The Federal law governs in the interpretation of Federal statutes, even though the case is in a state court. Brady v. Southern Ry. Co., 320 U.S. 476, 479, 64 S.Ct. 232, 88 L.Ed. 239; Miller v. Atlantic Coast Line R. R. Co., 90 S.C. 249, 73 S.E. 71.

In order to uphold the findings of the Review Committee, the evidence should furnish a reasonably sound basis from which the facts in issue may be fairly inferred, and a good rule for weighing the evidence to ascertain whether it is adequate, is to compare it with the evidence necessary to sustain the verdict of a jury upon a similar issue. If only one reasonable inference can be drawn from the evidence, it becomes a question of law for the court.

The question presented by this appeal is whether, in connection with the establishment of the 1949 flue-cured tobacco acreage allotment and farm marketing quota for respondent's farm under the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938, as amended, 7 U.S.C.A. § 1281 et seq., the Review Committee's findings of fact regarding the amount of cropland in the part of the farm known as the Kuker Tract, are supported by evidence. We are, therefore, concerned only with the evidence and its sufficiency.

As stated, the basic issue has to do with the cropland acreage on the Kuker tract, which is divided into five comparatively small fields. Were the County Committee and the Review Committee correct in finding this acreage for the purpose of tobacco allocation to consist of 34.7 acres, or 23.7 acres, as contended by respondent? There is a difference of 11 acres, which, as pointed out by respondent, would increase his allotment from 20 acres to 21.2 acres.

Cropland is defined in the regulations of the Secretary of Agriculture governing tobacco acreage allotments and marketing quotas for the 1949-1950 marketing year, as follows:

'(e) 'Cropland' means that land on the farm which is included as cropland for the purposes of the 1948 Agricultural Conservation Program, but shall not include wood or waste land from which no cultivated crop was harvested in any of the years 1944 through 1948.' (7 C.F.R., 725.12(e) 13 F.R. 4813).

This definition incorporates by reference the definition of cropland for the purposes of the 1948 Agricultural Conservation Program, which is as follows: 'B. Cropland means farm land which in 1947 was tilled or was in regular rotation.' (South Carolina Handbook, 1948 Agricultural Conservation Program, issued November, 1947, p. 13; quoted by the court below, R. 51).

By combining these two definitions, the following is derived: "Cropland' means that land on the farm which in 1947 was tilled or was in regular rotation, but shall not include wood or waste land from which no cultivated crop was harvested in any of the years 1944 through 1948.'

It will be seen that the affirmative requirement of this definition is that the land either was tilled in 1947 or was in regular rotation in 1947.

The first question we shall consider is whether the trial judge erred in holding, as to fields Nos. 13, 14, and 18 of the Kuker Tract, that the amounts of cropland thereon were, respectively, 7.4 acres, 4.2 acres, and 4.4 acres, while the appellants claim, in accordance with the findings of the Review Committee, that the respective acreage thereon was 8.1 acres, 4.9 acres, and 4.8 acres.

These fields are admittedly cropland. The only dispute relates to their size, which according to the measurements of the County Committee affirmed by the Review Committee, is 17.8 acres. Respondent contends that in accordance with his measurements and the holding of the lower court, they have a total of 16 acres. The difference would appear to be inconsiderable. But in our opinion, the testimony on this issue is fully sufficient to support the findings of the Review Committee, and the lower court erred in not so holding. We do not have here a question of law, but conflicting evidence is presented from which different inferences may be drawn.

The measurements of these three fields were made by Mr. M. C. Peterman, State Performance Supervisor and Mr. Archie Lee Bacot, Florence County Performance Supervisor, and consisted of physical measurements on the land, with a chain designed for the purpose. The measurements were made in the presence of respondent and the County Committee, from field boundaries which were determined by observation.

In addition to this, the measurements were checked by plotting and scaling on aerial photographs which are used regularly in programs of the Production and Marketing Administration, United States Department of Agriculture.

The measurements of...