Rudd v. Fairforest Finishing Co.

• Decision Date: 03 January 1939
• Docket Number: 14797.
• Citation: 200 S.E. 727,189 S.C. 188
• Parties: RUDD v. FAIRFOREST FINISHING CO. et al.
• Court: South Carolina Supreme Court

200 S.E. 727

189 S.C. 188

RUDD v. FAIRFOREST FINISHING CO. et al.

No. 14797.

Supreme Court of South Carolina

January 3, 1939

Appeal from Common Pleas Circuit Court of Spartanburg County; G. B Greene, Judge.

Proceedings under the Workmen's Compensation Act by Geoffrey A. Rudd employee, opposed by the Fairforest Finishing Company employer, and the Employers' Liability Assurance Corporation, insurance carrier. From a judgment affirming the award of the Industrial Commission denying the claim for compensation, the employee appeals .

Affirmed.

Carlisle, Brown & Carlisle, of Spartanburg, for appellant.

Wise & Whaley, of Columbia, for respondents.

FISHBURNE Justice.

The appellant, an employee of Fairforest Finishing Company, filed his claim for compensation with the South Carolina Industrial Commission alleging that he had suffered a compensable hernia on July 14, 1937, while in the course of his employment with this company. The Compensation Commissioner made an award in favor of the claimant. Upon appeal to the full Commission the award was set aside, and the claim for compensation was denied. The judgment of the full Commission was affirmed by the Court of Common Pleas.

The claim is based upon Section 7035-2, sub-section (r) of the South Carolina Workmen's Compensation Law (39 St. at Large, p. 1231, et seq.), which reads:

"In all claims for compensation for hernia or rupture, resulting from injury by accident arising out of and in the course of the employee's employment, it must be definitely proven to the satisfaction of the industrial commission:

First. That there was an injury resulting in hernia or rupture.

Second. That the hernia or rupture appeared suddenly.

Third. That it was accompanied by pain.

Fourth. That the hernia or rupture immediately followed an accident.

Fifth. That the hernia or rupture did not exist prior to the accident for which compensation is claimed."

It will thus be noted that the legislature has made hernia the subject of special provisions and exceptions under the Workmen's Compensation Act. The burden is on the claimant to definitely prove to the satisfaction of the Industrial Commission the accompanying circumstances and conditions prescribed by the statute. Therefore, in all claims for hernia alleged to have resulted from accidental injury sustained in the course of employment, it must be definitely proven that there was an injury resulting in hernia; that the hernia appeared suddenly; that the hernia or rupture immediately followed the accident; that it did not exist prior to the accident for which compensation is claimed, and that the accidental injury was accompanied by pain. A claimant cannot recover under the Act unless he has a finding in his favor on all of the above requirements.

It is a familiar formula that findings of fact by a Board or Commission on a claim under a Workmen's Compensation Act are conclusive; and the appellate court will not review such findings except to determine whether there is any evidence to support the award. It may reverse an award if there is an absence of any evidence to support it, but it is not a trier of facts. If the facts proved are capable as a matter of law of sustaining the inferences of fact drawn from them by the Board, its findings are conclusive in the absence of fraud, and neither this Court nor the Court of Common Pleas is at liberty to interfere with them. This is but an application to Workmen's Compensation cases of the fundamental principle universal in Courts of law, that whether there is any competent evidence is for the Court to determine, but whether the evidence is sufficient is a question for the jury; the function of the Commission being in that respect that of a jury in actions of law. While the findings of fact by the Industrial Commission will be upheld if there is any evidence on which it can rest, it must be founded on evidence, and cannot rest on surmise, conjecture or speculation. Phillips v. Dixie Stores, Inc. et al., 186 S.C. 374, 195 S.E. 646; Murdaugh v. Robert Lee Const. Co., 185 S.C. 497, 194 S.E. 447; Spearman v. F. S. Royster Guano Co., 188 S.C. 393, 199 S.E. 530.

These governing principles find general concurrence in other jurisdictions. See Note in Ann.Cas.1918B, 647.

Compensation laws should be given a liberal construction in furtherance of the beneficent purpose for which they were enacted, and if possible, so as to avoid incongruous or harsh results. Baltimore & Philadelphia Steamboat Company v. Norton, 284 U.S. 408, 414, 52 S.Ct. 187, 189, 76 L.Ed. 366.

In our opinion, the legislative purpose evident in our Act is to restrict compensation for hernia to those cases where there is a relative and reasonably close coincidence between the accidental injury and the hernia, and where it is clear that no other agency intervened, as to time, place, or action, to cause the injury.

The words "suddenly" and "immediately" are elastic terms, admitting of much variety of definition, as held by the Commission. And, as used in the Act, these words should not be construed as the equivalent of the word "instantaneous." Like similar absolute expressions, they are used here with less strictness than the literal meaning requires. For to give them their literal signification in all cases, regardless of the attendant situations and circumstances, would often defeat meritorious claims upon purely technical grounds, and thus frustrate the purpose of the Act.

The facts in the case are undisputed. The appellant had been in the employ of Fairforest Finishing Plant as dispenser in one of its dye rooms continuously from February, 1937, until July 14, 1937, the date he claims to have suffered his injury. The process of finishing cloth required the use of a chemical known as hydrosol, which came in metal drums containing 55 gallons, and weighing between 500 and 600 pounds. The appellant's duties included bringing the drum of hydrosol from a store room upstairs, inserting a spigot in the head of the drum, and placing the drum on a low wooden rack, from which the contents would be dispensed. When the drum became empty it was the appellant's duty to remove the empty drum from the rack and replace it with a full drum, using "main strength" for that purpose. He was so employed for five months before his injury, and experienced no difficulty in doing the heavy work.

On July 14, 1937, about 11 o'clock A. M., assisted by a fellow employee, appellant was engaged in lifting a full drum of hydrosol on to the wooden rack, when the spigot in the head of the drum became entangled with the framework of the rack and the drum slipped, jerking the appellant, and throwing a heavy strain on him for two or three minutes. With the assistance of a third employee, the drum was finally, after about ten minutes, placed in position. The appellant continued working at lighter tasks for the remainder of that day, which did not involve the lifting of heavy weights. He...