Lee v. Dowda

• Decision Date: 31 October 1944
• Citation: 19 So.2d 570,155 Fla. 68
• Parties: LEE, Comptroller, v. DOWDA et al.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

19 So.2d 570

155 Fla. 68

LEE, Comptroller, v. DOWDA et al.

Florida Supreme Court

October 31, 1944

J. Tom Watson, Atty. Gen., and George M. Powell and Frank J. Heintz, Asst. Attys. Gen., for petitioner.

Thomas B Dowda, of Palatka, Joe C. Jenkins, of Gainsville, and F Bamberg Harrell, of Jasper, for respondents.

BROWN, Justice.

The respondents here, plaintiffs in the court below, filed a bill in equity in the Circuit Court of Leon County against the petitioner here, defendant in the court below, to require the defendant as Comptroller of the State of Florida, by way of mandatory injunction, to carry out section 14 of the General Appropriation Bill adopted by the Legislature of 1943, which section had been vetoed by the Governor, alleging in the bill that the Governor's veto was invalid. The respondent Comptroller filed a motion to dismiss the bill. The chancellor denied the motion to dismiss and transferred the cause to the law side of the docket, evidently upon the theory that plaintiff's appropriate remedy was by mandamus rather than by mandatory injunction. Defendant Comptroller seeks review of this order, denying the motion to dismiss the bill, by certiorari under our Rule 34. Upon oral argument in this court, counsel for the respective parties are in substantial agreement as to the controlling questions involved, which are (1) whether or not the Governor's veto was authorized under the Constitution, and (2) whether or not section 14 could have been constitutionally embraced in the appropriation bill under section 30 of article III of our Constitution. As we consider the last question determinative of this case we will address ourselves to that first.

Section 14 of the General Appropriation Bill, which bill was adopted by the Legislature and now appears as Chapter 22071, Laws of 1943 with the exception of those sections which were vetoed by the Governor, reads as follows:

'Section 14 All disbursements made under the appropriations provided for in this Act together with all other disbursements made by the Comptroller's Warrant, countersigned by the Governor shall be classified according to personal services, travel expenses, contractual services, supplies, equipment, capital outlays and such other classification as may be prescribed by law and such detailed classifications shall be printed in the Comptroller's annual reports and shall be adopted by the State Budget Commission as the classification of accounts in the preparation of the budget of the State of Florida.'

The reasons given by Governor Holland, as alleged in the bill, for vetoing said section were as follows:

'(a) It would require a greatly enlarged personnel in the Comptroller's office to keep the accounts required.

'(b) It would require the purchase and maintenance of bookkeeping and tabulating machines and other office equipment now unobtainable and unlikely to be obtainable during our present national emergency and for a considerable time after its end.

'(c) Due also to the requirements of the nation for man power, competent personnel for this additional work is not, and probably will not be, available.

'(d) No provision is made for the added expense involved.'

Section 18 of Article IV of the constitution provides that:

'Sec. 18. The Governor shall have power to disapprove of any item or items of any bills making appropriations of money embracing distinct items, and the part or parts of the bill approved shall be the law, and the item or items of appropriations disapproved shall be void, unless repassed according to the rules and limitations prescribed for the passage of other bills over the Executive veto.'

The contention of the respondents is that section 14 of the bill was not 'an item or items of a bill making appropriations of money embracing distinct items,' and that therefore the Governor's veto was invalid.

The Circuit Judge was of the opinion, and so held, that said section 14 of the appropriation bill was obnoxious to section 30 of article III of the Constitution, except in so far as the same provides as follows:

'Section 14. All disbursements made under the appropriation provided for in this Act * * * shall be classified according to personal services, travel expenses, contractual services, supplies, equipment, (and) capital outlay * * *.' and that the provisions and requirements of said section, except as above quoted, were properly stricken and eliminated by the veto complained of. The Honorable Circuit Judge was also of the opinion that because of the limitations imposed by the title of the act, there was grave doubt whether the title was sufficient to authorize any other provisions relating to accounting other than those above quoted.

But the second question involved here involves a still more important and fundamental question. Section 30 of article III of the Constitution of 1885 is exactly the same as section 30 of article IV of the Constitution of 1868. That section reads as follows:

'Section 30: Laws making appropriations for the salaries of public officers and other current expenses of the State shall contain provisions on no other subject.'

It is manifest that the Constitution considered this matter of appropriation laws so important that it required they should be freed from all log rolling, by putting into such bills riders dealing with any other subject whatsoever, so that the attention of the Legislature should be concentrated upon the wisdom of and the necessity for the several items of appropriations made by and enumerated in the bill, and so also that the public could rest assured that when an appropriation bill was up for consideration in the Legislature nothing would be considered but the appropriations, and that this important matter should not be prejudiced by the injection into the appropriation bill of any other matters, regardless of their inherent merits or demerits.

The first two occasions on which this court construed this section of the Constitution were in advisory opinion to the Governor reported in Opinion of Justices, 14 Fla. at pages 283 and 285. Both of these opinions were written for the Court by that eminent Florida jurist, Justice James D. Westcott, Jr. The first opinion is very short. The Governor wanted to know whether a section in a general appropriation bill which provided that comptroller's warrants and treasurer's certificates issued since the 1st day of January 1872, except for services rendered prior to that date, should be receivable for all State dues incurred since January 1, 1872, excepting interest on the public debt, sinking fund and school fund was constitutional. The opinion said: 'The effect of the clause of the Constitution which you mention is to render everything in a law which may be called strictly 'a law making appropriations' unconstitutional which proposes to do anything other than make appropriations. The third section of the 'General Appropriation Bill,' which you call to our attention, does not make an appropriation, and for this reason it is in our opinion unconstitutional and therefore void.'

In the next advisory opinion commencing on page 285 of 14 Fla., the Court was dealing primarily with the constitutionality of a section contained in an act for the assessment and collection of revenue. But in the opinion this same section of the Constitution was construed in connection with the section relating to raising revenue. The Court said:

'Section 2 of Article XI of the Constitution requires that the Legislature shall provide for raising revenue sufficient to defray the expenses of the State for each fiscal year, and also a sufficient sum to pay the principal and interest of the existing indebtedness of the State. Sec. 30 of the IVth Article provides that laws making appropriations for the salaries of public officers and other current expenses of the State shall...