Lee v. Great Divide Ins. Co.
Decision Date | 11 March 2008 |
Docket Number | No. DA 06-0763.,DA 06-0763. |
Citation | 2008 MT 80,342 Mont. 147,182 P.3d 41 |
Parties | Bryan LEE, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. GREAT DIVIDE INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant and Appellee. |
Court | Montana Supreme Court |
For Appellant: Mark M. Kovacich; Lewis, Slovak & Kovacich, Great Falls, Montana.
For Appellee: Allan H. Baris; Moore, O'Connell & Refling, P.C., Bozeman, Montana.
District Court Judge JOHN W. LARSON, sitting for Justice JIM RICE, delivered the Opinion of the Court.
¶ 1 Bryan Lee ("Lee") appeals from a summary judgment order entered for Great Divide Insurance Company ("Great Divide") by the First Judicial District Court, Lewis and Clark County. We consider the following issue on appeal: Did the District Court properly grant summary judgment for Great Divide? We affirm.
¶ 2 This case arises from a July 15, 2000, automobile accident in Helena that occurred at the intersection of Euclid Avenue and Joslyn Street involving vehicles driven by Lee and Sheree Peters ("Peters"). Peters had not purchased the statutorily required automobile liability insurance coverage for her vehicle. She received citations for that omission, failure to yield the right-of-way, driving with a suspended driver's license and driving under the influence of alcohol.
¶ 3 Lee was driving a Ford pickup purchased in January 2000 and insured by American States Insurance Company ("American States") effective June 9, 2000, under a corporate policy issued to his corporation, Lee's Mobile Home Service Inc. Great Divide insured two 1994 trailers and a 1993 Ford pickup, pursuant to a separate commercial policy to "Bryan Lee DBA: Lee's Mobile Home Service Inc." The policy period for the Great Divide coverage was effective on March 10, 2000. A policy change endorsement amended the named insured solely to "Lee's Mobile Home Service Inc." and removed the reference to Bryan Lee as a named insured.
¶ 4 On May 15, 2002, Lee filed a suit against Peters and American States in the First Judicial District Court, Cause No. DV-2002-326. Lee did not name Great Divide as a defendant in that action. The first notice to Great Divide of the July 15, 2000, accident was by letter dated September 23, 2003.
¶ 5 In April of 2004, the case against American States for uninsured motorist ("UM") coverage was settled. In September 2004, Lee moved the District Court to remove any reference to American States in the Complaint while continuing his claim against Peters. American States subsequently was removed from the caption.
¶ 6 On September 28, 2004, Lee served Peters with his Second Amended Complaint. The Second Amended Complaint did not include any reference to the earlier complaint for UM coverage against American States, which had been settled. Lee sent a letter to Great Divide dated November 1, 2004, which stated "[p]lease take whatever action you deem necessary to protect the insurer's interests regarding this matter." Attached to this letter, Lee provided Great Divide with a copy of the Second Amended Complaint against Peters alone.
¶ 7 On November 16, 2004, Peters' default was entered by the District Court. Following a hearing on April 13, 2005, a $1,100,232.05 judgment was entered against Peters. Lee did not notify Great Divide of the entry of default or hearing for default judgment in that case.
¶ 8 On August 18, 2005, Lee filed the current action, BDV-2005-568, against Great Divide and set forth the following causes of action: Declaratory Relief; Breach of Insurance Contract; Unfair Claim Settlement Practices; and Punitive Damages. On May 24, 2006, Lee moved for partial summary judgment against Great Divide arguing that Great Divide should provide its policy limits of $1,000,000 of UM coverage and $5,000 of medical benefits coverage due to the default judgment entered against Peters in the separate action. After a hearing, the District Court denied Lee's motion and granted Summary Judgment for Great Divide, concluding the Great Divide policy did not cover Lee for the accident, and Lee did not provide proper notice of his claim to Great Divide.
¶ 9 The standard of review for a district court's grant of summary judgment is de novo. Farmers Union Mut. Ins. Co. v. Horton, 2003 MT 79, ¶ 10, 315 Mont. 43, ¶ 10, 67 P.3d 285, ¶ 10.
¶ 10 Under M.R. Civ. P. 56(c), summary judgment is proper if "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Further, "[i]f the district court determines that genuine issues of fact do not exist, the court must then determine whether the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Edwards v. Burke, 2004 MT 350, ¶ 11, 324 Mont. 358, ¶ 11, 102 P.3d 1271, ¶ 11 (citations omitted).
The movant must demonstrate that no genuine issues of material fact exist. Once this has been accomplished, the burden then shifts to the non-moving party to prove, by more than mere denial and speculation, that a genuine issue does exist.
Mathews v. BJS Constr., Inc., 2003 MT 116, ¶ 12, 315 Mont. 441, ¶ 12, 68 P.3d 865, ¶ 12 (citing Oliver v. Stimson Lumber Co., 1999 MT 328, ¶ 21, 297 Mont. 336, ¶ 21, 993 P.2d 11, ¶ 21 (quoting Bruner v. Yellowstone County, 272 Mont. 261, 264-65, 900 P.2d 901, 903 (1995))). "Because summary judgment is an extreme remedy which should not be a substitute for a trial on the merits if a material factual controversy exists, all reasonable inferences which can be drawn from the evidence presented should be drawn in favor of the non-moving party." Jobe v. City of Polson, 2004 MT 183, ¶ 10, 322 Mont. 157, ¶ 10, 94 P.3d 743, ¶ 10 (citation omitted).
If the moving party satisfies its burden of proof, the non-moving party must provide "material and substantial evidence, rather than mere conclusory or speculative statements, to raise a genuine issue of material fact." Stuart v. First Sec. Bank, 2000 MT 309, ¶ 16, 302 Mont. 431, ¶ 16, 15 P.3d 1198, ¶ 16. "[T]he non-moving party must set forth specific facts and cannot simply rely upon their pleadings, nor upon speculative, fanciful, or conclusory statements." Thomas v. Hale (1990), 246 Mont. 64, 67, 802 P.2d 1255, 1257.
Hiebert v. Cascade County, 2002 MT 233, ¶ 21, 311 Mont. 471, ¶ 21, 56 P.3d 848, ¶ 21. "An absence of evidence simply cannot—under law or common sense—establish the existence of a genuine issue of material fact." Saari v. Winter Sports, Inc., 2003 MT 31, ¶ 17, 314 Mont. 212, ¶ 17, 64 P.3d 1038, ¶ 17.
¶ 11 A cross-motion for summary judgment is not required for a court to enter summary judgment in the non-moving party's favor where it is apparent that no genuine issues of material fact exist. Bitterroot Intern. Systems, Ltd. v. Western Star Trucks, Inc., 2007 MT 48, ¶ 38, 336 Mont. 145, ¶ 38, 153 P.3d 627, ¶ 38.
¶ 12 Lee argues that the Great Divide corporate policy should extend coverage to him personally because of ambiguities in the policy. Lee contends he has individual coverage under this policy based upon a general reference to "you" as used in the section of "Who is an insured" under the policy's explanation of liability coverage. He argues that ambiguous references to "insured" and "you" in the Great Divide policy should be determined to expand coverage to any person affiliated with a corporation such as owners, officers, and directors of which Lee is the sole type. Lee also argues that Great Divide provides portable coverage for accidents which involve any vehicle occupied by an insured.
¶ 13 Great Divide responds that no such ambiguity exists and Montana case law interpreting corporate policies has not been expanded to cover individual officers, directors, shareholders or employees of a corporation unless insureds are injured while occupying a covered corporate vehicle. Great Divide notes that when Lee obtained coverage he choose to limit coverage to specifically described vehicles. Great Divide argues that a determination interpreting this policy to cover individual insureds in any vehicle is contrary to the express terms of the policy which identify it as a corporate policy for certain identified vehicles.
¶ 14 The determination of who is the insured under a business automobile policy issued to a corporation is the beginning point of our analysis. The District Court addressed the coverage issue by first determining to what extent Great Divide provided coverage. Under the Great Divide policy, a corporate insured can agree to insure its vehicles in one of nine ways. Of the nine separate covered vehicle options available, Lee elected to insure only "specifically described `autos.'" The policy defined "specifically described `autos'" as those listed autos in the covered autos section of the Commercial Auto Policy Declarations for which a premium charge is shown. Because the 2000 Ford truck involved in this accident which injured Lee was not listed under the Great Divide policy nor considered a substitute vehicle per the policy, the District Court determined he was not driving a covered auto at the time of the accident. He did not elect to cover the truck under any part of the Great Divide policy; instead, he only purchased the American States policy to cover that vehicle.
¶ 15 The District Court relied on Lierboe v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 2003 MT 174, 316 Mont. 382, 73 P.3d 800, and Chilberg v. Rose, 273 Mont. 414, 903 P.2d 1377 (1995), to reject expansion of coverage under the business auto policy to any person associated with a corporation who was driving a vehicle not listed on the policy and injured by an uninsured motorist. The Chilberg case supports limiting coverage to the reasonable expectations of insureds occupying vehicles listed in the policy at the time of the accident. Chilberg, 273 Mont....
To continue reading
Request your trial-
Estate of Gleason v. Cent. United Life Ins. Co.
...public policy or is against good morals.” 283 Mont. at 263–264, 940 P.2d at 119.¶ 29 More recently, in Lee v. Great Divide Ins. Co., 2008 MT 80, 342 Mont. 147, 182 P.3d 41, we upheld a denial of coverage for violation of a notice provision after discussing the ways the late notice had preju......
-
Am. States Ins. Co. v. Flathead Janitorial & Rug Servs., Inc.
...the stacking issue.STANDARDS OF REVIEW ¶ 8 This Court reviews a grant for summary judgment by the district court de novo. Lee v. Great Divide Ins. Co., 2008 MT 80, ¶ 9, 342 Mont. 147, 182 P.3d 41. Pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 56(c), summary judgment is proper if the facts and record demonstrate......
-
Steadele v. Colony Ins. Co.
...Summary Judgment.Standard of Review ¶ 14 We review a district court's grant or denial of a summary judgment motion de novo. Lee v. Great Divide Ins. Co., 2008 MT 80, ¶ 9, 342 Mont. 147, 182 P.3d 41 (citing Farmers Union Mut. Ins. Co. v. Horton, 2003 MT 79, ¶ 10, 315 Mont. 43, 67 P.3d 285). ......
-
Stonehocker v. Gulf Ins. Co.
...The parties agree that Montana law allows an insurer to limit coverage to a corporation or other business entity. See e.g. Lee v. Great Divide Ins. Co., 2008 MT 80, ¶ 16, 342 Mont. 147, 182 P.3d 41 (interpreting a policy that "limit[s] coverage to the corporation and to anyone else occupyin......