Lee v. New York Life Ins. Co.

• Decision Date: 19 December 1941
• Citation: 310 Mass. 370,38 N.E.2d 333
• Parties: MARY S. LEE v. NEW YORK LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

310 Mass. 370

38 N.E.2d 333

MARY S. LEE v. NEW YORK LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Suffolk.

December 19, 1941

November 12, 1941.

Present: FIELD, C.

J., DONAHUE, QUA & RONAN, JJ.

Conflict of Laws. Insurance, Accident.

Coverage provisions of a contract of insurance must be construed according, to the law of the State where it was made.

Under a policy of life insurance issued in the State of Maine providing for double indemnity upon proof "that the death of the insured resulted directly and independently of all other causes from bodily injury effected solely through external violent and accidental cause," liability arose upon proof that the insured died of pneumonia caused by restricted breathing and coma which were a result, regarded by physicians as so remote as to be practically negligible, of the proper use, consented to by the insured, of a spinal anesthetic in preparation for an operation for hernia, sought by him when otherwise in good health.

CONTRACT. Writ in the Superior Court dated January 24, 1941. The case was heard by Buttrick, J. It was agreed that on "May 9, 1925, the defendant in the State of Maine entered into a contract of life insurance with Francis C. Lee of Dover-Foxcroft Maine." The judge found for the plaintiff in the sum of $2,076. The defendant alleged exceptions.

B. Aldrich, (F.

H. Nash with him for the defendant.

C. Lee, for the plaintiff.

RONAN, J. The defendant issued, in the State of Maine, a policy of insurance upon the life of one Francis C. Lee of Maine, in which the plaintiff was named the beneficiary, and which provided for the payment of double indemnity upon proof "that the death of the insured resulted directly and independently of all other causes from bodily injury effected solely through external, violent and accidental cause." The insured on September 6, 1940, was in apparent good health and appeared to be normal in every way except that he had been suffering since December, 1939, from a hernia, for the correction of which he went to a hospital in New York where, in preparation for an operation, he was placed upon an operating table. In accordance with the advice of the surgeon he consented to a spinal anesthetic. A solution of metycaine, a derivative of novocaine, was injected by a hypodermic needle in the customary manner and amount by a qualified anesthetist in a proper place in the lower part of the spine. The insured immediately complained that he was unable to breathe, became unconscious and had convulsions. His pulse was not observable and he seemed to stop breathing. All thought of an operation was abandoned. He was revived to some extent by artificial respiration and adrenalin injections, but his breathing was labored and he did not regain consciousness. He remained in a coma until his death on September 10, 1940, from hypostatic broncho-pneumonia, which resulted from his inability on account of his comatose state to discharge normally the fluids in his nose, throat and lungs. The metycaine was the cause of the respiratory failure which, in turn, produced the coma and other symptoms that resulted in pneumonia and death. The chances for the occurrence of respiratory failure from a novocaine anesthetic are so remote as to be commonly regarded by doctors as practically negligible. The respiratory failure was, in this case, unusual and unexpected and was in that sense abnormal. The insured had had no previous experience with this anesthetic and had no knowledge of any particular risks or dangers in its use other than those common to all anesthetics. We have, in substance, stated all the material facts relating to the cause of death that appear in the agreed statement of facts upon which the case was submitted to the Superior Court. The defendant excepted to a finding for the plaintiff.

The parties agree that the only question raised by the defendant's exception is whether the agreed statement warrants a finding for the plaintiff, and this in turn has been narrowed by the parties to the single issue whether the cause of death came within the double indemnity coverage of the policy.

The death of the insured followed the intentional and proper administration of an anesthetic. There was no mistake in the identity of the anesthetic, the quantity used, the place of application or the method by which it was employed. Every external act was done deliberately and voluntarily. There was no external accidental cause. That death supervened as an unforeseen or unexpected result of the administration of the anesthetic would not under our own law or that of various other jurisdictions prove that the death was caused by a "bodily injury effected solely through external, violent and accidental cause." The liability is measured by these words; it does not extend to every accidental result but is limited to results that are produced by the cause described. Smith v. Travelers Ins. Co. 219 Mass. 147 . Henderson v. Travelers Ins. Co. 262 Mass. 522. United States Mutual Accident Association v. Barry, 131 U.S. 100. Landress v. Phoenix Mutual Life Ins Co. 291 U.S. 491. Order of United Commercial Travelers of America v. Shane, 64 F.2d 55. Pope v. Lincoln National Life Ins. Co. 103 F.2d 265. Northam v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. 231 Ala. 105. Ogilvie v. Aetna Life Ins. Co. 189 Cal. 406. Caldwell v. Travelers Ins. Co. 305 Mo. 619. McGinley v. John...