Smith v. Travelers' Ins. Co.
| Decision Date | 24 October 1914 |
| Citation | 219 Mass. 147,106 N.E. 607 |
| Parties | SMITH v. TRAVELERS' INS. CO. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court |
Endicott P. Saltonstall and Chas. W. Blood, both of Boston, for plaintiff.
Walter I. Badger and Wm. Harold Hitchcock, both of Boston, for defendant.
The deceased, whose life was insured by the defendant against some risks, died from spinal meningitis. This disease according to the plaintiff's evidence, was caused by the prosence of streptococcus germs in the brain. The germs had penetrated into the brain from the middle ear through a hole in the mastoid bone. They had been carried into the ear from the outer nose, through the Eustachian tube, by a nasal douche which the deceased was using for catarrh, as he had been in the habit of doing, and which on this occasion he had 'sniffed' or drawn into his nostril less gently or harder or more violently than he usually did. Streptococcus germs are among the most virulent and dangerous germs known but they are found somewhat frequently in the outer nose, and might remain there indefinitely without harm. The nasal douche used by the deceased was harmless in itself; but the harm was done by the fact that he drew it too violently into his nostril, by reason whereof it reached the Eustachian tube and was carried into the middle ear, and thence penetrated into the brain. That there should be a hole or perforation in the mastoid bone through which pus or germs could pass from the ear into the brain is a very rare occurrence, in only one of about 1,000 skulls.
The policy insured the deceased against 'bodily injuries effected directly and independently of all other causes through external, violent and accidental means,' and against death resulting 'from such injuries alone' within a stated time not now material.
In an ordinary civil action under like circumstances, there would be no difficulty in saying that there could be found to have been an unbroken string of causation between the too violent inhalation of the nasal douche and the ensuing death. The too violent inhalation carried the streptococcus germs with the douche into the Eustachian tube, and everything else followed naturally. The presence of these germs in a place where, however virulent in themselves, they were harmless, and the existence of the perforation in the mastoid bone, could be found to have been conditions rather than operating causes of the illness and death. If therefore it can be said that this too violent inhalation effected a bodily injury through 'external, violent, and accidental means,' that it was itself such a means of injury, the first and chief obstacle to the plaintiff's recovery would be removed. This is the doctrine of many of the decisions relied on by her. Freeman v. Mercantile Accident Association, 156 Mass. 351, 30 N.E. 1013, 17 L. R. A. 753; McGlinchey v. Fidelity & Casualty Co., 80 Me. 251, 14 A. 13, 6 Am. St. Rep. 190; Ludwig v. Preferred Accident Ins. Co., 113 Minn. 510, 130 N.W. 5; United States Mutual Accident Association v. Barry, 131 U.S. 100, 121, 9 S.Ct. 755, 33 L.Ed. 60; Preferred Accident Ins. Co. v. Muir, 126 F. 926, 61 C. C. A. 456; Manufacturers' Accident Indemnity Co. v. Dorgan, 58 F. 945, 954, 7 C. C. A. 581, 22 L. R. A. 620; Winspear v. Accident Ins. Co., 6 Q. B. D. 42; Lawrence v. Accidental Ins. Co., 7 Q. B. D. 216; Hamlyn v. Crown Accidental Ins. Co. [1893] 1 Q. B. 750; Brittons v. Turvey [1905] 1 K. B. 233.
But there was nothing accidental in the inhalation of this douche. The deceased did exactly what he intended to do. This particular act of inhalation, though harder or more violent than usual, was not, so far as appears, harder or more violent than he intended it to be. There was no shock or surprise during the inhalation which made him draw a deeper breath than he intended to draw, nothing strange or unusual about the circumstances. The external act was exactly what he designed it to be, though it produced some internal consequences which he had not foreseen. Accordingly there was no bodily injury effected through a means which was both external and accidental. But it is only for a death resulting from injury effected through such means that the defendant is made responsible by the policy. It is not sufficient that the death or the illness that caused the death may have been an accidental result of the external cause, but that cause itself must have been, not only external and violent, but also accidental. Hatch v. United States Casualty Co., 197 Mass. 101, 104, 83 N.E. 398, 14 L. R. A. (N. S.) 503, 125 Am. St. Rep. 332, 14 Ann. Cas. 290; Cobb v. Preferred Mutual Accident Association, 96 Ga. 818, 22 S.E. 976; Hastings v. Travelers' Ins. Co. (C. C.) 190 F. 258; Lehman v. Great Western Accident Association, 155 Iowa, 737, 133 N.W. 752, 42 L. R. A. (N. S.) 562; In re Scarr & General Accident Assurance Corp. [1905] 1 K. B. 387.
To continue reading
Request your trial