Lee v. Nielsen

• Decision Date: 31 July 1978
• Docket Number: No. 77-124-A,77-124-A
• Citation: 388 A.2d 1176,120 R.I. 579
• Parties: William V. LEE et al. v. Edward NIELSEN et al. ppeal.
• Court: Rhode Island Supreme Court

Page 1176

388 A.2d 1176

120 R.I. 579

William V. LEE et al. v. Edward NIELSEN et al.

No. 77-124-Appeal.

Supreme Court of Rhode Island.

July 31, 1978.

[120 R.I. 585] David J. Kehoe, Providence, for plaintiffs.

Aram K. Berberian, Cranston, for defendants.

OPINION

KELLEHER, Justice.

This is an appeal from a judgment entered in the Superior Court granting the plaintiffs, two members-elect of the Charlestown Democratic Town Committee (the Committee), certain injunctive relief. The defendants, also members-elect of the Committee, are the incumbent officers. Edward Nielsen is the Committee Chairman, and Louise M. Rousseau is the Committee Secretary.

In June 1976, sixty persons, including plaintiffs and defendants, filed declarations of candidacy for the Charlestown Democratic Town Committee. All were endorsed by the Democratic Party, ran unopposed in the September primary, and were elected to the Committee.

Town committees are required by statute to "organize biennially in the month of January in every odd year * * *." General Laws 1956 (1969 Reenactment) § 17-12-9. Accordingly, defendant Nielsen scheduled an organizational meeting for the newly elected Committee at his home on January 23, 1977. ¹ The notice which was sent informing the members of the meeting also stated that proxy ² ballots could be picked up at Mr. Neilsen's home.

The organizational meeting was never held, for on January 20, 1977, plaintiffs filed the instant complaint, seeking to temporarily and permanently enjoin defendants from holding the organizational meeting as scheduled and from soliciting and using proxy ballots. The complaint alleged that plaintiffs were acting on behalf of themselves and 21 other members-elect of the Committee; ³ that the use of proxy ballots was not authorized by the rules of either the State Democratic Committee or the Charlestown Democratic Committee; that holding the meeting in Nielsen's home would have a "chilling effect" on "loyal" Democrats; and that plaintiffs would suffer irreparable harm and would be denied rights secured by the United States and Rhode Island Constitutions. The plaintiffs also claimed that they had been unable to obtain a copy of the Committee bylaws from defendants.

A temporary restraining order was issued on January 20, 1977, and the matter was set down for hearing on the prayer for a preliminary injunction on January 28. At the commencement of the January 28 hearing, the trial justice, acting pursuant to Super.R.Civ.P. 65(a)(2), ordered the trial of the action on the merits to be advanced and consolidated with the hearing on the application. At the conclusion of the hearing the trial justice (1) enjoined defendants from holding the organizational meeting at Nielsen's home; (2) ordered that the meeting be held at the Charlestown Town Hall; (3) enjoined the use of proxy ballots at the organizational meeting; (4) ordered the organizational meeting to be conducted in accordance with the bylaws of the Committee and Robert's Manual and Robert's Rules of Order; and (5) ordered the organizational meeting to be held within 30 days, with notice being mailed to each member at least 10 days prior to the meeting.

At the outset we are confronted with the question of mootness. The defendants neither sought nor were granted a stay of the injunction pending appeal. Super.R.Civ.P. 62(c) and (d); Sup.Ct.R. 8. If defendants had complied with the injunction and held the organizational meeting within 30 days, the case would apparently be moot, for there would be nothing upon which our decision could act. However, at oral argument the court was informed that the organizational meeting has never been held. Thus, the resolution of this issue is, if nothing else, not moot.

The sole issue on appeal is whether the Superior Court erred in refusing to dismiss plaintiffs' complaint as presenting a nonjusticiable political dispute. As a general rule, the judiciary ought not to interfere with the internal affairs of our political parties. O'Brien v. Brown, 409 U.S. 1, 92 S.Ct. 2718, 34 L.Ed.2d 1, vacated as moot 409 U.S. 816, 93 S.Ct. 67, 34 L.Ed.2d 72 (1972); Winn v. Wooten, 196 Ark. 737, 119 S.W.2d 540 (1938); Rosenberg v. Republican Party, 270 S.W.2d 171 (Ky.App.1954); State ex rel. Pfeifer v. Stoneking, 80 Ohio App. 70, 74 N.E.2d 759 (1946). To some extent, the autonomy which political parties and other private groups are accorded is constitutionally required by the First Amendment to the United States Constitution. Fahey v. Darigan, 405 F.Supp. 1386, 1398 (D.R.I.1975); see generally Developments in the Law Judicial Control of Actions of Private Associations, 76 Harv.L.Rev. 983 (1963). A more common explanation for judicial restraint in entering the "political thicket" ⁴ is the belief that a large public interest is served in allowing the political processes to function free from judicial supervision. O'Brien v. Brown, 409 U.S. at 5, 92 S.Ct. at 2720, 34 L.Ed.2d at 6; Kester, Constitutional Restrictions on Political Parties, 60 Va.L.Rev. 735, 774-75 (1974). Therefore, political parties are generally recognized to have certain "inherent powers of self-government" and to be vested with wide discretion to interpret and decide their own regulations, rules, and disputes. Bunting v. Board of Canvassers & Registration, 90 R.I. 63, 66, 153 A.2d 560, 562 (1959); Comment, Judicial Intervention in Political Party Disputes: The Political Thicket Reconsidered, 22 U.C.L.A.L.Rev. 622, 636 (1975). See also Como v. Sprague, 46 R.I. 235, 126 A. 378 (1924).

Only where the challenged action of a political party infringes on a specific constitutional or statutory right, usually the right to vote or hold public office, will the courts intervene. Smith v. Allwright,321 U.S. 649, 64 S.Ct. 757, 88 L.Ed. 987 (1944); DeCesare v. Board of Elections, 104 R.I. 136, 242 A.2d 421 (1968); Bunting v. Board of Canvassers & Registration, 90 R.I. 63, 153 A.2d 560; Republican Town Committee v. Knowles, 60 R.I. 339, 198 A. 780 (1938); Como v. Sprague, 46 R.I. 235, 126 A. 378; Carney v. Pilch, 30 Conn.Sup. 34, 296 A.2d 687 (1972). Accordingly, in determining whether a particular dispute is a nonjusticiable political matter, the focus has been on whether the dispute is an "integral part of the electoral process" or merely involves the internal affairs of the political party. Gallant v. LaFrance,101 R.I. 299, 305-06, 222 A.2d 567, 570 (1966); Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 735, 94 S.Ct. 1274, 1281, 39 L.Ed.2d 714, 726 (1974); O'Brien v. Brown,409 U.S. at 4, 92 S.Ct. at 2720, 34 L.Ed.2d at 6; Fahey v. Darigan, 405 F.Supp. at 1398; Rosenberg v. Republican Party, 270 S.W.2d at 172; Comment, Judicial Intervention in Political Party Disputes: The Political Thicket Reconsidered, 22 U.C.L.A.L.Rev. 622, 627 (1975).

Application of the above principles to the case at bar is not difficult. The plaintiffs have failed to specify a single constitutional or statutory right which was jeopardized...