Lee v. Smith

• Decision Date: 17 September 1976
• Citation: 387 N.Y.S.2d 952,87 Misc.2d 1018
• Parties: Application of Annie LEE et al., Petitioners, for a Judgment Pursuant to Article 78 of the Civil Practice Law and Rules and for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, v. J. Henry SMITH, as Commissioner of the New York City Department of Social Services and Philip L. Toia, as Acting Commissioner of the New York State Department of Social Services, Respondents.
• Court: New York Supreme Court

Page 952

387 N.Y.S.2d 952

87 Misc.2d 1018

Application of Annie LEE et al., Petitioners, for a Judgment Pursuant to Article 78 of the Civil Practice Law and Rules and for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, v. J. Henry SMITH, as Commissioner of the New York City Department of Social Services and Philip L. Toia as Acting Commissioner of the New York State Department of Social Services, Respondents.

Supreme Court, Special Term, New York County, Part 1.

Sept. 17, 1976.

Nancy E. LeBlanc, Carolyn A. Kubitschek and Ralph Murphy, MFY Legal Services, Inc., of counsel; Michael D. Hampden, Ian F. Feldman, New York City, The Legal Aid Society, of counsel; Bedford-Stuyvesant Community Legal Services Corp., Mary Marsh Zulack, Brooklyn, of counsel, for petitioners.

Louis J. Lefkowitz, Atty. Gen., State of New York, Ellen Hill, Asst. Atty. Gen., New York City, of counsel, for respondent Toia.

W. Bernard Richard, Corp. Counsel, Isidore S. Glickman, New York City, of counsel, for respondent Smith.

NATHANIEL T. HELMAN, Justice:

Petitioners are recipients of Supplemental Security Income (SSI) from the United States Social Security Administration which includes optional State grants provided by the New York Social Services Law. In this Article 78 proceedings they challenge a provision of the New York Social Service Law Section 158(a) which provides State Home Relief, but renders petitioners ineligible to receive supplemental public assistance solely on the ground that they are SSI recipients. In a preliminary proceeding before this Court on the procedural issue as to whether this action could properly be maintained as a class action the Court denied respondents' motion to dismiss, and directed the State Commissioner to file his answer, so that the proceeding could be heard on the merits, a determination that was upheld on appeal.

Prior to the enactment of a Federal Statute effective Jan. 1, 1974 public assistance to the Aged, Blind and Disabled was administered under a New York State program funded by both Federal and State Governments (AABD). On January 1, 1974 the Federal Government took over the program directing that it be administered by the Social Security Administration. A basic grant was provided to every Aged, Blind and Disabled person in the country with appropriate provisions authorizing each State to make an additional grant for each SSI recipient, so that the Social Security Administration could issue one check for the combined total. In conformity with this plan, New York State repealed its own AABD program (Social Services Law §§ 207--320) and authorized supplemental grants for each SSI recipient as a flat grant. It is to be noted also that the same statute directed the Commissioner to promulgate regulations authorizing grants to provide for any other needs of SSI recipients not being met by those that had been received. While that regulation expired April 1, 1974, its purpose was clearly defined in the case of Fuller v. Nassau County Department of Social Services, 77 Misc.2d 677, 684, 352 N.Y.S.2d 978, 987, where the Court said:

'Section 131--a(10) of the Social Services Law specifically authorizes departmental provision to meet the needs of AABD persons 'whose needs are not met' by the SSI program.

Since there is no stated limitation upon this residual assistance, this statute appears to cover this type of emergency where SSI has failed to meet the urgent needs of aged, blind, and disabled persons. It is the residual channel of aid, where all others break down, that fulfills the state's obligations under its Constitution and Social Services Law . . .' No regulations implementing these stated purposes, were enacted.

On the other hand, the legislature proceeded to amend Section 158(a) of the Social Services Law to provide that all SSI recipients were barred from receiving Home Relief. It is the claim of the petitioners in this proceeding that the SSI grants are insufficient to meet their needs as defined by regular public assistance standards, and that the denial to them of eligibility similar to that possessed by other citizens is an impairment of their Constitutional rights. In addition to their charges of inequality and discrimination in the distribution of assistance petitioners point out that persons who are Aged, Blind and Disabled have many more monthly requirements than their fellow citizens, particularly with reference to transportation costs, clothing needs, special diets, proximity to hospital and other circumstances requiring disbursements in excess of those received by other persons in need. This they demonstrate by charts and calculations indicating that in mumerous instances, they would receive greater allowances were they placed in the ordinary category of relief recipients.

Section 1 of Article 17 of the New York State Constitution states:

'The aid, care and support of the needy are public concerns and shall be provided by the state and by such of its subdivisions, and in such manner and by such means, as the legislature may from time to time determine.'

While many decisions have been rendered reviewing the intent and meaning of the quoted provision, an excerpt from the debates at the 1938 Constitutional Convention best states its essential purposes.

'The Legislature may continue the system of relief now in operation. It may preserve the present plan of reimbursement to the localities. It may devise new ways of dealing with the problem. Its hands are untied. What it may not do is to shirk its responsibility which, in the opinion of the committee, Is as fundamental as any responsibility of government.' (Emphasis added.)

Primary responsibility for the handing of problems involving aid and care of the needy has been placed in the hands of local welfare districts by the provisions of Section 62(1) of the Social Services Law which reads as follows:

'Subject to reimbursement in the cases hereinafter provided for, each public welfare district shall be responsible for the assistance and care of any person who resides or is found in its territory and who is in need of public assistance and care which he is unable to provide for himself.'

There can be no doubt, under various decisions of our State, that the local welfare districts have such a responsibility independent of any assurance of reimbursement from the State. This was clearly held in Jones v. Berman, 37 N.Y.2d 42, 371 N.Y.S.2d 422, 332 N.E.2d 303.

Thus the major issue to be determined in this proceeding based upon the history of SSI and its antecedents, is whether or not Section 158(a) of the Social Services Law in so far as it bars needy SSI recipients from receiving Home Relief, is a denial of equal protection of the Law. That statute provides:

Any person unable to provide for himself, or who is unable to secure support from a legally responsible relative, who is not receiving needed assistance or care under other provisions of this chapter, or from other sources, shall be eligible for home relief. . . . A person who is receiving federal supplemental security income payments and/or additional state payments shall not be eligible for home relief. (Emphasis added.)

The charts and schedules submitted by petitioners show several instances in which the bar of Section 158(a) denied them support payments which they would ordinarily receive were they on Home Relief. While the difference may not be substantial to the average employable citizen, to an individual who falls within the SSI category it may represent a matter of serious hardship. The Courts have looked critically upon this type of inequality in the distribution of relief benefits. In Rothstein v. Wyman, D.C., 303 F.Supp. 339 the Court found discriminatory a difference in...