Lee v. State, 98-485
| Decision Date | 02 March 2000 |
| Docket Number | 98-485 |
| Citation | 11 S.W.3d 553 |
| Parties | Jamie Darnell LEE v. STATE of Arkansas CR 98-485 ___ S.W.3d ___ Opinion delivered |
| Court | Arkansas Supreme Court |
Appeal from Miller Circuit Court; Phillip B. Purifoy, Judge; affirmed.
1. Discovery -- request for information by defendant -- disclosure by prosecutor. -- It is reversible error when a prosecutor fails to comply with a defendant's timely request for disclosure of information when that failure results in prejudice to that defendant; the information must be disclosed by the prosecutor in sufficient time to permit the defense to make beneficial use of it; when the prosecutor fails to provide information, the burden is on the defendant-appellant to show that the omission was sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome of the trial.
2. Discovery -- failure to disclose asserted -- no prejudice shown. -- Where the State failed to disclose a witness's criminal history, but the prosecutor questioned the witness about his prior convictions when he was testifying before the jury; where it was obvious from his prison clothes that the witness was currently incarcerated; where appellant's attorney questioned the witness about his parole violations on cross-examination; and where the witness admitted in testimony that he had several previous convictions, his credibility was impeached, and the appellant could not show that prejudice resulting from the asserted discovery violation.
3. Criminal procedure -- Ark. R. Crim. P. 17.1(d) -- when criminal information required to be disclosed. -- Under Ark. R. Crim. P. 17.1(d), the prosecution is required to disclose any information that "tends to negate the guilt" of the defendant; the United States Supreme Court has held that a prosecution's suppression of evidence favorable to an accused violates the defendant's due process rights where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution; this includes impeachment evidence, as well as exculpatory evidence; for an appellant to prevail on the issue of whether the prosecution was required to disclose any criminal information about the witness, even if that information did not solely relate to criminal convictions, the appellant must demonstrate a reasonable probability that the result would have been different had he had the information concerning the witness; a reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.
4. Discovery -- failure to disclose criminal history -- not reversible error. -- The undisclosed evidence of the witnesses' prior criminal activity appeared to have been material, because it went to the credibility of the State's witnesses; however, there was not a reasonable probability that the results of the trial would have been different even had the court excluded the testimony of all three witnesses who had criminal records; there still would have been three witnesses for the State who identified appellant as the shooter; furthermore, appellant presented no evidence that any charges were dropped against State witnesses as part of an agreement to obtain their testimony; the failure to fully disclose the criminal histories of the three State witnesses did not constitute reversible error.
5. Evidence -- admission -- when relevant. -- The trial court has wide discretion on rulings concerning the admissibility of evidence, and the supreme court will not reverse such a ruling absent an abuse of discretion; evidence is relevant if it has any tendency to make the existence of a fact more or less probable; evidence of gang membership is relevant to show motive for murder.
6. Evidence -- testimony properly excluded under Ark. R. Evid. 608(b). -- There was no fault in the trial court's exclusion of an officer's testimony; Ark. R. Evid. 608(b) provides that specific instances of the conduct of a witness may not be proved by extrinsic evidence to attack that witness's credibility; this appears to be precisely what the defense was attempting to do, attacking the credibility of State witnesses concerning gang membership by extrinsic evidence, that is, by the officer's testimony; furthermore, there was abundant evidence in addition to the testimony of the officer that the three witnesses had a gang affiliation, and, thus, the officer's testimony would have been cumulative.
7. Evidence -- bias argument in conflict with defense -- no reversible error in disallowance of testimony. -- Where the whole tenor of appellant's defense was that he did not do the shootings and never had a gun, the question whether gang rivalry precipitated the shootings had a diminished significance, as did appellant's contention that the three witnesses lied because of gang rivalry when they pinpointed him as the culprit; there was no reversible error in the trial court's disallowance of the officer's testimony concerning evidence of gang affiliation.
8. Evidence -- gang graffiti not admitted -- no abuse of discretion found. -- Where appellant offered no proof on who wrote the graffiti, when it was written, or how it related to his case, and it was also cumulative, because there was abundant evidence otherwise showing that the shootings were motivated by gang relationships, there was no abuse of discretion by the trial court in its refusal to admit it.
9. Jury -- seating of -- removal of juror. -- An appellant must show prejudice when the trial court removes a juror and seats an alternate in the juror's place; such matters are reviewed under an abuse-of-discretion standard.
10. Witnesses -- credibility of. -- The trial court is in the best position to judge the credibility of the witnesses and to resolve any conflicts in that testimony.
11. Jury -- removal of juror -- no abuse of discretion or prejudice found. -- Where the trial court conducted an investigation of all twelve jurors and determined that the removed juror was the only one who had talked to a jail trusty, and where appellant failed to show that he was prejudiced in any respect by the seating of an alternate, the trial court's determination that it was in the best interest of both parties that the juror be excused was not an abuse of discretion; because no prejudice was shown, the trial court's decision was affirmed.
12. Trial -- closing arguments -- trial court has broad discretion to control. -- The trial court clearly has broad discretion in controlling trial counsel in closing arguments, and thesupreme court will not disturb a trial court's ruling regarding an objection during closing argument absent a manifest abuse of discretion; remarks requiring reversal are rare and require an appeal to the jurors' passions.
13. Mistrial -- extreme remedy -- when appropriate. -- A mistrial is an extreme remedy and one that should not be used unless there has been an error so prejudicial that justice cannot be served by continuing the trial or when the fundamental fairness of the trial itself has been obviously affected.
14. Trial -- send-a-message closing arguments allowed. -- The supreme court has allowed "send-a-message" themes to be used by prosecutors in closing arguments; comments that a prosecutor hopes to send a message to people who might be inclined to engage in criminal activity are not reversible error; a primary purpose of sentencing a person convicted of a crime is to deter criminal behavior and foster respect for the law.
15. Mistrial -- motion properly rejected -- closing arguments not evidence. -- The trial court did not err in rejecting the motion to declare a mistrial because closing arguments are not evidence, and the jury was instructed to that effect; moreover, this was not a "golden rule" argument as appellant suggested; a golden-rule argument is one where the jury is implored to put themselves in the position of the victim; that was not what the prosecutor argued here; there was no abuse of discretion by the trial court in declining to declare a mistrial.
16. Appeal & error -- cumulative-error argument -- not addressed for first time on appeal. -- Where no cumulative-error argument was made to the trial court, and no ruling was obtained, the supreme court would not entertain it; the court will not entertain such an argument unless first made to the trial court.
Mickey Buchanan, for appellant.
Mark Pryor, Att'y Gen., by: Brad Newman, Ass't Att'y Gen., for appellee.
Appellant Jamie Darnell Lee appeals his judgment of conviction for capital murder and for four counts of first-degree battery, all stemming from shootings that took place at a Texarkana nightclub. He was sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole for capital murder and for twenty years on each of the first-degree battery charges, to run consecutively. He raises four issues on appeal: (1) the trial court erred in refusing to grant him a new trial based on the State's failure to disclose exculpatory impeaching information; (2) the trial court erred in foreclosing the defense from introducing evidence of gang affiliation and from cross-examining witnesses on the same matter; (3) the trial court abused its discretion in dismissing the sole black from the jury rather than declaring a mistrial; and (4) remarks made by the prosecutor in closing argument mandate reversal. We find no reversible error, and we affirm.
The events leading up to the criminal charges and convictions all occurred at the Ace of Clubs nightclub in Texarkana in the early morning hours of October 6, 1996. According to witnesses for the State, at about 3:00 a.m. that morning, the rap song "Bow Down" was playing in the nightclub for a crowd of patrons who were young men and women. The rap song deals with two rival gangs -- one on the west side and one on the east side. The song depicts the west side gang as having more power. Some of the male patrons at the nightclub were members of rival gangs in Texarkana, Arkansas and Texarkana, Texas. Jamie Lee was...
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