Lee v. State

• Decision Date: 25 May 2012
• Docket Number: No. 07–1879.,07–1879.
• Citation: 815 N.W.2d 731,19 Wage & Hour Cas.2d (BNA) 135
• Parties: Tina LEE, Appellee, v. STATE of Iowa, POLK COUNTY CLERK OF COURT, Appellant.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

815 N.W.2d 731

19 Wage & Hour Cas.2d (BNA) 135

Tina LEE, Appellee,

v.STATE of Iowa, POLK COUNTY CLERK OF COURT, Appellant.

No. 07–1879.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

May 25, 2012.

Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Jeffrey S. Thompson, Deputy Attorney General, and Grant K. Dugdale, Assistant Attorney General, for appellant.

Paige E. Fiedler and Brooke C. Timmer of Fiedler & Timmer, P.L.L.C., Urbandale, for appellee.

CADY, Chief Justice.

In this employment case, we must primarily decide whether the State of Iowa is immune from claims under the self-care provision of the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) in state court. The district court denied the State's posttrial motions for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict or a new trial asserting Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity after a jury awarded damages to a state employee based on a claim for violating the Act. The Iowa Court of Appeals affirmed. On further review, we vacate the decision of the court of appeals, reverse the judgment of the district court, and remand for further proceedings.

I. Background Facts and Prior Proceedings.

Tina Lee worked in the office of the Polk County Clerk of Court as a state employee. She began working for the clerk's office in 1981 as a full-time employee in the traffic division. Lee received positive yearly performance evaluations throughout much of her employment and was promoted numerous times. At the time of her termination, she held the position of lead worker in the records department.

The employee policy handbook distributed by the office of the state court administrator contained a section governing the various forms of leave available to employees, including a section on family and medical leave under the FMLA. The policy read in part:

Employees who have worked at least 12 months and at least 1,250 hours during the previous 12 months may request up to 12 weeks of job protected leave in a fiscal year, pursuant to provisions of the federal Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) of 1993.

(Emphasis added.)

The provisions also required employees approved for FMLA leave “due to the employee's own serious health condition (including childbirth and recovery) ... to exhaust all paid sick leave, vacation, and comp time before unpaid leave” would be granted. Throughout the section of the handbook entitled “Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA),” the leave was described as “FMLA leave,” and the provisions repeatedly identified the FMLA as the source of the leave. The FMLA leave provisions were in place at all relevant times to this case.

In 1997, Lee was diagnosed with anxiety disorder.¹ She periodically took time away from work when her anxiety disorder would lead to bouts of depression. In the fall of 2004, Lee requested FMLA leave to cope with stress-induced anxiety brought about by family turmoil. She submitted a completed FMLA request form on October 20, 2004, after visiting with her treating physician. The form included her physician's signature indicating Lee was experiencing a serious health condition that was expected to last until November. Lee believed this form enabled her to take time off work during the next month when she felt it was necessary until she recovered. As a result, she left work throughout the remainder of the month when she was unable to work due to her medical condition. Lee previously used FMLA leave while working at the clerk's office to recover from neck surgery, care for her daughter, and for surgery on both of her feet.

On November 3, 2004, Lee returned to work after having been gone for several days. Following a meeting with her supervisor, Lee was demoted for failing to follow absentee policies by calling in to work each day she was absent. She was suspended for three days and asked to surrender her key to the office. On November 8, Lee called her supervisor because she was again unable to come to work. The following day, Lee did not report to work and did not call. On November 10, Lee's supervisor sent her a letter terminating her employment for job abandonment.

Lee filed a petition against the State of Iowa in the Polk County District Court under 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1)(D) (2000), the self-care provision of the FMLA. In its answer, the State asserted the affirmative defense of sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment of the United States Constitution and filed a motion for summary judgment on the same grounds. In addition to claiming its constitutionally based immunity was not abrogated by Congress in enacting the self-care provision of the FMLA, the State asserted summary judgment was proper because it did not otherwise expressly waive its immunity and did not impliedly waive its immunity by placing the FMLA provisions in its handbook. Relying on the United States Supreme Court decision in Nevada Department of Human Resources v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 726, 123 S.Ct. 1972, 1976, 155 L.Ed.2d 953, 962 (2003), and the overall purpose of the FMLA, the district court found Congress abrogated the State's sovereign immunity in state court by enacting the self-care leave provisions. Consequently, the district court did not address the issue of express or implied waiver.

The case was tried and submitted to a jury on two legal theories. Lee claimed wrongful termination and retaliatory discharge for exercising her rights under the FMLA. The jury ultimately returned a verdict in favor of Lee for $165,122.

The State filed a motion requesting the court either enter a judgment notwithstanding the verdict or grant a new trial. Lee also filed several posttrial motions, including a motion for reinstatement of her employment and other relief in the form of liquidated damages, front pay, and attorney fees.

In the motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, the State reiterated its position that Lee's claims were barred by the State's constitutionally based sovereign immunity. It also argued that it neither expressly nor constructively waived its immunity by placing the FMLA provisions in its employee handbook and notices around the workplace. Lee asserted the State constructively waived its immunity by failing to inform its employees that it was retaining its immunity. Lee also argued the State waived its immunity through its conduct in implementing the FMLA provisions with knowledge that they were enforceable. Lee argued that her FMLA rights would be lost without a right to sue for money damages.

The district court denied the motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. It again held Congress abrogated the State's immunity. Additionally, it found the State constructively waived its immunity by placing the FMLA provisions in the handbook and posting notice of the right to take FMLA leave. It stated:

The FMLA is explained in their personnel policies handbook and posted in the Clerk of Court's office. Employees are aware that they have the right under the FMLA to take leave for their own illnesses. Nowhere did Defendants indicate that one specific type of leave, self-care leave, is not permitted or that employees would have no recourse if they were terminated or retaliated against for taking self-care leave. Furthermore, the state employees testified they knew it was illegal to terminate or retaliate against someone for using FMLA leave. Thus, the State has waived any immunity through its conduct.

The district court entered judgment against the State for the back-pay damages as determined by the jury, in addition to reinstatement of employment and benefits, front pay, liquidated damages, attorney fees, and educational training for supervisors.

The State appealed. In a separate proceeding, we granted the State's motion to stay the judgment pending this appeal. We transferred the case to the court of appeals. The court of appeals determined that Congress validly exercised its power in Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment to abrogate the State's immunity to suit under the self-care provision of the FMLA. It further found the State impliedly waived its immunity to suit through the actions of the executive branch in allowing State employees FMLA leave.

The State requested further review, which we granted. We subsequently held the case in abeyance pending a decision by the Supreme Court of the United States in Coleman v. Court of Appeals of Maryland, ––– U.S. ––––, 132 S.Ct. 1327, 182 L.Ed.2d 296 (2012).

II. Standard of Review.

We review a district court's decision to deny a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict for errors at law. Van Sickle Constr. Co. v. Wachovia Commercial Mortg., Inc., 783 N.W.2d 684, 687 (Iowa 2010). In reviewing the court's decision, we must determine whether sufficient evidence existed to justify submitting the case to the jury at the conclusion of the trial. Id. We view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Id.

III. Discussion.

The Family and Medical Leave Act was enacted by Congress in 1993. Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, Pub.L. No. 103–3, 107 Stat. 6 (1993) (codified at 29 U.S.C. ch. 28). It entitles eligible employees to take unpaid leave from their jobs for a number of qualifying reasons for a period of up to twelve work weeks each year with guaranteed job protection. 29 U.S.C.A. § 2612(a)(1) (West, Westlaw through P.L. 112–104 (excluding P.L. 112–96 and 112–102)).² The first three reasons that permit leave are typically collectively referred to as the “family-care provisions.” They authorize a worker to take leave to care for family members during the birth and care of a child, adoption of or foster care of a child, or care of a spouse, child, or parent who has a “serious health condition.” The fourth reason is referred to as the “self-care provision.” It allows an employee to take leave due to the employee's own “serious health condition” that makes the employee unable to perform the functions of his or her job.

The Act also creates a private right of action for employees to sue employers in court for violating the...