Lee v. State
Decision Date | 03 January 1962 |
Docket Number | No. A-8484,A-8484 |
Citation | 352 S.W.2d 724,163 Tex. 89 |
Parties | M. W. LEE, Petitioner, v. STATE of Texas, Respondent. |
Court | Texas Supreme Court |
Davis, Kee & Thomas, Angleton, for petitioner.
Will Wilson, Atty. Gen., J. Arthur Sandlin, Asst. Atty. Gen., Joe G. Davis, Huntsville, for respondent.
The controlling question in this case relates to the constitutionality of that portion of Senate Bill No. 317 of the Acts of the Regular Session of the 56th Legislature (Acts 1959, ch. 201, p. 472) which purports to authorize the Texas Board of Corrections to condemn certain lands in Brazoria County, Texas. The caption of the Act reads as follows:
'An Act concerning State prison lands in Brazoria County; and declaring an emergency.'
Petitioner here asserts that insofar as the power to condemn lands is concerned, this caption is patently insufficient to meet the requirements of Article 3, § 35 of the Texas Constitution, Vernon's Ann.St. which provides that:
We agree with petitioner's contention.
The trial court held for the condemnee Lee (petitioner here) upon the ground that certain jurisdictional requirements prescribed by Article 3264, Vernon's Ann.Tex.Stats., had not been met. The Court of Civil Appeals correctly held that the trial court erred in the particular mentioned, but in reversing the judgment of the trial court the Court of Civil Appeals overruled Lee's contention based upon Article 3, § 35 of the Constitution. See State v. Lee, 346 S.W.2d 498.
Section 1 of Senate Bill No. 317 authorizes the Texas Board of Corrections to sell and convey certain described land in Brazoria County. Section 2 of the Act provides that the Board shall have the right to acquire the surface estate in several described tracts by eminent domain. Nine separate tracts are described, including two tracts belonging to the petitioner. These tracts lie within the limits of the Ramsey State Prison Farm. Section 3 contains the emergency clause which recites that a security hazard exists because of the presence of privately owned tracts within the limits of Ramsey Prison Farm.
The courts have construed Article 3, § 35 of the Constitution upon numerous occasions. As a result, there is an abundance of authority to sustain certain broad, general principles governing its application.
It is well established that the caption of an act should be liberally construed so as to uphold its validity if at all possible. Gulf Insurance Co. v. James, 143 Tex. 424, 185 S.W.2d 966. It has also been said that, 'None of the provisions of a statute should be regarded as unconstitutional when they relate, directly or indirectly, to the same subject, have a mutual connection, and are not foreign to the subject expressed in the title.' Austin v. Gulf, Colorado & Santa Fe R. Co., 45 Tex. 234. So long as the caption states the main subject of an act, it will...
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