Moore v. Edna Hospital District
| Decision Date | 31 December 1969 |
| Docket Number | No. 465,465 |
| Citation | 449 S.W.2d 508 |
| Parties | W. W. MOORE et al., Appellants, v. EDNA HOSPITAL DISTRICT et al., Appellees. . Corpus Christi |
| Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
Vickery & McConnell, Charles R. Vickery, Jr., Houston, William H. Hamblen, Edna, for appellants.
Vinson, Elkins, Weems & Searls, John L. Murchison, Jr., Houston, Thomas R. Bell, Office of Atty. Gen., John W. Fainter, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen., Austin, Anderson, Smith & Null, M. L. Null, Victoria, for appellees.
This case involves a suit for declaratory judgment, for injunctive relief and an alleged election contest. The occurrence made the basis of the case was the creation of the Edna Hospital District by confirmation election on November 11, 1967, in accordance with House Bill 610 as passed by the 60th Legislature of Texas, Regular Session, 1967, effective May 12, 1967, sometimes hereinafter referred to as the Enabling Act. Appellants who are land owners and taxpayers within the Hospital District filed suit in the District Court of Jackson County against the Hospital District and its board of directors, Jackson County and its county judge and other members of the Commissioners' Court, seeking a declaration that the Hospital District was invalid either because its Enabling Act was unconstitutional or because it was not lawfully created. Appellants' petition included alternative pleadings requesting declarations that Jackson County could not tax for hospital purposes and that it be enjoined from doing so if the Hospital District was valid.
The trial court sustained District's plea to the jurisdiction in connection with an alleged election contest and ruled that it would take no further cognizance of the grounds contained in appellants' pleadings which could be asserted and raised in a statutory election contest; and as to such matters appellants' pleadings were dismissed .
The trial court also granted District's motion for summary judgment, which in effect upheld the validity of the District. Interlocutory orders were entered (and later carried forward into the final judgment) which disposed of the controversies between appellants and District. Thereafter, the controversy between appellants and County was tried before the judge and an empaneled jury. When the evidence was closed the trial court withdrew the case from the jury and held in favor of County on the question of its right to levy and collect ad valorem taxes on all property in Jackson County for the purpose of maintaining and supporting the County Hospital located at Ganado, Texas, outside the boundaries of the Edna Hospital District.
The final judgment entered by the trial court, which denied the relief sought by appellants, contained the following recitations:
'It is further ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED by the Court that a declaratory judgment should be rendered as follows:
(1) Jackson County has the right to assess and collect ad valorem taxes on all property in Jackson County for the purpose of maintaining and supporting the County Hospital located at Ganado, Texas.
(2) The Edna Hospital District has been lawfully created and has a lawful existence.
(3) The Enabling Act for the Edna Hospital District is valid and constitutional.
(4) The Edna Hospital District has authority to levy taxes and to issue bonds for hospital purposes and medical care within the boundaries of the District.'
We agree with the trial court's holdings hereinabove set out for the reasons hereinafter to be stated and affirm the judgment.
Appellants assert ten points of error. We will consider the contentions made thereunder in three groups as follows: Group One, involving appellants' contentions that the District Enabling Act is an unconstitutional local and special law prohibited by Art. III, Section 56 of the Texas Constitution, Vernon's Ann.St.; that the notice to apply for the enabling law required by Art. III, Sec. 57 of the Texas Constitution was insufficient; that the title of the Enabling Act is insufficient; and that the Enabling Act conflicts with the Texas Constitution's 'outstanding indebtedness' assumption requirement. Group Two, involving appellants' contentions concerning an alleged election contest; and particularly that appellants duly complied with the notice requirements of the Texas Election Code, Art. 9.03, V.A.T.S. Group Three, involving appellants' contentions that the judgment unlawfully subjects appellants' land to double taxation for hospitals by the County and District; and that the Enabling Act conflicts with the constitutional prohibition of double taxation.
The background facts may be summarized as follows: On November 11, 1967 the qualified voters of the District voted 655 to 332 for the creation of the Edna Hospital District and for approval of bonds for the building and operation of the hospital. Theretofore, special notice had been given to the residents of the proposed district (on December 29, 1966 and January 5, 12 and 19, 1967) that the Legislature was considering a Bill for the creation of the Edna Hospital District. On May 12, 1967, pursuant to Art. IX, Sec. 9 of the Texas Constitution, the Legislature enacted the Enabling Act here in question, the same being a prerequisite to the creation of District. Texas Laws 1967, Chap. 172, p. 355; Art. 4494q, V.A.C.S. On November 13, 1967 the Commissioners Court of Jackson County, Texas convened in regular session and 'approved as canvassed' the elections of November 11, 1967. The Commissioners Court ordered that the returns of the election be entered in the election return records of the County Clerk's Office. Thereafter, Mr. John W. Fainter, Jr., Head of the Municipal Bond and Charitable Trust Division for the Attorney General of Texas, requested preparation of a nunc pro tunc order canvassing the returns of the election for entry by the Commissioners Court of Jackson County, Texas. This order was duly entered on March 11, 1968, 'Nunc Pro Tunc for the 13th day of November, 1967.' Prior to the filing of appellants' suit the Attorney General of Texas had given preliminary approval to the bonds of District. Final approval was subject to receipt by the Attorney General of a non-litigation certificate and examination of bonds. After institution of the instant suit the Attorney General advised District that its bonds would not be approved until such time as a final judgment favorable to their issuance had been rendered. This action appears to be in accord with long standing policy of the Attorney General and does not reflect a view as to the merits of this suit. The preliminary approval of the bonds by the Attorney General did, however, reflect his views concerning the validity of the District in the absence of litigation.
We agree with District that appellants' Group One contentions are without merit. Appellants argue primarily that the Enabling Act creating the Edna Hospital District is the type of 'local or special law' condemned by Art. III, Sec. 56, Texas Constitution. That provision prohibits certain types of local or special laws 'except as otherwise provided in this Constitution.' Appellee District takes the position that in any event the Enabling Act is expressly permitted by Art. IX, Sec. 9, Texas Constitution, which in part provides as follows:
'The Legislature may by law provide for the creation, establishment, maintenance and operation of hospital districts composed of one or more counties or all or any part of one or more counties * * *.'
The question of whether an Enabling Act passed pursuant to Art. IX, Sec. 9, Texas Constitution is an unconstitutional 'local or special law' has apparently not been heretofore considered by any Texas appellate court. However, in Sweeny Hospital District v. Carr, 378 S.W.2d 40 (Tex.Sup.1964) our Supreme Court examined certain phases of that provision. Although the question here presented was not before the Court in Sweeny, it is apparent that the court understood that the Enabling Acts passed pursuant to Art. IX, Sec. 9, Tex.Const., were local or special laws. The court there reviewed the history of a series of amendments to Art. IX of the Texas Constitution authorizing creation of hospital districts with power to levy taxes and issue bonds and in part held as follows:
'Whereas all of the other hospital district amendments are local in scope, Sec. 9, Article 9 is general in scope. It empowers the Legislature to provide by law 'for the creation, establishment, maintenance and operation of hospital districts composed of one or more counties or all or any part of one or more counties with power to issue bonds' for the purchase, construction, etc. of hospitals and with authority to levy annual taxes at a rate not to exceed 75cents on the $100.00 valuation of property to meet the district's bond requirements, the indebtedness assumed by it, and maintenance and operating expenses. No authorizing election is required by the amendment for the issuance of bonds or the assumption of indebtedness, but it provides that 'such district shall not be created or such tax authorized unless approved by a majority of the Qualified property taxpaying electors thereof voting at an election called for the purpose."
Art. IX, Sec. 9, Texas Constitution does not limit the Legislature to either general or special laws in the creation of hospital districts. In our opinion such districts may be created by either type of enactment. The nature of hospital districts to be created in limited areas, particularly where only a county or a portion of one county is involved, may be and usually is basically local in character. The operation of such hospital district may be confined to a fixed part of the State territory over which legislative jurisdiction is exercised.
Appellants rely in part on Smith v. Davis, 426 S.W.2d 827 (Tex.Sup .Ct., 1968). That case concerned a hospital district created under general...
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